FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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BISMARCK'S LEGACY

By G. P. Gooch

MAKERS of history from Julius Caesar to Adolf Hitler and Winston Churchill have felt an urge to write about themselves, to explain to posterity what they have done and tried to do, to justify the use they have made of their power, to cast the blame on others for what went wrong. Bismarck's apologia stands at the top of the list of political autobiographies, not merely because he is the greatest man who ever wrote a full-length narrative of his public career, and not merely owing to the earth-shaking events it describes, but because its utility as a manual of statesmanship is unsurpassed. It produces an almost overwhelming sense of power. So long as rulers desire guidance on the discharge of their perilous duties, and so long as students seek to unravel the tangled skein of European diplomacy, his volumes are likely to be read. Compared with their dynamic force and their majestic sweep, the lengthy narratives of Guizot and Bülow seem commonplace enough. Is it an exaggeration to describe the Iron Chancellor's political testament as the most authoritative treatise on the art of government since the "Prince" of Machiavelli? As a factual record and interpretation of events it is as open to criticism as any other work of its class. Its unique significance lies not only in the visualization of the greatest figure of the nineteenth century except Napoleon, but in the maxims it enunciates and the warnings it suggests.

Some of the most celebrated books in the world owe their origin to the accident of their authors' fall from power. It is unusual for a superman such as Frederick the Great to compile a large-scale record of his achievements amid the turmoil of the daily task. Clarendon's two masterpieces were the fruits of his earlier and later exile. Napoleon needed the boredom of St. Helena to dictate his fragmentary reminiscences. Émile Ollivier compiled the 16 volumes of "L'Empire Libéral" when the débâcle of 1870 terminated his brief political career. Differing widely in their importance, these and other writings of the same class have a family resemblance in their pose of superiority and injured innocence.

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When the most famous and powerful performer on the world stage found himself at the age of 75 in the ranks of the unemployed, he determined to fight his battles over again. "I cannot lie down like a hibernating bear," he exclaimed in the bitterness of his heart. It was no sudden resolve, for when he was contemplating retirement in 1877 he planned to write his memoirs and determined that Lothar Bucher should lend his aid. When the blow fell in the spring of 1890 no time was lost. Accepting a tempting offer from Cotta of 100,000 marks per volume, he summoned his veteran associate of the Foreign Office, who, unlike the crafty Holstein, had remained loyal when the shadows began to fall. Busch and Poschinger coveted the job, but Bucher was clearly the better man. Encouraged not only by his indefatigable collaborator, who resided for long periods at Friedrichsruh and Varzin and sorted out the available materials, but also by his son Herbert, the old warrior dictated fragmentary reminiscences and musings when he felt in the mood, which "the pearl," as his employer called him, arranged in chapters. It was uphill work, for he kept irregular hours and—in his secretary's view—wasted a great deal of time over the newspapers. Since he trusted to memory and possessed few works of reference, the first draft swarmed with errors which it was Bucher's task to rectify by visits to the libraries of Berlin. When *Buchlein,* as the faithful old scribe was named by Princess Bismarck, passed away in October 1892, the foundations of the massive edifice had been laid. In the following year the first section was set up in type and served as a basis for the revisions which continued till the end.

The circumstances of its composition are reflected in the character of the work. It bears little resemblance to the comprehensive apologias whose authors possessed ample documentary materials and told their tale in orderly sequence from beginning to end. The original title "Erinnerungen und Gedanken" was restored in the critical edition published in 1937 as Volume XV of the "Gesammelte Werke," edited by Gerhard Ritter. The first two volumes, which appeared immediately after his death in 1898 under the auspices of Horst Kohl, the editor of his collected speeches, close with the brief reign of the Emperor Frederick, and are immeasurably superior to the scolding supplement which could not emerge till the Hohenzollern Empire was swept away in 1918. The narrative of his fall, which forms its exclusive theme, was dictated in 1891 when the smart of the wound was fresh, and, like

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the later performance of Bülow, damages the author at least as much as the ruler whom both of them had served and despised.

William II is far from being Bismarck's only *bête noire*. Though the picture of his modest old master William I is painted with affectionate gratitude and is essentially true to life, and that of the Crown Prince Frederick is friendlier than was expected, his comments on rivals and enemies, among them the Empress Augusta, Count Harry Arnim and Gortchakoff, are vitiated by the exasperation of Prometheus chained to his rock. His vendettas had always been too violent to be hidden, and the self-portrait would have been unconvincing had the tiger's claws been kept out of sight. The faults of temperament which impair the authority of the book as a contribution to history and compel us to check every verdict by independent evidence enhance its value as a revelation of personality. Here is the whole authentic superman of blood and iron, fighting with the gloves off as he had fought all his life, hating and thundering to the last. In Meinecke's phrase the work is a wood of natural growth, not a well laid out park. No effort is made to cover the whole of the ground, for the main theme is foreign affairs. Domestic issues play a subordinate rôle, and economic problems are almost entirely ignored. Though on the whole he has been fortunate in his biographers, from Lenz and Marcks to Arnold Oskar Meyer and Erich Eyck, none of them—not even Busch—brings the reader so close to his innermost heart as his own dictated record, and none of them leaves such an impression of elemental greatness of brain and will. "Not a work of art," is the verdict of Marcks, "but it is Bismarck."

II

Political apologias are not history but contributions to history. The least arresting portion of the narrative is the analysis of home affairs, which is largely a running fight with his foes. Such major controversies and achievements of his later years as the nationalization of railways, the tariff of 1879, the duel with the Socialists and the foundation of the Welfare State are described with tantalizing brevity, and their lowly place indicates that foreign affairs dominated his thoughts till the end. The only domestic issue which receives fairly extensive treatment is the *Kulturkampf*, which is partially explained by the fact that his campaign against the Vatican was primarily a drive against the Poles. The

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first half of his public life was spent in founding the Reich, the second in combating disruptive elements—and their friends beyond the frontier—which seemed to threaten its cohesion. His methods in the later period were as ruthless as in the former. Political foes became personal foes. Throughout the book there are more broadsides than bouquets. When the failure of the *Kulturkampf* became obvious he made his peace with Leo XIII and drove his Kultus-Minister Falk like a scapegoat into the wilderness. Few would include magnanimity among the virtues of the founder of the German Empire.

The author skims lightly over his early years, and the narrative becomes dramatic only with his election to the United Landtag of 1847, when he emerged as the spokesman of the extreme Right. It was the era of Frederick William IV, the Hohenzollern Hamlet —more nerves than muscle, it was said—who is always mentioned with political disapproval and personal respect. During the first four years of his public life Bismarck's aim was to preserve the royal authority against the encroachments of the March revolution and the timidity of the ruler himself, not because he believed, like his master, in Divine Right, but because he regarded the dynasty as the core of the national strength. "The unlimited authority of the old Prussian Monarchy was not, and is not, the final word of my convictions," he wrote at the close of his life. "Absolutism primarily demands impartiality, honesty, devotion to duty, energy, and inward humility in the ruler. These may be present, and yet male and female favorites (in the best case the wife), the monarch's own vanity and accessibility to flattery will nevertheless diminish the fruits of his good intentions, since he is not omniscient and cannot have an equal understanding of all branches of his office. My ideal has always been a monarchy so far controlled by an independent national representation, preferably of classes or professions, so that neither Monarch nor Parliament could separately alter the position." Though a Junker by birth and tradition, his political ideology was much more modern than that of his old friend Roon and his neighbors in the Mark.

In the second or Frankfurt period Bismarck's task as Prussian envoy to the Diet was to establish the equality of Prussia with Austria in the Deutscher Bund. A meeting between the aged Metternich, returning to Austria from exile in 1851, and the newly appointed Prussian envoy to the Diet symbolizes the coming shift of power in the second half of the century from Vienna to

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Berlin. In the emotional reaction against Germany engendered by two world wars there has been a tendency to discover virtues in the Bund which were scarcely perceptible in the exhilarating era of unification. It would have been wiser, it is argued, to continue the Austro-Prussian partnership established after the fall of Napoleon than to unleash a series of wars and to Prussianize Germany. This partial revival of the *Grossdeutsch* doctrine of Constantine Frantz ignores the hunger for a nation-state which was felt with equal intensity during the same era in Italy and the Balkans. Bismarck's dispatches from Frankfurt, published by himself with some omissions in the later years of his Chancellorship, record his slow conversion to the belief that the Bund was an empty shell which barred the way to nationhood. "I had come to Frankfurt well disposed towards Austria. The insight into Schwarzenberg's policy of *avilir puis démolir,* which I there obtained by documentary evidence, dispelled my youthful illusions. The Gordian knot was not to be untied by the gentle methods of dual policy, and could only be cut by the sword." In Germany, he declared, there was no room for both. It was equally clear that far-reaching changes were impracticable so long as Frederick William IV sat on the throne, since in his eyes the predominance of the Hapsburgs in the Bund was as axiomatic as the Christian creeds. Part of Bismarck's intellectual equipment for the tasks of diplomacy was his sense of timing. In his own expressive phrase, it is no good putting forward the hands of the clock for it will not go faster at your bidding.

The most notable lesson he learned during his third phase—in the Embassy at St. Petersburg—was the necessity of covering the Prussian flank in the event of a conflict in central or western Europe. "It was not, and it is not, in our interest to stand in the way of Russia turning her surplus forces towards the East. In our position we ought to rejoice whenever we find Powers in whom we encounter no sort of competition of political interests, as in this case, so far, with us and Russia. With France we shall never have peace, with Russia never the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders spoil the situation."

When Bismarck was called to the helm by King William in 1862 at the age of 47 his program was ready: to challenge the status quo in central Europe, if necessary at the price of war with the Hapsburg Empire and its friends in the Bund; to create a nation-state under the Hohenzollerns as Cavour had just ac-

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complished for the House of Savoy; to prepare for all eventualities by strengthening the Army; to avoid trouble with Russia by tolerating her plans in the Balkans. England hardly came into the picture, for her ambitions were oversea. The pregnant chapter entitled "Retrospect of Prussian Policy" is a dirge on lost opportunities. Frederick the Great left behind him a rich inheritance and a belief in Prussian policy and power. "Since his death our policy had either lacked definite aims or chosen or pursued them unskilfully." In the words of Queen Luise, Prussia had gone to sleep on the laurels of her greatest king. At last, just a century after the close of the Seven Years War, a man was found to stretch the bow of Ulysses. "Real responsibility in high politics can only be undertaken by a single directing Minister, not by numerous boards with majority voting." The King's assent to a spirited program was secured during a conversation in the train between Jüterbog and Berlin after the "blood and iron" speech in the Budget Commission had echoed round the globe. Bismarck's hour was about to strike with the synchronization of a resolute monarch on the throne, his old friend Roon at the War Office, and Moltke, the "battle-thinker," waiting in the wings.

The narrative of the wars of unification forms the kernel of the book. Before 1866, we are assured, Prussia could claim the title of a Great Power only *cum grano salis*. Why should such humiliation continue when the balance of forces had changed? "To reach my goal—North Germany under Prussian leadership," he informed a French journalist on the eve of the struggle, "I would face anything, exile, even the scaffold." The stricken field of Königgrätz shattered the Bund, created a North German Confederation under Prussian leadership, and pointed towards a united Reich. He had staked his physical as well as his political survival on a throw of the iron dice, for defeat would have involved his suicide. A crucial factor was Francis Joseph's decision for dynastic reasons to entrust the command in Bohemia, where victory was problematical, to Benedek, who was ignorant of the terrain, while the command in Italy, where victory was reasonably certain, was given to the Archduke Charles.

If luck aided the Prussian cause on the battlefield, it was due to Bismarck alone that the fruits of victory could be gathered in. The chapter entitled "Nikolsburg" describes his desperate struggle for a generous peace. Difficult though he had found it to persuade his master to fight Austria for the leadership of Ger-

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many, it proved still harder to hold him back when the fumes of victory mounted to his head. For three days he wrestled with the old monarch, and so painful was the scene that the man of iron nerve left the room and burst into a paroxysm of tears. The ruler's opposition was only overcome with the aid of the Crown Prince, and he grudgingly consented to what he denounced as a disgraceful peace. Bismarck's finest hour was not the proclamation of the Empire in the Galérie des Glaces, but his decision not to turn a defeated rival into an irreconcilable foe. No annexations, no triumphal parade through the streets of Vienna, no crushing indemnity! Austria had been expelled from the Bund. The paralyzing dualism was over. "All we wanted was a free hand in Germany." Why should he encourage the Hapsburgs to look towards Paris or St. Petersburg by imposing needless humiliations? Austria's feelings were further spared by his refusal to punish her South German allies by merging them in Prussia as urged by the fiery young Treitschke, "the Bismarck of the Chair." Thirteen years later his foresight was vindicated by the conclusion of the Dual Alliance.

In a striking little book, "Bismarcks Friedensschlüsse," Johannes Haller, best known as the biographer of Eulenburg, pronounces the Treaty of Prague not only the wisest of his settlements but as the perfect model for statesmen. Magnanimity played no part in it for the Chancellor was the least sentimental of men; his moderation was the result of the coolest calculation. "It was already quite clear to me that we should have to defend the conquests of the campaign in future wars. I did not doubt that a Franco-German war must take place before a United Germany could be achieved." His next task was to postpone the conflict till Germany became strong enough to meet the challenge. Among other steps was the inclusion of adult male suffrage in the constitution for the new North German Confederation. "Put the German people in the saddle and they will show they can ride," he exclaimed. The autobiography confesses that it was a war measure designed to deter foreign monarchs from sticking their fingers into the German pie.

If the "Nikolsburg" chapter exhibits the master of statecraft, the story of the Ems telegram reveals the cunning of the fox. France, he declares with truth, had no title to interfere with Spain's choice of a Hohenzollern for the vacant throne. "Politically I was tolerably indifferent to the whole question." That she

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would object to a Francophil Hohenzollern he could not anticipate. As a matter of fact she did not really object, for Spain in her irrevocable decline could never again be a danger, and the Emperor, jealous of the growing might of Prussia since 1866, seized the pretext to unleash a war. This version sounded plausible till the diaries of King Carol of Rumania and other publications revealed that he had dispatched a secret agent to Madrid to encourage the project, the probable consequences of which he foresaw and designed. "A trap for Napoleon," commented Lothar Bucher, who knew the truth. Whether the author was deliberately lying or his usually tenacious memory had failed is anybody's guess.

After securing the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature Napoleon III demanded a promise that it would never be renewed, thereby presenting his antagonist with the winning card. Abeken's report of the interview between Benedetti, the French Ambassador, and the King at Ems reached the Chancellor when Roon and Moltke were his guests at dinner, and the narrative of the "editing" of the telegram forms the most thrilling episode in the book. "Now it has a different ring," commented Moltke; "it sounded like a parley; now it is like a flourish in answer to a challenge." No alteration of the text had been made, but skilful abbreviation had changed its tone. Bismarck's action is defended by Marcks as a legitimate reply to a challenge which ought never to have been made, but foreign opinion has almost unanimously condemned it as a discreditable trick. He was proud of his handiwork, which was promptly published and produced the desired result of a French declaration of war. In a celebrated passage he describes the change of mood from gloom to gaiety produced on his guests. They knew that the Prussian army was ready and that the South German states would help; and the Chancellor had arranged that France should find no allies. Austria's defeat was too recent for her to burn her fingers again, and Russia had been squared by encouraging her to denounce the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. England, connected with Germany by close dynastic ties, had no reason to keep Napoleon III on his throne. Italy had received Venetia from her Prussian ally in 1866, and a Franco-German war would ensure the evacuation of Rome by the French garrison and the end of the temporal power of the Pope. Diplomati-

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cally the road was clear, and the military conflict proceeded according to plan. The chapter on Versailles is disappointing, with growls at the Generals for conspiring to exclude the Chancellor from military decisions, at his master for reluctance to accept the Imperial title, and at "the royal ladies" for striving to influence their husbands to be lenient to France.

When the nation-state was founded it had to be maintained. *Wir sind satt,* declared the master-builder; but other Powers were not, and he had to reckon with the resentments of the states which had felt his heavy hand. His system of insurance was as consummate an achievement as the creation of the Reich. His task would have been easier had not his desire to content himself with Alsace been overruled by his master and the Generals on the ground that a portion of Lorraine was essential to national defense. Here was his one major error as a diplomatist. "I do not want too many Frenchmen in my house," he remarked, and French-speaking Lorraine was to prove as indigestible as Polish Prussia. It is arguable that French sentiment might gradually have been reconciled to the loss of Alsace, all the more since she was allowed to retain Belfort; but the Chancellor realized that the annexation of Lorraine inflicted a wound too deep to heal. His excuse is that he had stood up to his master and the Generals in 1866 and could not face an even sterner ordeal. Moreover the danger of France finding an ally, he believed, would be less under a Republic than under a Catholic Monarchy which might perhaps attract the support of the Austrian Emperor and count on the sympathy of the Vatican, the incurable hostility of which to the new Protestant Empire is repeatedly proclaimed. Accordingly he endeavored to distract the gaze of Frenchmen from "the gap in the Vosges" by encouraging them to seek compensation in a colonial empire.

Since France could never launch another attack without an ally she had to be kept in quarantine, which was only possible if no other Great Power needed her help. The rumor that Bismarck was ready to fall on her in 1875 when she was beginning to recover her breath is angrily dismissed as a lie invented by Gortchakoff, who resented German hegemony in Europe. The soldiers, it is true, favored a preventive war, and the Chancellor himself was momentarily alarmed by certain military measures beyond the Rhine, but neither he nor

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his master had the slightest intention to draw the German sword. With England there would be no difficulty, for she did not make alliances and Bismarck craved neither colonies nor a fleet. The new Kingdom of Italy, weak as it was, had no reason to quarrel with Berlin. Austria, smarting under the humiliation of 1866, required watching, but her rivalry with Russia in the Near East placed a brake on her ambitions in Central Europe. For the remainder of his official life the Chancellor's chief anxiety was to prevent Russia and Austria flying at each other's throats. When Alexander II inquired what Germany would do in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, he was informed that it was Germany's interest that neither combatant should be so weakened as to endanger its status as a Great Power: in other words, he refused a promise of neutrality. This was not enough for the Tsar, and Bismarck's detached attitude as "honest broker" at and after the Congress of Berlin increased his resentment. So menacing indeed was his language that in 1879 the Chancellor found Austria willing to make the defensive alliance of which he had dreamed. At last the feud between Hohenzollerns and Hapsburgs which began with the seizure of Silesia in 1740 was closed. Andrassy's refusal to extend the promise of mutual assistance to cover an attack by France was a disappointment though hardly a surprise. The Dual Alliance was transformed into the Triple Alliance in 1882 by the adhesion of Italy who dreaded a clash with France over African colonies.

Confronted with an Austro-German bastion stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic, the Tsar changed his tune, and in 1881 Bismarck's loftiest aim was realized in the Three Emperors League which was renewed in 1884 for a further three years. When it broke down in 1887 over Austro-Russian friction about Bulgaria the old chess-player concluded a secret treaty of neutrality with Russia for three years. Nothing scared him except "the nightmare of coalitions," and it was an axiom of his diplomacy to have only one potential enemy at a time. In these delicate manœuvres, on which the security first of Prussia and then of the Reich depended, he was a virtuoso. "In Egypt I am English," he declared; "in Bulgaria I am Russian." The Balkans were "not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." So anxious was he to avert a collision with Russia that he would not grudge her Constantinople,

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which had been her dream ever since Catherine the Great. That the first symptoms of a Franco-Russian rapprochement were already visible on the eve of his fall is true enough, but they materialized only when his Reinsurance Treaty of 1887 was scrapped. When the Franco-Russian alliance was announced in 1895 he fired a broadside at the Emperor and his advisers by revealing the pact of 1887 and its lapse on the morrow of his fall. His death in 1898, the year of the first Navy Law, spared him the grief of witnessing the estrangement of England which paved the way to the Triple Entente.

III

The lessons of Bismarck's political testament and unique career fall into two classes: those which concern statesmen of all times, and those specifically addressed to his own countrymen. The most important in the first category is enshrined in his celebrated aphorism: "Politics are the art of the possible," by which he meant the meticulous adjustment of ends to means. *Qui trop embrasse mal étreint.* Though nothing appears so obvious as the need for horse sense on the stony paths of *haute politique,* no maxim has proved more difficult to apply by those who scale the giddy summits of power. The difference between practicable aims and *Caesarenwahnsin* was sharply illustrated by the careers of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. The former staked his fortunes on the seizure of Silesia, which events were to prove within his capacity to accomplish and retain. Though he cherished and fulfilled other territorial ambitions, he never dreamed of fighting for them. Napoleon, on the other hand, intoxicated by his early victories in Italy, followed his delusive star and ended at St. Helena. The contrasted experiences of Bismarck and Hitler tell a similar tale. The former set out with a bold but limited resolve and when he reached his goal he sheathed the sword. It was not a case of the Prussian eagle borrowing the silky plumes of a dove, but a clear-eyed perception that there were limits to the strength of the Reich. Preventive wars he repudiated on the ground that no mortal could read the cards of Providence. The outstanding figure of the era of nationalism was neither an imperialist, for he never desired to impose German rule on alien races, nor a Pan-German, since he never aspired to bring all Germans into one fold. So long as he remained at the helm it could not be seriously argued that the new Reich had misused its

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strength. Hitler, on the other hand, neurotic, inexperienced, and trusting to his intuitions, was spurred forward by ambition as insatiable as that of Napoleon, and even before his appointment as Chancellor he confided to Rauschning his fantastic dreams. Like Napoleon he never—in Byron's words—learned "that tempted fate will leave the loftiest star."

From this general principle of limiting risks stemmed a salutary exhortation to his countrymen, whose recurring temptation, located at the center of the European chessboard without natural frontiers, has been to hit out in all directions. During the medieval *Kaiserzeit* it was an urge to the south, in the twentieth century the call of East and West. A weak and divided Germany has always been a tempting bait to greedy neighbors, a united and powerful Germany a potential threat. Though Bismarck solemnly adjured her rulers to avoid the simultaneous estrangement of East and West, the warning was in vain. In that well-organized state, it has been remarked, there was anarchy at the top. While Tirpitz, bent on challenging Britain's naval predominance, urged the covering of the German flank through an understanding with Russia, Bethmann advocated friendly relations with England as a condition of forward moves in the Middle East. Both policies had their advantages and their risks, and a choice should have been made between them, but there was no Bismarck to make it. Had he revisited the scenes of his triumphs in the opening decade of the twentieth century, he would have been appalled by the transformation of a friendly England and a neutral Russia into potential foes. Had he returned for a second time at the close of the second decade, he would have pointed in grief and anger to the result of a policy of uninsurable risks. Like the Emperor Augustus after the defeat of Varus in the battle of the Teutoburger Wald, he might have murmured: "Give me back my legions."

Statesmen can learn much of their trade in Bismarck's school but not the whole. *Raison d'état* is a polite name for an ugly thing—the divorce of politics from morals. This gospel of anarchy, formulated though not invented by Machiavelli, has been practised, if not always professed, by men of all races, all creeds, by good and bad alike. "If I see my opportunity," exclaimed Frederick the Great when the sudden death of the Emperor Charles VI opened the road to Breslau, "shall I not take it?" Napoleon dismissed as *idéologues* men who, as he believed, refused to look facts in the face. In the latter half of the nineteenth century

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Cavour and Bismarck played the familiar game with complete lack of moral scruple and with consummate skill. "If we did for ourselves what we do for our country," remarked the maker of United Italy, "what rascals we should be." Among the most successful of his stratagems was the dispatch of a beautiful countess to win the support of Napoleon III in expelling the Austrians from Lombardy. Though Bismarck stressed the importance of *imponderabilia,* when the right hour struck he acted and let the world say what it liked. It is an error to regard Prussia as more of an aggressor than Piedmont and Bismarck as morally inferior to Cavour. It was not till the shattering experience of the First World War revealed the insufficiency of the sovereign state in an increasingly interdependent world that Woodrow Wilson, General Smuts, Lord Cecil and other practical idealists launched a crusade for a system which seemed to promise less tragic results.

A second weakness in Bismarckian statesmanship was his neglect to train his countrymen for self-government. His grant of adult male suffrage suggested confidence in their wisdom and patriotism; but the Reichstag proved—and was intended to prove—little more than a fig-leaf, to use Liebknecht's drastic expression, to cover the nakedness of autocracy. That the power of the purse might have been put to better use is true enough, but the core of the constitution was the retention of final decisions in non-elective hands. A further bar to the democratization of Germany was the maintenance of the Three Class voting system invented by Frederick William IV for Prussia, which contained two-thirds of the population of the Reich and in which the rapidly growing army of urban workers did not count. So obsessed was Bismarck by the principle of undivided responsibility that, though he was prepared to admit to office Bennigsen, the trusty leader of the National Liberals, he declined the request to bring two of his Parliamentary colleagues with him, and the project of broadening the basis of government was dropped. When the Hohenzollern Empire fell with a crash in 1918 the problems of Weimar Germany had to be faced by amateurs.

It was not solely the fault of the Chancellor, for there was little demand for parliamentary government except among the Socialists and the Radicals. Collaboration worked well enough in South Germany, but the Emperor, the army chief, the Junkers and the great industrialists of the Rhineland objected to entrusting the proletariat with a substantial share of power. Conservative his-

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torians such as Hans Delbrück and Adalbert Wahl regarded the Bismarckian Constitution as a model blending of popular representation with an irremovable executive, thus ensuring continuity in foreign policy and national defense. Liberal scholars, on the other hand, such as Ziekursch and Erich Eyck, censure him for ignoring the world-wide demand for parliamentary government. He could not live forever, and no other superman was in sight. Officials nominated or dominated by the ruler are as liable to make mistakes as Ministers responsible to Parliament.

Bismarck bequeathed to his grateful countrymen a superb inheritance: a nation-state, a Triple Alliance to ensure its safety, a federal constitution which satisfied the rulers of the component states, the beginnings of social security, colonial territory, and a prestige unknown since the Emperor Barbarossa. Almost all these assets were thrown away by the shortsighted successors who forgot that politics are the art of the possible. It is one of the ironies of history that his most enduring monument should be a book which would never have been written but for the accident of his dismissal. The action of a young ruler, so hotly resented by his victim, unwittingly set the seal on his immeasurable renown.

Bismarck spoke disdainfully of "Professor Gladstone," but are the practitioners of Realpolitik as much wiser as they believe? Their weakness is to think too much of immediate returns and too little of the long-range results of their hammer strokes. Vast and splendid as was his intellect, he could see nothing and imagine nothing beyond the sovereign state pursuing exclusively its own supposed interests. Europe was only a geographical expression. The vision of an organized world, an international order resting on a willing partnership of self-governing national units, was beyond his ken. The presupposition of all profitable political and economic planning is a firm grasp of the unity of civilization. To the shaping of the human spirit for that supreme adventure of the human spirit he contributed nothing. He labored exclusively for his countrymen—first for Prussia and later for a Prussianized Reich—and was satisfied with their applause. In a word, he dates, for we have learned by bitter experience that nationalism is not enough. Yet the twentieth century will have little right to throw stones at the nineteenth until all the Great Powers begin to operate a system more conducive to human welfare than that which the Iron Chancellor practised and preached.

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GERMANY AND EUROPE

The German Social Democratic Program

By Carlo Schmid

OBSERVERS abroad often identify the German unions with the Social Democratic Party and sometimes suppose that statements made by union officials can form the basis for conclusions regarding the attitude of German workers toward problems of foreign policy. Both assumptions are incorrect.

Contrary to the situation in Great Britain, where the unions are an integral part of the Labor Party, the German Federation of Unions (*Gewerkschaftsbund*) has nothing to do, as an organization, with the Social Democratic Party (S.P.D.). It is true that most of its officials and the core of its members are Social Democrats; but other members, though fewer in number, belong to other parties. Unlike the unions before 1933, the German Federation of Unions is a politically autonomous corporation. Nor do union duties include making decisions on foreign policy. Leading officials will, of course, make comments occasionally on problems in the foreign field. But these commit nobody—neither the union membership nor the political parties—and often are merely isolated personal opinions. Some time ago, when two leading officials of the Federal Board of the unions spoke in favor of the Adenauer Government's remilitarization policy, the industrial unions violently protested; and a recent meeting of union delegates agreed unanimously that foreign policy must be the exclusive concern of the political parties and the Bonn parliament.

The foreign policy of the Social Democratic Party is neither dogmatic nor doctrinaire. It is based on a knowledge of what certain facts may mean for peace and for democracy's chances in Germany and in the world. It is based further on an appraisal of the consequences which, experience teaches, are apt to arise when certain attitudes are adopted. The Party has developed a clear concept of foreign policy from the experience of recent years, and will hold to it so long as new facts do not force a revision of theories hitherto valid. No event, even one of the gravest importance, can alter the S.P.D.'s basic determination to make every

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sacrifice to the law of peace, creative coöperation among nations and the preservation and development of democracy.

II

From the very beginning the S.P.D. has pointed out that the German people must bear the consequences of crimes committed under the Nazi régime and during Hitler's war of aggression. Though it has always opposed the thesis of the German people's collective guilt, it has acknowledged that since they were unable to prevent the government's actions they must be held liable for them. It therefore followed logically that—to give just one example—the S.P.D. was the first German party to demand both publicly and in parliament that the Federal Government acknowledge a special moral and legal obligation to make amends for the terrible injustice done the Jewish people, and recognize in this connection the State of Israel's title to Jewish reparation claims when no individual heir had appeared.

Our Party realizes that so far as the material capabilities of the German people permit, everything possible must be done to liquidate the past. Those material capabilities are limited by the fact that 14,000,000 Germans were expelled from their homes in the East and had to be admitted to Western Germany and provided with the necessities of life. But the S.P.D. has always been equally determined to oppose all Allied measures which it regarded as superfluous and which merely flattered the national egoism of certain Allied Powers while damaging democracy and vital German interests. This explains its struggle against the dismantling of industries, the dismemberment of Germany and all measures that discriminated against the German people.

Furthermore, the S.P.D. has based its foreign policy on the belief that measures to liquidate the past and measures to help build new foundations for the coexistence of nations should be kept strictly apart. Otherwise the political institutions which are to support the European nations in the future will be constructed out of old materials, yesterday will control tomorrow, and what was planned in good faith as new will turn out to be simply old and ominous elements in a new disguise. Take as example the European Defense Community, which together with the Schuman Plan has been called the first step toward a fundamentally new relationship between the European nations and the creation of a new political atmosphere. It has even been represented as the

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nucleus of the United States of Europe. But can it be seriously believed that an institution of this kind should be developed on the principle of how to prevent Germany by verbal prohibition or actual discriminatory measures from damaging her neighbors or from fully developing her own economic potentialities? If so, these "European" institutions will be nothing but the ways and means of old power politics in new form.

It is not enough to fly the European flag when European functions are to be performed. Psychologically it is only natural that in the light of certain experiences with former German governments the neighbors of Germany should wish to protect themselves against a repetition of the past and hence are determined to build their policies on the basis of suspicion of Germany. It is not for us Germans to reproach those who feel thus. But those who declare their intention of building a European community on the basis of a partnership with the Germans must also accept its conditions and consequences. The primary requisite is that they have the courage to establish a political relationship with Germany based on confidence. If this seems to involve accepting too great a responsibility, then so-called European projects had better wait; their time obviously has not yet come. Any other procedure risks compromising the European idea for generations.

These reflections may explain the S.P.D.'s opposition to German participation in projected institutions which appear to be made in the image of new political convictions but actually conceal the machinery of old power politics. This attitude does not derive from nationalism of any sort. The S.P.D. is as internationalist as it ever was or as any Socialist party can be if it is prepared to take responsibility for the fate of the nation to which it belongs. It considers it a mistake to appraise and try to solve political problems solely in the light of national conditions and national interests. It is deeply convinced that the problems of all nations are interdependent and that the only solutions which are useful and can last are those which establish a sound and sensible balance of opposing interests. But it does not admit that nationalism can be conquered by yielding to the nationalist claims of others, even when they sail under an international flag.

The intensity of a nation's democratic way of life is, in the end, nothing but a political expression of its innate self-respect. If a people is forced to resign itself to being treated as a second-class nation or to become a simple object of policy for other nations,

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the period of conquest will create such bitterness in the hearts of later generations that they will open the door to the vicious and poisonous pseudo-religion of National Socialism which caused the world such suffering. The most effective way to prevent this from happening is to have a firm determination not to yield to any circumstances that may destroy the nation's power of self-assertion and capacity for self-respect. These qualities within itself will make it respectful of the rights and interests of others.

I should like to point out here in all seriousness that the victory of freedom in Europe will ultimately depend on whether the German working class can be convinced through fair treatment that it was right in deciding in favor of the West and its way of life. It must never be forgotten that the appeal to the working man's self-respect is the most effective temptation offered from the East. The appeal is false and the German workers know it. But the West should avoid anything that might breed resentment among them and dim the clarity of their convictions.

One of the main sources of evil after the First World War was the fact that the Germans were forced to sign treaties which no nation could have accepted except in the first moments of deepest depression following defeat and which actually obliged them to adopt a foreign policy of revisionism. If for ten years the foreign policy of a great people is concentrated on getting free from their signature the political atmosphere is bound to become poisoned. One side resents the refusal of the other to release him; the other considers the would-be revisionist disloyal, unreliable and troublesome. The consequences are well known.

The S.P.D. has therefore bitterly opposed the Federal Government's signature of agreements which, it feels certain, will be considered inacceptable by the German people in a few years' time. Where it is not yet feasible to negotiate agreements which will be acceptable in the future it would be better to settle for a modus vivendi which, with everybody's consent, should be made subject to the clause *rebus sic stantibus*.

Since the Federal Republic is only a provisional arrangement covering one section of a country it cannot under any condition enter into agreements that would presume to determine the definitive status of all Germany. Agreements of such a kind create a double danger: either they handicap or prevent a reunification of Germany, or it may happen that an all-German parliament might not feel committed to them—and quite legally, too, since

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one part has obviously no right to prejudice the fate of the whole. Neither danger should be risked, for each would be fatal to the world. Every practicable effort should be made to create the necessary conditions for an all-German government as soon as possible; this would obviously be the most wholesome solution because it would open the way to genuine agreements on the status of Germany. Failing this, and until it becomes feasible, one should keep to agreements of a provisional nature. I believe lasting solutions could be reached more quickly and safely by this means than by forced attempts to create something final at the wrong moment.

It should be realized that the S.P.D. is not obsessed with considerations of prestige when it holds that Germany cannot enter long-term and far-ranging commitments so long as the Federal Government is denied sovereignty. In the long run nations will feel a conscious obligation only to commitments which they have entered into in full freedom of decision. The S.P.D. wants the coexistence of nations placed on such solid foundations that the German people may waive parts of their sovereignty without misgivings. This is why it insists that mortgages on German freedom of action be liquidated. A nation cannot be brought into a supranational community through the instrumentality of a third party without risk of becoming a mere object of policy. A free people must have sovereign rights before it can give them up.

Finally, the S.P.D. weighs every political situation and every political project in the light of its possible effects on the strength and determination of the population in the Soviet zone to resist the pressures and temptations of the occupying Power and of its puppet government party. We must not lose sight of the fact that even valiant peoples can become accustomed to terroristic régimes. Occasionally such régimes even acquire involuntary allies—as when certain measures adopted in Western Europe, and particularly in Western Germany, cast doubt on the sincerity of the asserted dogmatic ethos of the Western Powers. The S.P.D. has warned against measures which might have such results and has refused to support those who ignore the warnings.

In particular, the S.P.D. violently opposes one method of negotiation used frequently by the Western Powers—that of "Junctim," signified by the fact that each time the occupying Powers decide to discontinue some regulation which has become unbearable they make the action, entirely appropriate on its own merits,

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subject to the assumption by the Germans of obligations which a free nation would not normally be asked to accept. The rate of industrial dismantling, for instance, had come to be recognized by everybody as senseless and harmful; it was finally altered on condition that the Federal Government accept the Ruhr statute. And now, as I write, West Germany's status as an occupied area is to be revised subject to its joining the European Defense Community. It is sensible enough for a country to enter a commercial treaty only if the other partner simultaneously accepts the same obligations; it is senseless and disastrous if an occupying Power makes long-required adjustments in its relationship with the occupied country subject to the acceptance by its new "partner" of essential features of the occupation régime as voluntary obligations. Few of the many blunders of postwar Allied policy have roused as many German doubts about the sincerity of Allied intentions as this clinging to the "Junctim" method.

The S.P.D. is aware of the important part Germany has to play in these times, since a large number of problems which do not seem to have anything to do with her directly will not be solved as long as her proper place in the political system has not been found. Our party would consider it a grave mistake to assume that the German people have a special "mission" in this world; but Germany has certain functions which if unfulfilled might affect the well-being of other nations and impede the attainment of their aims. Germany obviously does not acquire these functions through her own power but as the result of her relationship with the other nations; and since this relationship varies, the character and potential effects of the functions are liable to vary also. In view of this, the S.P.D. would like to shape Germany's foreign relations so that she can contribute the maximum to order and progress. But a policy so aimed is bound to run into difficulties wherever the position assigned to Germany seems not to be in line with political realities. After all, a nation held below the level of its capabilities is as harmful to the international equilibrium as one which tries to reach beyond its capabilities.

III

These general criteria may help to explain the S.P.D.'s attitude toward various specific factors which will determine the development of Germany's destiny.

Though the S.P.D. would naturally like to see Germany main-

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tain pleasant relations with all nations it feels that there are some nations with whom it is important to establish genuinely good relations prior to others. These are the nations which occupied Germany after the war and still seem to intend to keep her occupied.

The S.P.D. is not anti-Russian. It would like to see the most friendly and prosperous relations established between the German and the Russian peoples. But it is also prepared to fight with all its strength against any attempt to bring Germany under the control of the totalitarian machine which holds the Russian people in its grip. The Party therefore has accepted every hardship involved in the present cold war.

The S.P.D. knows what the American people have done for the German people in the years since the war. It was the first party to welcome the Marshall Plan, without which the German people would have perished. This knowledge leads our party feelings in a special direction. Nor has the S.P.D. forgotten what the United States did during the Berlin blockade—for Berlin and consequently for Germany and for Europe. It recognizes that American policy has been able to prevent, or at least restrict, many fatal schemes of the other occupying Powers. But nothing in all this can free the Party from its obligation to utter a warning and, if necessary, to fight vigorously against any American measures which seem to it wrong; for good intentions do not, unfortunately, diminish the bad consequences of a mistake.

What is true for the United States also goes for Great Britain and France. As to the latter, we consider that one of the first and foremost problems is the establishment of a Franco-German relationship based on confidence, but that this can be done only if France ceases to insist on amputating German territory and agrees to recognize the Saar as part of Germany. If she did this she would in fact be simply confirming her official verbal statement that the régime which she was creating in the Saar—and which today already can be maintained only by the methods of a police state—was to be regarded as provisional until the peace treaty was signed. The S.P.D. is quite prepared to accept agreements which take account of France's specific economic interests in the Saar. But it will fight with all its power against a separation of the Saar from Germany, whether or not the label "Europeanization" is applied to the procedure. The S.P.D. does not want the Saar to develop into an abscess which ten years hence might

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have the same fatal effects on German democracy and world peace as Danzig had before.

The S.P.D. is convinced that the problems of European interrelationships can be solved only on a "European" basis, and is prepared to support the idea that Germany should surrender sovereign rights to a supranational authority on the same scale that other European nations do. But there must be guarantees to prevent discriminatory treatment; for as the Schuman Plan has proved, the details of an agreement may do precisely that even though the text as a whole purports to treat all the partners equally.

The S.P.D. supports a Federation of Europe in principle. However, it is not willing to join a supranational organization which does not include Scandinavia and Great Britain, since that would amount to splitting Europe, with unforeseeable consequences. Europe must be organized in a way to permit Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries to participate. Going further, the S.P.D. feels that the honorable word "European" should be applied only to projects where all partners share equally in the community's burdens as well as its privileges. Europe must be organized on the principle of equal risk and equal opportunity, and this must apply to the various interim stages as well as to the final goal. Where the basic European rule fails, so that this nation or that is able to dispose of its partners' capacities without giving anything in return, the result will not be "Europe" in a true sense but a new jungle of power politics. It is in the light of this anxiety that the S.P.D.'s attitude toward various projects which fly the European flag must be understood.

IV

In 1950 the S.P.D. opposed Germany's joining the European Council in Strasbourg—not because it was hostile to the European idea but because it believed that only free nations could give it reality. We feel that an organization is almost disqualified from being called "European" if it includes some nations which are free as well as others which are under the occupation and control of nations whose representatives also sit with them in the European Council. We feared that this might dangerously prejudice a close relationship between the European nations in the future; the future United States of Europe cannot contain members with different privileges.

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Another reason for our Party's refusal to approve membership for the Federal Republic in the European Council was that the Government of the Saar was invited to join the European Council at the same time and under the same conditions. For Germany to join the European Council in these circumstances would be interpreted, our Party thought, as recognition of the Saar Government. We did not share the Federal Government's view that membership in the European Council would end the difficulties caused in Franco-German relations by the Saar problem; and unfortunately recent events have justified our fears.

Because the S.P.D. has vigorously opposed acceptance of the Schuman Plan it has been reproached for a stupid excess of nationalism, and oddly enough some of the people who helped to bring Hitler to power in 1933 have joined in the complaint. The S.P.D. has nothing against the objectives of the Schuman Plan. On the contrary, it is an old Socialist demand in Germany that European key industries be placed under international administrative control so that they will serve the economies of all the nations concerned. If the hundred articles of the Schuman Plan agreement signed on April 18, 1951, had faithfully represented this ideal the S.P.D. would gladly have approved. But thorough study proved that the agreement was only a caricature of the ideal. I cannot explain the reasons in details here, but will mention a few.

The speeches made during the ratification debate in the French National Assembly made clear that the French Government was not guided by what might be called European intentions when it proposed the Schuman Plan in the first place so much as by the aim of securing access to the Ruhr coal by political means disguised in the form of a corporate agreement—in other words, it aimed to exploit the position of power created by Germany's defeat. France needs the Ruhr coal if she is to utilize her full steel capacity, uneconomically enlarged since 1945 by the expenditure of public and American funds. The S.P.D. does not deny France's right to supply herself with Ruhr coal, but does not wish her to do so in a way to endanger the German economy.

In fixing key dates and setting up various regulations the terms of the Schuman Plan seem to make investments in the Ruhr impossible, with the result that the industry of the region which has suffered from war, dismantling and wear is bound to remain at a disadvantage compared to the French industry which has been

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modernized by investment of public funds. The S.P.D. fears that this may cause unemployment in the Ruhr and, moreover, will limit the possibility of guaranteeing social security, with dangerous results on the score of peace and democracy.

As far as the structure agreed on at Paris is concerned it can hardly be called anything but a super-cartel. Apart from the fact that cartels are apt to have highly undesirable economic effects, the S.P.D. fears that it will be much harder to protect the workers' interests in dealing with an international cartel having sovereign functions. The practical impotence of labor organizations under the Schuman mechanism one of the Plan's particularly grave deficiencies.

Since the allocation of coal and iron was transferred to the Ruhr Authority, Germany has to a large degree lost her capacity to develop an autonomous economic, financial and social policy; and, in addition, by its control of Ruhr industries the Authority holds the keys to political developments in Germany. Nevertheless in character the Ruhr Authority is purely a management régime. Its nine members, elected for a period of six years, are practically irremovable. They are not subject to any genuine and effective parliamentary control; indeed, in their field they have more power than any government. The S.P.D. fears that some day people might say that if it is right for managers to rule in disregard of parliaments on the European level, why should it not be right also on the national level?

These considerations would have been sufficient by themselves to prevent members of the S.P.D. from voting for the Schuman Plan quite apart from the fact that Germany who contributes 51 percent of the coal to the pool is represented in the Ruhr Authority only in a proportion of 2 to 7. Those seven members, moreover, represent countries united in a common interest of obtaining as much coal as possible from Germany and of producing as much steel as possible—so that Germany need not produce it. Things should not be made as easy as all that for people to abuse their power.

The fact that the Schuman Plan has created a grave obstacle to German reunification will not be discussed here, beyond mentioning that any extension of the area to which it applies is subject to confirmation by all the six partners. A united Germany therefore would either have to reconcile herself to remaining split into two economic systems or else permit the other Powers repre-

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sented in the Ruhr Authority to lay down the conditions for German reunification.

As regards the S.P.D.'s attitude toward the problem of European defense it should be stated at the start that the S.P.D. is not pacifist, neutralist or defeatist. The Party is determined to participate in all efforts that promise to increase effectively the security of both Germany and Europe. It is unwilling, however, to take the responsibility for measures which can give only the illusion of security while weakening Germany's capacity in fields where she could make her best and most effective contribution to defense.

We already are living in a war—a cold war which has one thing in common with hot war: it can be won only by the right means and by concentrating on those which are necessary here and now. If the cold war which Germany and her workers are fighting today in the front lines were lost, the rest of Europe need not give much thought to what would have to be done in case of a hot war. Stalin would then be everywhere he might choose to be—and without having to move a single Russian soldier. The cold war can be won only if the whole German people—and particularly the workers who are most susceptible to influence from the East —register a firm No to Eastern threats and temptations, not because the masses think that conditions in the West are simply the lesser of two evils but because they can be enthusiastic about them. This, in turn, requires that the standard of living in Western Germany shall not be pressed below a certain minimum. It will be if Germany is forced to make the military and financial contributions recently under discussion with the Bonn Government. Moreover, if the standard of living is lowered dangerously, Soviet infiltration will find vulnerable points for developing into a fifth column. Anybody can figure out what would be the military value of German divisions if a strong fifth column were operating in their back.

Can anyone seriously believe that there would still be room for considering the problem of European defense at all if the S.P.D. had not succeeded in preventing the number of German Communist voters from reaching the percentages achieved in France and Italy? In this respect the S.P.D. has through its past policy made a concrete contribution to European defense which should not be overlooked; it is more effective than would be the addition of 12 German divisions to the forces of the Western Powers.

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The only sensible reason for raising German divisions is that in combination with the forces raised by other nations they can provide a reasonable chance that the European Continent will be spared the fate of becoming a battlefield and nothing but a battlefield and scorched earth. This would happen only if the militarily strong Powers of the West would send considerably more troops to Europe than they at present apparently intend; for then and only then would there be a reasonable chance that an addition of 12 German divisions might scare the Russians from risking even the first battle of a third world war. The fact that the last battle would be won by the Western forces is of no interest to nations whose fate—up to the point of actual biological elimination—would be decided by the result of the first battle.

In any case, it seems unjustifiable in S.P.D. eyes that Germany should be requested to raise a contingent for a European army if she is, at the same time, denied a seat and vote in the political and military committees which control this European army and consequently the German soldiers in it. Without the equal partnership of Germany in NATO the German contingents would be only a kind of foreign legion at the disposal of other nations. It cannot be assumed that under such conditions German soldiers will fight with the determination necessary for coping with such an overwhelming power as that of Soviet Russia.

The same applies to the agreements which are to replace the occupation statute. The occupying Powers apparently reserve essential rights and intend to remain occupation Powers in Germany, in their own right. The privileges enjoyed by American forces in Germany, for instance, will go much further than those which American troops enjoy in Great Britain and France. Is it seriously believed that under such conditions German soldiers will really feel treated as partners?

A further reason for the S.P.D.'s opposition to the military plans of the Adenauer Government is that in its opinion the basic law of the Federal Republic forbids the formation of an armed force and hence that a German defense law cannot be promulgated unless the German Constitution is changed. The S.P.D. therefore has raised objections on this score with the Federal Constitutional Court (*Bundesverfassungsgericht*); and it demands, moreover, that elections should be held in order to give the people a chance to decide for or against the creation of German military forces. If the German people are denied this right a

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grave crisis of confidence in democracy will be inevitable in Germany.

V

Perhaps the main reason why the S.P.D. is opposed to the present agreements is its fear that if they are accepted German reunification will become impossible.

German reunification is the elementary and natural desire of the German people, who will never reconcile themselves to the present state of affairs. What is more, it is a political necessity of the first order. So long as the two halves of Germany keep each other in commotion nothing can be built on firm ground anywhere in the world; for it is a fact that the split in Germany is only a visible expression of the gash that divides the entire political planet. The fact seems now to be recognized also outside of Germany, and it is gratifying that certain countries—including probably the United States—have adopted German reunification as part of their policy.

German reunification can be brought about only in freedom and must be attempted only by peaceful methods. The only possible route is all-German free elections under international control. This requires the consent of the Russians, however, and that cannot be obtained except at a Four Power Conference. The S.P.D. is therefore of the opinion that it should be the first objective of the Western Powers to arrange such a Conference, to be limited to studying the conditions for free all-German elections, for guaranteeing the accomplishment of those elections and for underwriting the freedom of action of the all-German government that will emerge from them.

All further problems concerning Germany should be left for solution at a later conference. Especially neither side should demand before the first conference meets that the other should accept in advance solutions which can logically be only the result of meetings at which substantive problems are discussed. Our Party therefore regrets that the first note of the Western Powers in reply to the Russian note on the German peace treaty implied that the Soviets should agree to Germany's political and military integration with the West. This means asking the Russians to renounce the East German potential which they now hold in order that this potential may be fitted into a political and military pact which the Russians must feel is directed against them. If it had been planned intentionally to prevent the Russians from agree-

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ing to free all-German elections no better way could have been chosen. It should not be insisted on the American side that agreements on Germany's military capacity must be made until the German people have been convinced by the attitude of the Western Powers that these Powers have done everything possible to come to an agreement with the Russians on all-German elections.

The S.P.D. stands against basic neutralism and against the neutralization of Germany. It does not believe in the possibility of Germany's being protected by neutrality even through a German national army, as the Russians propose. It simply does not believe in isolated recipes for squaring the German circle. The German problem can be settled only as part of a general new order, and the basis for this has still to be found. The dispute between the United States and Soviet Russia determines today the fate of the world. The Asian and European countries may by their attitude influence the course of this dispute; but no genuine and general political order can emerge except as a result of a basic accord of the two remaining World Powers. Everybody must work for the consummation of such an accord, or at least to make it become a possibility. If it cannot be reached—and it can hardly be reached if Germany is sold in advance to the Western pact system—East and West will dig themselves in on the political battlefield and the Iron Curtain which now stretches from the north of Finland to the southern seas will become a double row of trenches, behind which the giants and their satellites will lie in wait to spring at each other. What the upshot might be, nobody knows, except this: it cannot be good.

If, however, an accord is reached—and this presupposes that the Russians are not presented with a *fait accompli* with regard to Germany—the place of Germany will be in a European order upon which the United States and Soviet Russia, together with the nations of Europe, can and will, by application of the necessary patience, energy and judgment, agree. People who believe that the mere idea of such an accord is utopian must have the courage to call on the nations frankly to adapt themselves to the law of the jungle. The S.P.D. has no illusions; but because of that it does not consider as utopian the idea that an accord is possible.

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FRANCE AND EUROPE

A Gaullist View

By Jacques Soustelle

TODAY France is threatened by Soviet imperialism, as yesterday it was threatened by German imperialism. The writer of this article has been an unwavering friend of the United States, and knows that nothing but the alliance of France and Europe with America can ward off the danger. I know, too, that if war should come this alliance would give France the only hope of saving her freedom and culture. It is just because everything depends upon this alliance that there is such wide and deep anxiety about it in France today. The policy followed so far in Europe since the war seems about to collapse. The force of inertia in the chancelleries carries the customary diplomatic procedure along, but the structure of Western European security offers no promise of real safety for the peoples of Europe—particularly for the French people—in the hour of supreme peril.

What should be done? First of all, the psychology of our people must be understood in America. It is a very different psychology from what must have been that of the American people following the last world war. The United States suffered during the war; but the country was not occupied by the enemy, Americans did not have to witness the slaughter of their fellow citizens in extermination camps, they did not watch their cities go up in flames, see their harvests destroyed by warring armies, roads, railroad lines and bridges cut, ports in ruins. The French went through all of that for four years, sharpened, too, by the bitterness of defeat. They cannot forget that for years before that experience they had trusted in the Maginot Line, which was supposed to preserve France from invasion. It proved a mirage. After such disillusionment and suffering they have no faith left in Maginot Lines of any kind, whether concrete or paper, strategic or diplomatic. Their first concern is to do whatever has to be done to prevent their territory from being invaded again.

Anyone who wants to throw France into the arms of Communism has only to spread the idea that in the event of war the United States will be content with a peripheral strategy, letting the Russians invade continental Europe to the Atlantic and the

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Pyrenees and merely expecting to reconquer this territory some years later. The prospect of a second occupation, more cruel even than the last and with the added refinement of atomic bombardment, plunges Europeans into despair. The number one question for Frenchmen is this: Will their homeland be defended with all the forces of the Atlantic alliance, or will it not? If the answer is yes, they are ready for sacrifices. If the answer is no, the alliance does not interest them; they will deviate from it in just the degree to which they think it will draw danger upon them instead of warding it off. These are the simple particulars which determine the French attitude toward the German question, the problem of Europe, the Atlantic Pact, and the general world situation.

II

Any consideration of the German question must begin with the elementary geographical fact that Germany is located in the heart of Europe, between the Slav world and the West. After 1945 there was but one possible policy to be followed toward Germany—the one advocated by the Provisional French Government under the leadership of General de Gaulle. It favored the rebirth of the German states—Baden, Württemberg, the Palatinate, etc.—and sought to make it possible for each of them to develop its own political and economic existence so that they could be incorporated in a federated Europe as distinct states, not as "Germany." This policy was neither understood nor supported by our British and American allies. On the contrary, they urged the fusion of the three Western zones and the creation of the Republic of Bonn. Inevitably, this raised the question of the unity of all of Germany. Even after the birth of the Western republic a safer policy was still available, however. If a European confederation had been set up without delay, Western Germany would have found her place in it and accustomed herself to it before nationalism was reborn. Instead, unfortunately, the West resorted to such fictions as the Council of Europe, and dangerous efforts were made to "pool" coal, steel and armed forces. Now Russia has decided to exploit her chosen weapon—the appeal of German unity. In the field of politics it is comparable to the atomic bomb.

It is useless to shut one's eyes to reality. Unity—the reconstitution of the Reich with its own armed force—is a primordial objective for the immense majority of Germans, even if it is pro-

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posed by the Soviets and even if it is encumbered with a Russian mortgage. From the Communists of Grotewohl through the Social Democrats of Schumacher and the Christian Democrats of Adenauer to the neo-Nazis of Remer the Germans will respond to the call of *Einheit*. Bolshevism plays its game boldly, astride the horse of the Apocalypse; German chauvinism is in full renaissance.

We French people know from the experience of three wars the meaning for us, and for the peace of the world, of the recurrent appearance of the German nebula which gathers itself together and then explodes. That was the phenomenon of the Bismarckian Germany of 1870, of Wilhelm's Empire of 1914 and of Hitler's Third Reich. Now the outlines of the Fourth Reich appear on the horizon, the product of Western errors and cynical Soviet calculation.

There is still time to deal with this problem; but only a little. The sole possible solution is a Franco-German agreement. In March of this year General de Gaulle said: "For centuries there has been a deplorable conflict between France and Germany. Europe cannot be built if these nations remain in opposition to one another." And he pointed out the path by which this "enormous and permanent historic fact" can be surmounted: "A *direct* agreement between France and Germany, on the subjects which have always divided them as well as on those which tend to bring them together." In General de Gaulle's view the "Atlantic policy" does not really tend in that direction. "This policy," he said, "pretends to arbitrate between a Germany and a France which are not in agreement, notably in the military field, rather than let them come to an understanding and themselves make that understanding the basis of a European confederation having in its charge matters of economy, defense, culture."

In other words, the solution is not to be found by countering German chauvinism with French chauvinism, but in the opposite course—an historic effort to rise above the age-old national conflict. Perhaps because they have been adversaries so long, it is possible for Frenchmen and Germans to reach a mutual understanding when they speak together directly. They know each other so well that the very dissimilarity of their qualities enables them to estimate each other more accurately than others can ever do. Only a Franco-German accord can provide the basis for a confederated Europe which would be a reality and not a fiction of

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the chancelleries. But the perpetual intervention of the other Powers, especially in view of the hope now entertained by the Germans of being able to secure a specially profitable alliance with America, makes such an accord impossible. And it is no less hindered by the French fear that the Americans will, in effect, recreate with their own hands the very idol which they brought down yesterday.

What should be the scope of this Franco-German accord? If it is to have the right results it should, I think, be "all-inclusive." It should include military clauses to determine the nature and relative size of the armed forces of each country. Its economic clauses should cover the whole productive systems of both nations—not coal and steel production only, as in the Schuman Plan. And it should have broad cultural provisions, establishing exchanges in the fields of science and the arts. It should be negotiated and signed by France in her full status as the French Union —that is, France as an African Power as well as a European Power—with all the consequences which that implies, economic and political. A Franco-German agreement of that nature and that scope would establish a zone of peace in the West, would deter even a reunified Germany from embarking on warlike ventures, and would open the way for her to a future in which she would not be dependent upon the Soviets. It would, finally, provide a solid base on which "Europe" could be constructed.

III

"Europe"—no one has done more in France than General de Gaulle and his followers to emphasize the vital necessity of turning that word into a concrete fact. It is quite absurd, of course, to compare the countries of Europe to the 13 original states of America, and to assume that like them the European nations can be integrated overnight into a single bloc. But we believe that a confederation is entirely possible at the present time through the following steps:

1. A referendum of the people of Europe, in which they will reply "yes" or "no" to the fundamental question: Do you desire a confederated Europe with supranational powers? I believe the response would be overwhelmingly affirmative.

2. The establishment of a democratic authority for the confederation.

3. The assignment to this authority, step by step, of a part of

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the sovereignty of each state in the fields of finance, economics, armed forces and culture.

Unfortunately, instead of attacking the problem in this fundamental and realistic way, the Western nations—largely in consequence of obstinate British opposition to the creation of a truly united Europe—have approached it by the roundabout road of so-called functional structures, devised by alleged economic and diplomatic experts. The Schuman Plan for a coal–steel "pool" and the proposal for a "European" army are chimeras. Such attempts to hang the steel industry, the military forces, and, presently, agriculture and other sections of the economy on complicated technical agencies without any democratic basis promise nothing but frustration to every country involved—certainly to France. A proposal to replace the normal powers of the President, Congress and Supreme Court of the United States by obscure committees of technocrats would be somewhat comparable. Such bodies are mere abstractions that will be swept away by the first puff of wind, and those who pin their hopes on them court two great dangers: that the old Franco-German antagonism will reappear in worse form; and that, in General de Gaulle's words, "The community of Europe, which ought to create the entente between the French and the Germans, instead runs the risk of opening a brilliant career toward hegemony for a unified Reich."

IV

Though the subject is important, I will not dwell on the way in which the daily operations of the Atlantic Pact sacrifice policy to technical expedients, in particular overriding French national feelings and forcing France to play a subordinate and dependent rôle on her own soil as well as in her overseas territories. This heedlessness damages the spirit of the pact and supplies choice items for Communist propaganda. Further, the fact that agreements are not properly ratified and made public keeps French opinion from understanding the methods by which air bases, supply depôts and services of all sort are installed on our territory, the way command is divided, or the relationship of American military authorities to French civil authorities. These things in my opinion are neglected and should not be; for in preparing for a possible conflict there is nothing more indispensable than to win the support of public opinion. In total war the battle is waged and won with the soul of the people.

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The fundamental defect of the Atlantic alliance, however, is that it is merely—Atlantic. Actually, it is restricted to the North Atlantic. It would have value as a regional section of a larger grouping, but in itself it is as inadequate as a breastplate covering half the chest or a helmet protecting the forehead but not the back of the neck. The danger facing the free nations is global. To parry it they must have a global strategy. The land mass of Russia and her satellites, stretching over most of the Eurasian Heartland from the Elbe to Vladivostok and from Petsamo to Shanghai, exerts its heaviest pressure on four segments of its frontiers: first, the European front, where the strategic objective of the Soviets, valuable to them beyond anything else, would be to cross France and the Low Countries and reach the Channel and the Atlantic; second, the Balkans, where Moscow's objective would be to liquidate the Titoist heresy and descend upon the Mediterranean; third, the Near East, with its oil and the explosive politics of Islam; and fourth, Southeast Asia, where the objective would be to drive across Indo-China against Malaya and Indonesia, outflanking Japan and breaking America's defensive chain in the Pacific.

These four fronts are plainly but parts of one whole. The Russians have the ability, exploiting the enormous advantage which an imperialist Power derives from the possession of the continental Heartland, to manœuvre on their inner lines and force the free nations to disperse their strength. In face of this danger, only the European and Atlantic sector has even begun to organize its defense—the Atlantic Pact. The Balkan sector and that of the Near East, though linked in some respects, are nonetheless chaotic. In Asia, finally, three wars are being fought simultaneously against the Russian advance guards: in Malaya, in Indo-China and in Korea. Three Western Powers—Britain, France and America—are engaged there with substantial forces; yet the three wars remain separate and distinct. The paradox is profoundly confusing.

The Mediterranean just as clearly forms a unit, but here deep disagreements divide the Allies, specifically in regard to the allocation of naval commands. In French eyes the western Mediterranean, with Marseilles on the north and Algiers on the south, is a body of water lying within our metropolitan territory. Communications across it from north to south are indispensable to us in peacetime, and absolutely vital in time of war. Thus North Africa's membership in the French Union, in the form of the French

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Departments of Algeria and the states associated by treaty—Tunisia and Morocco—cannot be challenged. In fact, every Frenchman unless he is a Communist considers Algiers, Oran, Bizerte and Casablanca French cities: not one would dream of agreeing to a separation of North Africa from the metropolitan area. We are surprised and perplexed, then, when we read diatribes in the American press against France's alleged "colonialism." We do not understand how Americans can contemplate sawing off the branch on which they are seated—weakening those whose alliance they seek, and bringing aid and succor to the common enemy. France has committed no crime in North Africa other than to bring it the progress of which the native régimes were incapable. The Frenchmen who have settled there have become as North African as the farmers of Nebraska are American. Are we to be reproached for not having eliminated the Arabs as if they had been Sioux or Navajos? The Arab peoples have prospered and multiplied; and we on our side have planted roots there and become acclimated. Algeria is a French land and everyone in it is French; the Arabs and the Berbers are citizens; they vote, and send Moslem deputies to parliament in Paris. The French Government is determined that the overseas populations shall progress (it was General de Gaulle who, by decree of March 7, 1944, emancipated the Moslems of Algeria), but we cannot accept foreign intervention in these matters and would no more agree to the secession of North Africa than Americans would agree to the secession of California.

If the British, the French and the Americans are allies against the Russian menace through thick and thin, then they should be allies everywhere and should act everywhere as allies. It is impossible to stand shoulder to shoulder on the Rhine and quarrel in the Maghreb or on the Euphrates. The common welfare also demands an end to the traditional rivalries of the specialized services. A general settlement in the Mediterranean should include an equitable division of naval commands; reconsideration of the question of Libyan independence which was arranged at the expense of Italy's legitimate interests; the inclusion of Spain in the common defense measures; and the establishment of a firm common front against intrigues of every sort, even when they hide behind the catchwords of pan-Arab demagogy.

The three wars in the Far East are in fact a single conflict. Russia is pushing forward her Chinese, Korean, Malayan and

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Viet-Namese satellites, forcing us all to shed blood and spend enormous sums of money, while she herself expends nothing but stocks of war matériel. The weight which France is carrying in Indo-China is crushing; the war there holds the best of her troops in Asia, and decimates them. But she cannot abandon the independent states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia without condemning them to death.

The time has come to view things in the Far East realistically. If France retreated from Tonkin and Saïgon, Indo-China would at once fall into Soviet hands, and Malaya as far as Singapore would quickly follow. What would happen then to Indonesia, Burma and Siam? And who would expect that the Philippines, Ceylon and India would be immune? With all Southeast Asia at stake, the mastery of the Pacific as a whole is plainly in the balance. It is indispensable for the Western allies to coördinate the strategy, logistics and financing of the single war which the Kremlin is waging against them in Asia under three different guises.

V

The Russian menace, and the risk that the present policy is about to collapse, call for bold initiatives. These, in sum, are the essentials:

First, a direct agreement between France and Germany.

Second, based on the Franco-German agreement, immediate steps to set up a European confederative authority.

Third, an alliance scaled to meet the present threat—a global alliance, that is, to meet a threat that knows no boundaries, regions or limits. The Atlantic Pact should be retained as a regional agreement. The global alliance should be subdivided strategically into theatres of operation, and the commands allocated on the basis of geopolitical and psychological as well as military factors. In every theatre the nations with world interests —the United States, Great Britain and France—should draw into partnership the nations having particular regional interests—the Western countries and Germany in Europe, Italy and Spain in the Mediterranean, Japan in the Far East, and so on.

If France is to play her indispensable rôle in the "Grand Alliance" of freedom it must be as a coördinate not a subordinate partner—integrated with the others but not dependent on any one of them. In brief, the French wish to be allies but they do not wish to be satellites.

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Such are the conditions under which we believe that the global menace of Stalin's totalitarian empire, entrenched in the land mass of Eurasia, can be "contained." The fundamental precondition of the success of this policy of containment is that the Western peoples of the European continent know that if war comes they will be defended by all the forces of the alliance against invasion and occupation—defended not as temporary advanced posts in a peripheral strategy but as vital territory to be held without reservation. That guarantee would make the difference between a Europe resolved to fight and a Europe resigned to be abandoned and to abandon itself.

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ECONOMIC CHECKS ON GERMAN UNITY

By Peter Nettl

IT is an accepted political principle in Germany that any political party which wishes to survive must make every possible effort to further the reunification of West and East Germany. Since positive contributions in this direction are impossible, Germans have concentrated more and more on the negative policy of opposing all measures which might prove an obstacle to unity in the future. It is the one aim on which all Germans seem to agree, and against which no one has dared, or wanted, to speak openly. Public opinion in the United States and Western Europe has come to take for granted that this urge for unity is a major factor to be considered in shaping any policy for Germany.

In 1948 the Russians decided to exploit the German desire for unity and make it the main vehicle for carrying to success their own particular policy for Germany. In the first years after the war they had exploited anti-Fascism both in Germany and elsewhere. Having reaped as much success on that line as possible, they decided, first, that as an active force anti-Fascism was dead, second, that they needed a particular policy for Germany different from that followed in other countries. Overnight, therefore, they began sponsoring unity as the main object in Germany, and have tried to persuade the Germans to accept the idea that they are the one Power wholeheartedly committed to achieving that goal. They made the most of every possibility of interfering with the policy of the West German Government by bringing pressure to bear on it through the exploitation of genuine national feeling.

The strength of latent national feeling is always difficult to measure, and those who act on estimates are apt to get an unpleasant shock. It therefore would be a waste of time trying to guess whether the desire for German unity is as strong a political force as it seems to be, or even to answer the derivative question as to how much popularity the Russians will gain from their ostensible support of it. The fact remains that all political parties in Western Germany insist that unity is their objective. To the parties on the Right it is the first and most necessary step toward establishing German economic and political predominance in Central Europe. To the Social Democrats it offers the means

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of obtaining office, through the votes of the traditionally Socialist eastern areas, as well as a means of escape from the octopus arms of NATO and the European Defense Community. Dimly it seems to promise them an era in which Socialist policy would rule Germany and in which Germany would be the arbiter of conflicting and alien world forces; and it promises also the chance of bloodless victory in the war which may lie ahead by keeping Germany neutral—the *nobilissima visione* behind 30 years of Socialist vacillation. All this in spite of the fact that if the S.P.D. has learnt anything it should be that the Communists are their bitter, relentless and everlasting enemies.

Even among the Christian Democrats, the West German Chancellor's own party, there is pressure sufficient to produce frequent Ministerial warnings to the Western Allies that the hopes of German unity cannot be ignored or obstructed. As recently as April 24, 1952, Chancellor Adenauer was forced to put the cat among the pigeons by stating in a broadcast that West German participation in the European Defense Community and the Schuman Plan was subject to revision once German unity became feasible. It was a reservation of tremendous potential importance.

The vehemence of tone used in expressing these feelings is a sign of danger. Should the ever-present lunatic fringe in German politics feel that its wishes are reflected among the population at the same time that they are spurned by the Western Powers, it may succeed in establishing a government in Western Germany which would be willing to extend a hand across the zonal boundaries even at the risk of being swallowed up in the process. Some of the speeches made by proponents of this policy may be mere verbal vote-catching; but neither the Western Powers nor Dr. Adenauer and his ministers dismiss them so lightly.

In these circumstances it is impossible for the West either to oppose unity or to outdo the Russians in shouting for it. On the other hand, the demand cannot simply be ignored. The Western Powers have had to follow the ungrateful course of pretending to examine each Soviet proposal as though it were sincere, and to rebuff it by pointing out its flaws, omissions and speciousness. This has hardly been satisfying to those Germans who want unity so much that they persuade themselves each Soviet proposal is in fact a concrete offer. At the same time, everything has been offered to Western Germany which could be granted in the circumstances. This has not abated the threats of the opposition;

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and now it seems that it may not even enable the Federal Government to keep the mandate of the legislature. When the German Communists report to Moscow on the current progress of Soviet designs in Germany, the Politburo experts responsible for German affairs will probably say that, even though the time has not yet come to bring the campaign to a climax and to support words with actions, the disintegration of the enemy camp is steadily proceeding and support for the Soviet unity campaign is steadily growing. Above all, they can say truthfully, the enemy has found no political answer to their campaign: time is on the Soviet side.

But such a report would ignore the fact that while even Marxists wait for a situation to develop, things change, often including basic premises. And the further the timetable reaches into the future, the less inevitable it becomes. The Russian Communist political mind works along geometrical lines; overconfidence frequently minimizes the importance of unplanned developments. There seems reason to believe that when the Soviets made their major change in policy toward Germany, from the "anti-Fascist" to the "unity" line, they expected to move irresistibly to victory. The failure of the Berlin blockade was an unforeseen obstacle; Dr. Adenauer's personal strength and steadfastness were another. And still another is the growth, during the last four years, of solid political and economic forces working against reunification. The longer the proposed Four Power discussions of all-German elections are put off, the stronger these economic forces will grow.

II

A factor militating against unity is Germany's present dual structure—in the West an improved Weimar Constitution incorporating some American suggestions, in the East the bogus Soviet system in which central and state governments are jerked by one and the same political puppet-master. Western Germany itself may not be, by American or Swiss standards, an entirely genuine federal state, but it has proved sufficiently so for state governments to be able to obstruct the wishes of the central government effectively. For states like Bavaria this is a prized possession. A reunification of Germany would be almost certain to bring in its train a strong attempt to give the resultant all-German government greater powers at the expense of the provinces, especially if the new government were Social Democrat or Com-

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munist. Moreover, the problems of unity imperatively demand powers for the central government which, by the present West German Constitution as well as the Occupation Statute, are expressly denied the Federal Government. Admittedly, the federal idea was imposed on Germany as a means of keeping her impotent, and was, moreover, imposed willy-nilly on institutions evolved from a highly centralized system. If this federalism has nonetheless achieved any permanence, it is only due to the fact that the Bonn administration never had the moral authority of a central German government, and that the state governments have profited from the resulting vacuum. The majority party in the Bundestag is strongest in the Catholic southwest and the Rhineland, and corresponds, as far as its views on states' rights are concerned, to the position of the "Dixiecrats" in America. The Government has consistently followed a policy of economic laissez-faire. But no all-German government could possibly do so. It is not too much to say that any practical degree of unity in Germany would bring the end of the federal experiment. Certainly it would cause the defeat of the party whose term of office has made possible the progress of federal government to date.

The economic policy of the Bonn Government has destroyed many of the links with that part of Germany now under Soviet control. Briefly, the scramble for quick-return investments after the currency reform in 1948 gave a tremendous spurt to many consumer goods industries, depriving heavy industry of capital for much-needed repair and development. A chronic fear of inflation has caused credit to be made as expensive as possible; much of the capital recreated since 1948 has had to be provided by the industries themselves out of profits, and by the resources of the private banks, traditionally a dependent unit of industry and commerce. In this Keynesian age, governments often (and quite correctly) console themselves and their supporters that nothing is easier or quicker than the increase of effective purchasing power by official action; but in Western Germany today the bare bones of the necessary credit machinery are missing, even if such relief were considered desirable. In short, there is a free economy in which a relatively high rate of consumption has been achieved by continually putting off the evil day when long-term policy will imperatively demand a replanning of the structure of current investment. This high rate of consumption, achieved with American help, may be one of the reasons why the

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rearmament program is viewed with suspicion in a Western Germany bitterly opposed to government planning; and the bogey of inflation reinforces this attitude, in spite of the ever-present fact of unemployment there.

But the demands of limited rearmament under the European defense scheme are a mere molehill compared to the replanning of investment that would become necessary after reunification. Opposition to rearmament in Western Germany is allegedly based on the view that it might retard the chances of unity. But in fact it may be to a considerable extent a product of economic fear—fear both of reduced consumption and of increased government planning. Amalgamation of the present economic freedom in the West and the poverty in the East would aggravate Germany's economic difficulties. The new stimuli to consumption goods industries would drain more capital away from the basic industries, whose need of investment would be all the greater in view of the enormous Russian depredations in the East. The Socialist alternative is large-scale investment in Eastern Germany; according to Professor Baade, of the Kiel *Institut für Weltwirtschaft;* the minimum required investment would be 3 billion Deutschemarks, or $714,000,000 at current rates. Professor Baade proposes that this be saved by reducing Western occupation costs. The estimate of the amount needed is reasonable, but the method proposed for making it available is absurd.

Moreover, it is in the East that the greatest obstacles to unity exist; and, ironically, it was the Russians who created them, in the flush of Communist power and anti-Fascist propaganda. The most far-reaching measure was the land reform. As it stands in the legislative record of the five provinces in the Eastern Zone it is an expropriatory measure on a large scale; as it has been implemented by Marxist authorities for six years it is a social revolution. The agricultural areas became in turn a small peasant economy, and then an agriculture state-controlled in all respects but ownership of the land itself. Both the former large landowners and many of the medium and small farmers have disappeared, and their equipment has been collectivized into tractor stations. The records of previous ownership have been burned. Neither politically nor economically is it possible to speak of an independent agricultural class today.

It is easy to break up large estates if one is prepared to accept, or overlook, the resultant loss in productive efficiency. Without

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an even greater upheaval it is impossible to recreate large estates; even the enforcement of collectivization, a process in which all equitable considerations are absent, is easier by virtue of the purely geometrical plan at which it aims. In England the process of enclosures, which performed a similar economic function of engulfing small-holdings into larger agricultural units, took more than 250 years to be completed, and even at that pace produced economic stresses and grave social difficulties. In addition to the economic aspect of unity in Germany there is the human problem of preventing any change of land ownership in the East from resembling the vengeance of rapacious émigrés after their victorious return to the country which expropriated and expelled them: a situation of great social danger. However harshly the peasants may have been treated by the quota system and its enforcement in Eastern Germany, it is not certain that they would welcome back the former owners. If the present distribution of land is to be left untouched, only vast government investments in agriculture—in fact a continuation of, and even improvement on, Communist policy—could counteract the agricultural decay in a country which, over-all, has not been self-sufficient since 1870.

III

Exactly the same situation arises in industry. Here the legal beneficiary has been the state; the gainers are the large army of administrators and technicians, and, once removed again, the numerous councils and committees which, in Communist countries, give the worker the illusion of having a direct say in production. If the former owners are to reacquire their industrial property these political functionaries will be out of jobs. So will the "People's Judges," the "democratic" teachers, trade union officials, and so on. Loss of jobs means loss of social position and influence, bourgeois qualities inherited with zest by the élite of the new Eastern Europe.

There is thus a considerable vested East German interest in favor of the present dual arrangement, since from 3,000,000 to 4,000,000 people there draw their means of livelihood directly from it. Their only chance of continued well-being would be the possibility of maintaining the status quo after a single German Government came into existence. This in turn would be possible only in one of two ways: either the economic and administrative system of Eastern Germany must be guaranteed by means of en-

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trenched clauses in the new constitution, or the present areas of Eastern and Western Germany must continue to have legal existence as sovereign and separate entities for certain constitutional purposes—in other words, a third federal level would have to be created between central and provisional governments. The first alternative is unlikely to be acceptable to anyone save the Communists. The second is a lawyer's nightmare, though that does not preclude its becoming a constitutional reality. The Western Powers and the Germans may yet have to ask themselves seriously whether they would be prepared to have unity on these terms, and if not, what satisfactory reasons they can give for refusing a Soviet proposal incorporating them. There is, of course, a third alternative: Soviet, and therefore Communist, control of the new all-German Government. It is unlikely to be achieved by negotiation.

The choicest industrial units in Soviet Germany are Russian-owned and operated. There is already a Soviet Empire within the East German economy;[1] and although the ever-open jaws of the Soviet enterprises now swallow less raw material, a substantial part of the East German production is still destined either for reparations or to supply the Soviet-owned corporations. The choicest export materials of the Soviet Zone, such as the BMW Motor Cars, are exported on Russian account and bring no benefit to the East German economy. There are, in addition, the other Russian subsidiaries, the Soviet transport undertakings and the whole Soviet structure of banking—all outside German control. It has frequently been suggested that this Soviet Empire might be used as the ultimate bargaining counter in a Russian proposal for reunification, although such an offer has not been made or even hinted at. Clearly it would be very difficult to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement to combine East and West Germany into one state if a large part of industrial capital and credit were foreign-owned and had the right to draw on the German economy for its needs without any reciprocal service.

If the Russians were prepared to abandon their holdings there would then be the question of disposing of these units: would they be restored to the combines which previously owned them, or would a new group of state-owned enterprises be formed to hold this property? Here again there is grave doubt that an ar-

[1] *Cf.* "German Reparations in the Soviet Empire," by Peter Nettl, *Foreign Affairs*, January 1951.

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rangement satisfactory to the Russians and the Germans could be reached, a doubt which in turn throws suspicion on the genuineness of the Russian offers. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Russians would abandon their reparation demands on the achievement of unity. Indeed, it is more likely that West Germany would find itself burdened with the incomplete reparation commitments of the Eastern Zone, and that the Russians would insist on writing such a provision into any unification proposal.

IV

An economic and political frontier drawn down the middle of a single national unit is like a wound, against which nature instinctively produces remedies. The plan-conscious East German Marxists, for whom self-sufficiency is sacred dogma, have done their utmost to accept the break as permanent and to stimulate domestic production of previously imported goods and raw materials. The fact that the shortages were largely in heavy industry —"basic industry" in their jargon—enabled them to adopt an orthodox Communist program of expanding just those industries which have always been more or less undeveloped in countries where the Communists have seized power. One wonders what would happen if the irony of history one day brought Communists to power in a country where consumer goods industries were relatively the least developed sector of the economy—Pennsylvania, for instance, or South Wales in the United Kingdom!

At excessive cost and in an uneconomic way, the East German administration has forced four brand new steel plants into precarious existence, and tried to compensate for the small amount of hard coal by pushing an ever greater quantity of labor into the mines. The spectacular reopening of the largely abandoned silver mines in Saxony to exploit their uranium content is an outstanding example. Metal refining and smelting, automobile construction and shipbuilding have had the benefit of intensive capital infusions, though much of the capital and most of the production is Russian-owned. Not that Eastern Germany has succeeded in making itself independent of the West! An investment program far beyond the resources of the Zone itself would be required just to return to a prewar level of production.

The vested economic interests created in the West are equally powerful. Consumer goods industries which, in the East, were either neglected or forced to work for reparations on what can

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only be described as a "cost minus" system, have emigrated to the West continuously from 1946. The printing industry, previously concentrated in Leipzig and Berlin, has in the main disappeared to Western Germany. Most of the skilled labor from the Zeiss works at Jena has drifted in the same direction, when it was not transplanted forcibly to Russia. Some of these migratory industries and skills have become viable in Western Germany and have not been replaced in the East; others have been duplicated, however, and exist by virtue of the economic barrier running through the center of Germany. For instance, the Sudeten textile industry, most of whose skilled laborers and technicians found a ready economic existence in Western Germany, free from the competition of Saxony, has become a successful vested interest in its new home; but if faced by the competition of the larger and more efficient units across the zonal border it would be hard hit. It is not surprising to hear one of the Sudeten spokesmen in Western Germany combining political absurdity with economic logic by calling for the reopening of the Sudetenland to the expelled Germans as a prerequisite of the unity campaign.

Finally there is the elusive but nonetheless important psychological fact that the longer the division of Germany lasts, the more separated East and West Germans become intellectually, psychologically and spiritually. Already, knowledge of what is going on on one side of the border is inexact on the other side, and, in spite of considerable newspaper coverage, information is more and more difficult to get. Hope of escaping from Communist control may continue to feed the demand for unity in the East. But in the West the personal urge to renew the links with the East may perhaps be on the way to being replaced by a more formal patriotism, based on political slogans and international considerations. The phrases used today by Ministers and journalists when dealing with unity seem more and more impersonal. Such stereotypes may be common coin for the expression of political feelings where the passions of constituents are involved. But if the unity campaign becomes less personal and more stereotyped it must lose much of its force, though one must always remember that such appraisals of the strength of national feeling can be no more than speculations.

v

These, then, are the arguments and factors operating against

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unity. The feeling for unity exists in Germany, and they will not destroy it; neither can they prevent Soviet exploitation of that emotion. The feeling in favor of unity will remain. The evidence does suggest, however, that if things continue for some years to go as they have been going, it will dwindle more and more into sentiment only, and the pressures against any attempt to make unity real will become stronger and will be recognized and taken into account. It may well be that this trend is appreciated by the Federal Chancellor himself, as shown by his patient but unwavering effort to build a solid foundation of association with the West rather than to follow the popular mirage of unity at all costs. In this he often has to compromise, and sometimes has had to disagree with certain of his own Ministers, particularly Jacob Kaiser, who is responsible for all-German affairs in the Federal Government. Yet amid these complexities Dr. Adenauer has pursued a remarkably steady course.

Nevertheless this assumption that the demand for unity may grow weaker as time passes is also subject to alteration by new events. A breakdown in the relations between the Western Powers and the Federal Government, an electoral overthrow of the present Government, the death or retirement of the 76-year-old Chancellor, or a significant Soviet gesture such as complete withdrawal from Eastern Germany might reverse the trend. Economic obstacles would not prevail against a political explosion, though after it occurred they could make havoc of the new arrangements.

For the West to endeavor to maintain the status quo for some years, and to avoid giving the Kremlin an opportunity to galvanize the movement for unity, seems sound policy. The Soviet leaders seem still to believe in the accuracy of their Marxist prediction that the "unity campaign" will deliver Germany into their hands through political channels. I believe that the foregoing considerations make that uncertain. If the rulers in the Kremlin come to doubt their success by present methods, we may see a return to the 1948 policy of violence and open provocation. A renewal of that more "active" Soviet policy is the danger against which the Western Powers must be on guard. Its beginning would be a sign that the Soviet unity campaign had failed.

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THE QUEST OF INDEPENDENCE

By Francis B. Sayre

AMERICANS seem not to realize what an important place dependent peoples and underdeveloped areas hold in the world today or what urgent problems are raised by their desire for independence and a larger share in the prosperity of our modern age. There is a tendency to consider these as secondary questions, not comparable in importance to the acute political problems of the day. But anyone who has served, as I have, as United States Representative in the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations, wrestling with the problem during more than five crowded years, will know the contrary. The policies which we adopt toward the backward areas of Asia and Africa will have consequences quite as far-reaching and profound as will the more spectacular decisions which we make in the stupendous struggle now raging between Soviet Russia and the free world. On their outcome hangs the future of civilization.

The situation is perilous today in large parts of Asia and in most of Africa because of the conjunction of three poison-breeding factors:

First, a condition of appalling human need. Living standards in most of Asia and Africa are the lowest in the world. In many sections, life expectancy at birth is only 32 years. One out of every three babies dies before reaching its first birthday. Those suffering from malaria in Asia today equal the total population of the Western hemisphere—and every year 3,000,000 of these sufferers die. Tuberculosis, malaria and yaws are rampant: all are controllable diseases. Monstrous illiteracy bars the door to spiritual or technological advance. More people in Asia and Africa are unable to read a word from a printed book or direction than inhabit the whole of Europe and of the United States.

Second, embittering memories of the cruel racial discrimination and exploitation which often accompanied nineteenth century colonialism. These have left livid scars. The feelings of racial inferiority which have been generated offer serious hindrances to Western attempts to build bulwarks for freedom. Racial hatreds have bred among many people in Asia and Africa profound distrust of all white peoples, and in some cases fear of them.

Third, surging forces of nationalism. The earlier conditions

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which isolated underdeveloped peoples have been largely swept away by modern commerce, the radio and military activities on a world scale. Asia and Africa today, emerging from the primitive conditions which locked them in for centuries, are being confronted with twentieth century problems which they scarcely understand and for which they are quite unprepared. Out of a welter of new conceptions and new aspirations the high explosive of nationalism is emerging. Peoples which have recently achieved independent statehood often remain rabidly nationalistic. Many of them, freed from the fetters of colonialism and awakening to the world around them, are beginning to feel the striking disparity between the peoples of the Western World, in their eyes luxuriating in plenty, and themselves, lacking even the bare essentials of existence. Millions of men and women in the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa are asking more and more insistently why they should live as the disinherited of the earth.

It is the conjunction of these three inter-related factors—desperate human need, the feeling of resentment bred by long years of racial discrimination and a new-found and explosive nationalism—that constitutes the problem of underdeveloped areas in Asia and Africa. Even if the Soviet régime collapsed tomorrow this problem would remain, and there could be no assurance of world peace until it had been mastered. For peace depends upon human freedom; and where there are desperate hunger and need, where racial hatreds are deep-rooted, and where peoples quite unprepared for the responsibilities of power acquire it suddenly, genuine freedom is impossible.[1]

II

In the face of these conditions three major sources of danger of the first magnitude are apparent, and United States policy should be consciously shaped and vigorously implemented to meet and avoid them. I think of Demosthenes' sage advice to the Athenians in 351 B.C. "Shame on you, Athenians," he cried, "for not wishing to understand that in war one must not allow oneself to be at the command of events. One must forestall them."

In the first place, there is the very real danger that the peoples of the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa will be successfully penetrated, wooed and won by Soviet agents, and that the

[1] Some of the material forming the basis for this article was used in a speech before the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston, April 9, 1952 (*Proceedings*, v. 81, no. 6).

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vast areas in question will thus be added to the strongholds of Communism. This possibility is indeed beginning to be recognized in the West. To suffering millions of peoples such as these the Communists come falsely offering deliverance. To dependent peoples under alien rule Communist slavemasters talk about the inalienable right of man to be free, and offer to make common cause with them against their foreign rulers. To agricultural peoples, exploited by landlords and money-lenders, they hold out promises of land reform which in practice lead not to individual ownership but to the collective farm. To lowly peoples, some of them actual victims of overbearing white discrimination and others oppressed by fancied grievances, they promise a new world built upon equal rights for all men and women. To peoples closed off from the world by illiteracy and appalling ignorance, they promise education and social advancement. Among the downtrodden and the dispossessed, their intoxicating message kindles exciting hopes for a new world. How are newly awakened and ignorant peoples to know that Soviet promises are false and impossible of fulfillment?

It is becoming increasingly apparent how heavily the Soviet Union is building its hopes today upon taking over, one by one, the underdeveloped areas of Asia and Africa. Stalin, the arch enemy of human freedom, pours out propaganda inciting Asian and other dependent peoples to rise against their governments. With the same cruelty with which he has already stripped the satellite states of every vestige of freedom, he waits to enslave them all in the name of "freedom."

There is another danger looming further in the future—in the world of the coming century. The problem of American security does not end with countering the Soviet enterprise. We decisively overthrew German militarism in 1918, but after its defeat it was followed by Nazism and Fascism, and now, by way of Russia, comes a no less monstrous threat to civilization. It will be repelled. But after the defeat of Soviet Communism will these restless areas be swept by some other ideology still more perilous, built upon equally alluring but equally hollow promises? If we allow these peoples, now entering upon a new period of their history and fast acquiring new forms of power, to remain in the grip of hunger, of chronic and preventable disease that saps their strength, of ignorance and illiteracy that shuts out hope, we have only ourselves to blame if in the twenty-first century we reap the

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whirlwind. Let us pause to remember that the whites constitute a decided minority race in the world, and that, however successfully power may be curbed for a time by political institutions or popular ignorance, the decisive strength ultimately rests in the hands of the people.

Whether or not the world is to have peace during the twenty-first century depends upon how effectively we work during this century—before we have lost the chance, as we have for the present in China—to assist the needy peoples of the earth to lift themselves out of the bondage of poverty, ignorance and disease.

III

A third pending danger raises immediate issues, and it is high time that the free peoples of the world devote close attention to them. The growing demand among newly awakened peoples for immediate political independence is producing ominous cleavages among nations and peoples which must stand strongly together if the attack now being made on human freedom on a world scale is to be successfully defeated.

International cleavages other than that between the Soviet Union and the free world are often evident in the debates of the United Nations; and if they are allowed to persist and deepen, they bode ill not only for the United Nations but for the cause of world peace itself. Acute disputes over tense political issues can usually be tided over, and with time may eventually be healed: political pressures constantly shift with changing events. But not so with innate prejudices and complexes acquired by individuals perhaps in childhood as a result of past discriminations or exploitation by alien races. Such groupings of weaker peoples against the Great Powers as are due to unhappy experiences in colonial days or to the poison of racial discrimination too often rest upon such inherent prejudice; and these may produce more dangerous cleavages than those resulting from political issues.

Significant tide-rips on the surface now and again reveal the deep-moving currents. In the General Assembly in Paris last November and December one felt the power of such currents in the debates of the Fourth Committee, where the representatives of some 60 nations deal with problems of trusteeship and dependent peoples. Of these 60 nations, eight administer the territories of dependent peoples and are responsible for their governance. Some 50 carry no such responsibility, although within the borders of

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many of them there live primitive peoples whose life is much the same as that of peoples in non-self-governing areas. In the Fourth Committee, consequently, in spite of support from some delegations representing non-administering countries, the eight administering Powers can be hopelessly outvoted. Often the administering Powers are urged by the majority to carry out policies which the majority would refuse to carry out in relation to their own peoples.

The issues that come to the surface in the debates in the Fourth Committee are basic. Certain peoples, isolated from the busy pathways of mankind, lack the modern resources, training and experience to govern themselves competently or to defend themselves against attack by a possible aggressor. Leading Western nations, with or without right, have entered the territories of many of these peoples in the past and successfully established control and government over them. Under the system of national sovereignty as developed in international law they consider today that their right to control and rule these people is legally and constitutionally unassailable.

But during the last 100 years a new social consciousness has arisen throughout the world, a deepening sense of the sanctity of the human rights which must lie at the foundation of any lasting world order. As a result, men and women everywhere are questioning the right of one people to govern and control another people without its consent; and the challenge is being pressed not only by dependent peoples but also by many sovereign nations which themselves possess no colonial territories. However strongly entrenched in law and in constitutional theory may be the right of colonial Powers to rule alien peoples, there is a growing tendency in the public mind to shift the issue from constitutional to moral considerations.

Within recent years, then, the march toward political independence has been assuming dramatic proportions. Moved by a complex of motives and forces, hastened by the pressures of world opinion, the great colonial Powers today are in numerous instances giving up former possessions or putting a time limit on the continuance of their rule. Since the Second World War some 500,000,000 people—a fifth of the entire population of the world —have won political independence.

But with independence come new problems; and genuine freedom is not to be had until a way can be found to solve them.

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Examples of this abound. As a result of the vote of the General Assembly in 1949, Libya has now become a "united independent and sovereign state," and the former occupying Powers, Great Britain and France, have transferred all their governmental powers to the new Libyan Government as from December 24, 1951. Free and democratic national elections have already been held there and a new constitution has been inaugurated.

But independence carries with it responsibilities. Defense calls for large outlays of money. Necessary buildings and public works cost large sums of money. So do adequate educational programs and public health measures. So do schools and hospitals and training institutions for indigenous schoolteachers and doctors and nurses. In Libya, thus far, the necessary revenues have for the most part come out of the treasuries of the administering Powers, Great Britain and France. Libya itself lacks sufficient revenues. The United Nations budget is not large enough to support the necessary expenditures. For the time being, Great Britain and France have promised to make good the deficits in the Libyan budget. During the current year the United Nations is advancing to Libya more than $1,000,000 in technical assistance; the United States is advancing about $1,500,000. But the question remains how the Libyan people will in the long run meet the necessary costs of economic and social and educational advancement. Whence will come the money?

Or take another example. In 1950 the people of the former Italian colony of Somaliland were put under trusteeship under Italian administration in accordance with the 1949 vote of the General Assembly and were promised their political independence at the end of ten years. The civil expenditures in Somaliland for the past year were almost double the amounts of receipts derived from the territory itself. Local receipts totaled $4,616,850, while civil expenditures amounted to $8,463,140. The difference is made up by a direct contribution from the administering authority. The Government of Italy also assumed all obligations relating to the security corps. Also, it is worth noting that about 75 percent of the direct and indirect taxes in Somaliland are paid by Italians.

Experts doubt whether Somaliland can ever be a viable state, supporting a high or even moderate level of government services. They question whether the country possesses sufficient natural resources or enough possibilities of industrial development ever

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to produce the revenues necessary for an adequately governed self-sufficient state. In 1960, Italy, the administering Power, steps out. What then?

Problems such as these face us today in many similar areas. Men and women are questioning the right of any nation to govern an alien people against their will, but they forget that the maintenance of independence and the development of economic and industrial resources cost money and require trained personnel. Where are these to come from? Surely the answer is not simple abandonment of the countries in question. Underdeveloped peoples cannot be left to live on in ignorance and want even if they would. In many of the underdeveloped areas in Asia and Africa we today have perhaps our last opportunity to meet these problems with humane and Christian solutions. If we fail, can we be surprised if Communism moves in?

Underlying the debates in the Fourth Committee is the effort on the part of many of the non-administering Powers to widen the scope of international accountability for the government of dependent peoples beyond the point specifically agreed to by the eight administering Powers in 1945 when the Charter was written and the international trusteeship system set up. How far can a system of international accountability for the government of dependent peoples be pushed? In other words, have the representatives of the 60 nations which are members of the United Nations the power to require the administering states to adopt such specific policies in the government of their dependent peoples as the Fourth Committee may decide upon by a majority vote?

The contest takes many different forms. Last November, in the opening days of the session, the Fourth Committee voted to grant hearings to representatives of the Ewe people, dwelling within the trust territories of French and British Togoland in West Africa. Since these representatives were invited to present their views in a controversy involving an international trust territory, there seemed little question as to the Fourth Committee's competence. In fact, the United Kingdom representative at the very outset spoke in favor of the invitation. This, however, was followed by a resolution similarly to grant a hearing to chiefs of the Herero, Nama and Damara tribes dwelling in South West Africa. South West Africa is not a trust territory but a mandated territory, set up by the League of Nations under the administration of the South African Union. Ever since the creation of the

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international trusteeship system the South African Union had steadily refused to put South West Africa under trusteeship in spite of repeated recommendations by the General Assembly. The representative of the Union Government strongly protested that since South West Africa is not a trust territory the adoption of the resolution would be an unconstitutional intervention in the Union's domestic affairs and thus a violation of its Charter rights. Others took a contrary view. When the resolution was passed, the Union delegation withdrew from the Fourth Committee and boycotted its further proceedings.

After this episode, there came severe criticism of British rule in British Honduras from the representative of Guatemala; and this in turn was followed by critical references by Greece to British rule in Cyprus and by Yemen to British administration in Aden. These speeches provoked strong British protests. There followed an attempt on the part of the Arab group to question French rule in Morocco. French Morocco is neither a trust territory nor is it under mandate. The representative of Iraq charged that the "lamentable position of Morocco" was basically due to the policy of colonialism pursued by France there. Every manifestation of nationalism, he asserted, was being harshly and strongly suppressed. The French representative protested that under the provisions of the Charter the proceeding lacked any constitutional validity; and he walked out of the Committee.

In debating the legality of the proceedings most of the non-administering Powers took the position that the Fourth Committee was entirely competent to discuss political matters and political aspects not only in trust territories but in all non-self-governing territories as well, and a resolution to that effect was introduced. Running through many minds was the position strongly taken by certain non-administering Powers the preceding year that the Fourth Committee is competent by its vote to determine the specific policies which "the administering authorities are under a clear obligation to implement." Dark clouds began to gather over the Fourth Committee. Would it split into irreconcilable factions? In the end, the Iraq representative agreed not to press the matter to a vote and the French representative returned to the Fourth Committee. But none could fail to realize the deep-seated animosities becoming manifest. Intense emotions had been aroused; far-reaching issues were at stake.

The seriousness of these incidents of last November must not

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be overmagnified. But their significance must certainly be fully appraised: every flier must know the air currents upon which he depends. Storm signals are appearing in many quarters. Cleavages such as those described can easily and quickly develop into acute political tensions. Indeed, this seems already to be happening in many important areas of the world. It is clearly urgent for the United States to develop and follow a carefully planned policy rather than to allow the situation to drift toward catastrophe.

Concrete examples of present trends are constantly manifesting themselves. The Arab peoples are at present inflamed with ill-feeling against France because of the charges of French ill treatment made by representatives of indigenous Moslem peoples in North Africa. Whatever the facts may be, the Arab resentment, based on a widespread belief by Arab peoples of French suppression and "colonialism," is an undeniable fact. Now the Middle Eastern bloc, supported by a large number of Latin American states, is able, together with the Soviet bloc, to control a majority of votes in the General Assembly. During the recent Paris session of the General Assembly the Arab states sought to place a discussion of French rule in North Africa on the agenda. France strenuously objected and succeeded in winning enough support successfully to resist the Arab move. Failing to gain their end, either in the Fourth Committee or in the plenary sessions of the General Assembly, the Arab group next made a determined move to have the Tunisian question placed upon the agenda of the Security Council, meeting in New York in April 1952. On both occasions the United States was placed in an exceedingly difficult position. The often declared policy of the United States in both the General Assembly and the Security Council has been consistently in favor of allowing full freedom of discussion. Yet application of that principle in these two particular situations would risk the alienation of France, whose military assistance is of key importance in the world struggle for human freedom. By our failure to apply it we damaged the friendship for us of the Arab and Middle Eastern peoples, whose support is also vital for the protection of American interests and the preservation of peace. The dilemma for the United States is unhappily one that is becoming increasingly frequent and acute.

In sum, there is developing a deepening and immensely dangerous cleavage in the councils of the world organization. On the

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one hand are the "colonial" or administering group—the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Australia and New Zealand—representing the culture of the Græco-Roman world and of Western Europe, possessing great military strength and a wealth of strategic bases, and ripe in experience in dealing with indigenous and underdeveloped peoples. On the other hand are the non-administering group, composed of some 50 nations, the larger part of them comparatively weak militarily and inexperienced in problems of colonial rule, many of them newcomers to the family of nations. In view of this developing cleavage what shall be the position of the United States? The question keeps arising in one concrete form or another in the various organs of the United Nations and particularly in the Fourth Committee and in the Trusteeship Council.

The problem raises issues in many fields. It touches one of the monumental facts of our time—the progressive shift of power in world politics, from Europe to America and perhaps in coming years from America to Asia. The great nineteenth-century arsenals of power—Great Britain and France, and with them Belgium and the Netherlands—are today being forced into second place. Not unnaturally, nevertheless, their attitudes, reactions and habits of thought are still in large measure based upon outlived nineteenth-century balances of power. On the other hand, in this new twentieth-century world many hitherto weak people are tasting new-found power. The Russian people have stepped to the front of the world stage. China and Japan have each to be reckoned with; and India with her 350,000,000 awakening people is a potential dynamo of power either for or against the Western World. In such a time of transition there is need for the older possessors of power to be alert to understand swiftly changing conditions and to realize that they can no longer afford to base their policies and decisions upon purely material factors or assumed superiority of race. Equally there is need for those peoples which are exercising newly acquired power to recognize the responsibilities which go with membership in the community of nations in the twentieth century.

IV

World peace can be built only upon human freedom. Yet at present some 200,000,000 people do not govern themselves. What is the solution of this paradox?

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The easy but superficial answer is prompt independence for all. This, the answer which the Soviets beguilingly espoused at San Francisco when the United Nations Charter was being framed in 1945, carries an instant emotional appeal to almost everyone. It wins support in every General Assembly—particularly among the Latin American groups and those Middle Eastern states which have achieved their independence after long years of struggle. And we Americans, perhaps more than any other people, believe that freedom is the rock upon which all human progress must be built. Without it, we know, democracy cannot exist and stable world peace cannot be attained.

Under its Charter, the United Nations is consecrated to the task of assisting all non-self-governing peoples in their progressive development toward independence or self-government. This is the avowed purpose of every people outside the Soviet ring. Since the setting up of the United Nations, as has already been pointed out, some 500,000,000 people have acquired political independence. Seven new nations of Asia—India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia—have come into existence. To these must be added Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Israel in the Middle East; and in Africa, Libya, which was given independence last December. Somaliland, Nepal, the new states of Indo-China and others stand in the offing.

But what many fail to understand is that political independence is not synonymous with human freedom. In 1783 the wresting of American independence from the British Crown was only the first step toward freedom. There had to be many more steps. There had to be a constitutional bill of rights to guarantee freedom of speech and of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of assembly, freedom from illegal process. Thereafter it took the people of the independent nation many years of sustained effort to build the social and cultural foundations necessary to establish American freedom and make it reasonably secure. And still we are in the process of building. As we move forward we continually gain new vision and adopt new goals.

Genuine freedom cannot be achieved by a mere political grant or by a military victory. It comes only as adequate political, economic, social and educational foundations can be made ready. In Somaliland, for instance, unless the people can learn, through actual experience and training, what majority rule by secret ballot means and accept the responsibilities that must go with de-

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mocracy; unless the local revenues can be increased through rapid agricultural or industrial development to pay for sorely needed schools and teachers and hospitals and doctors, there will be no genuine individual human freedom there ten years from now. Political independence is a notable step along the way. But surely it is only a step, and in no sense the goal itself. Men can be as effectively manacled by economic and social forms of servitude as by political oppression. Among the peoples living in many primitive parts of Asia and Africa the real problems therefore go far deeper than political status. In such areas genuine solutions can come only through steady processes of education and training in the fundamentals upon which successful self-government must be built.

When we undertook the administration of the Philippine Islands in 1898, we did not, in spite of insistent Filipino demands, give them independence for almost half a century. Instead we sent among them armies of schoolteachers and doctors and road-builders. We helped them to learn the meaning of democracy in action. We gave them practical experience in the exasperating art of self-government. Even today we must continue to assist them as they learn to stand alone.

The premature grant of political independence, before a people have had adequate economic and social preparation, can do them untold harm. Indigenous leaders who are not subject to the restraint of the civic standards that come with popular education can exploit their compatriots as ruthlessly as aliens, or even more so. Nor is the cause of international peace served by giving full independence to a people who are not able to defend themselves. Large parts of Asia and Africa which today possess immense natural resources and exceedingly valuable strategic bases are inhabited by people quite unable to hold their own against lawless aggressors armed with twentieth-century weapons.

If we are to build for human welfare and for the peace of the world our course is, therefore, clearly marked. We must stimulate and help the peoples in all underdeveloped areas, self-governing as well as non-self-governing, to construct the kind of economic and social and educational foundations necessary to prepare them for maintaining their political freedom and to qualify them for increasing self-government. Only thus can we rid ourselves of the inherent dangers now existing in every underdeveloped country—dangers due to Communist infiltration, to the possible

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rise and spread among such peoples in the future of ideologies even more devastating than Communism, to deepening cleavages among those who must stand together if peace is to be stabilized in the world. Only thus do we make our own freedom.

Many will ask why we should force a twentieth-century culture upon peoples who through the centuries have developed their own cultures and found happiness in them. Would it not make for the happiness of all to leave them unmolested in their own ways of life? The answer is that we in fact have no choice. No one can stay the hand of advancing cultures—least of all in an age when insistent commercial and military demands knit all peoples into an inescapable unity. Western Samoa during the whole of the second half of the nineteenth century struggled to preserve its indigenous culture and to remain in isolation from Western civilization. The effort was of no avail. Other attempts tell the same story. In the shrunken world of the twentieth century no people can successfully isolate their native culture behind a Chinese wall. Each people has contributions of incalculable value to make to the human race. The conditions of our twentieth century demand that every people make its own contributions and share the differing cultures of others.

What, specifically, is to be our American policy in face of this increasing demand for independence regardless, as it were, of consequences? We cannot afford to abandon our West European and British Commonwealth allies. Neither can we afford to turn our backs on the struggle for human freedom or sacrifice the good will of smaller nations composed of virile peoples bent on making their way in the world. Because of its wealth, its military power and its traditional stand for democracy and human rights, the United States finds itself today in a strategic position to exercise a high leadership. It must rise above partisan politics. It must play no favorites. It must give convincing evidence of its determination to utilize its power and its resources for the protection of human rights everywhere. It must give groups of opposing forces to understand that its assistance can be counted on only in so far as the course and policy pursued is one for human welfare. The day of military alliances for purely selfish interests and national aggrandizement is past.

The American policy toward the problem of independence must be based, then, upon recognition of the inherent human right of every people to freedom, and thus to eventual independ-

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ence or self-government. With this right, however, go very definite responsibilities. Until a people is prepared and ready to assume these responsibilities, the grant of political independence may do them and the cause of peace more harm than good. In other words, American policy must affirm the right and capacity of all peoples to work toward self-government or independence; but it must also take account of the fact that all are not as yet equally ready to shoulder the resulting responsibilities.

V

The task of building adequate economic, social and educational foundations in underdeveloped territories must be pushed with all speed. It is a monumental task. But the great fact is that the free peoples of the world are coming to comprehend ever more clearly the underlying issues and are concentrating more of their energies on developing methods for constructive progress. Measurable advances are being made both by the United Nations and by the coördinated efforts of individual states. The Trusteeship Council, the Economic and Social Council, the U. N. Technical Assistance Board, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, UNESCO, the Commission on Human Rights and other U.N. organs and specialized agencies—all are making their distinctive contribution.

Perhaps the most profound and baffling problem of all among underdeveloped peoples is the issue of racial discrimination. One thing we know. Brazen racial discrimination undermines the position of the white man in the world community. Change will come; and it is greatly to the interest of the white race to help to guide rather than to impede that change.

As a matter of fact, experience over many years has shown that when colonial administration is based upon the exploitation of human beings, it has bred only difficulties and well-nigh insuperable problems. On the other hand, when colonial administration came to be based upon the conception of sharing common problems and common fortunes, stable and reasonably satisfactory solutions have generally been reached. One thinks of New Zealanders and Maoris, of Americans and Filipinos. Wise administration recognizes the oneness of the human race.

It is along this pathway that the United States, acting through the United Nations and other carefully coördinated enterprises, must push forward. During the current year the total program of

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the United States in technical assistance, excluding its contribution to the United Nations, amounts to more than $200,000,000. This amount should be substantially increased. At the same time we must keep in mind that assistance programs cannot be rammed down the throats of undesiring recipients. At least one non-Communist country has refused the offer of American technical assistance because it fears or misunderstands our motives. Also, innovations may arouse the opposition of tribal chiefs or the holders of vested rights. Again, old-time subsistence economies, easygoing and never exacting, often have a greater appeal than increased revenues. Progress as it is conceived of in our Western cultures is not necessarily coveted by every people, particularly if it involves the abandonment of ancestral ways of life.

The building of economic foundations for freedom clearly involves more than handing out dollars or pounds or francs in backward areas. Like all effective work for human progress it requires a deep understanding of the people concerned, tempered with infinite patience and wisdom. It will not succeed unless wrought with an abiding faith in the dignity and worth of every personality, regardless of the color of his skin or his unfamiliarity with formal education.

Probably the most necessary foundation for human freedom, particularly among primitive and tribal peoples, lies in the field of education. "If a nation expects to be ignorant and free," wrote Thomas Jefferson, "it expects what never was and never will be." In Asia, Africa and the South Pacific, many peoples still lack any comprehension of what human progress outside their own static cultures means. In the weird Cargo Cult of the South Pacific, for example, one gains a glimpse of the thought processes of the primitive mind. Among the peoples of some of the islands runs an unquestioning belief in magic, in the power of the fetish, in unholy spells. Struck with the utterly inexplicable power of foreigners to produce as from the skies inexhaustible supplies of ships and guns and food and kerosene stoves and machine monsters of indescribable power, certain South Pacific peoples under the spell of the Cargo Cult, perhaps touched by a misunderstood conception of sacrifice gained from Christian missions, will take a sudden decision to destroy everything they possess—to tear down their houses, burn their pathetic belongings, chop down their trees and root up their gardens, in a fine gesture of faith

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and hope that their gods or ancestors will thus be induced to send to them, too, even as do the foreign gods to their followers, miraculous machines and a wealth of food.

As a general rule, there is an intense eagerness in underdeveloped areas for modern schooling. In most such areas it is far easier to get children to come to school than it is to provide sufficient schools and trained teachers to teach them. An educational program based upon the use of foreign teachers for a population running into millions or even tens of millions is manifestly impracticable; there are not enough foreign teachers to be had. The solution must be adequate training schools where indigenous teachers can be trained.

Plainly the problem of independence and the development of underdeveloped areas in Asia and Africa cannot be solved in a night, but will require endless effort along a hundred different fronts. It falls into two parts, distinct but inseparable. Freedom involves not only the absence of political oppression but also the emancipation of men and women from the shackles of hunger, disease and ignorance. Both are necessary. Victory in one field contributes to victory in the other. But both must progress together. If we recognize this and act upon it, Soviet Communism will not win. Neither authoritarianism nor ruthless dictatorship can ever permanently prevail. Free men working together throughout the world for human freedom possess matchless power. Today they are uniting as never before. Their power is unconquerable.

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MODERN NATIONS AND ISLAM

By Robert Montagne

ALMOST unforeseen development of modern history has been the metamorphosis of the immense Moslem community, stretching from the Dutch East Indies to Morocco and from the Mediterranean to the tropical forests of Africa, which in response to Western influences has broken up into a number of modern countries. Already 14 separate Moslem states crowd into the Assembly of the United Nations or stand on its threshold. African and Asian leaders wish at least six others to join them tomorrow. How will these new arrivals behave in the international council chamber? Will they maintain separate individualities? Will they be governed by their particular interests, or will they instead form a compact group dominated by religious or ethnic considerations? Will they join forces with neighboring racial groups? These questions pose a major problem for the West. It is not simply a question of the existence in the Assembly of a permanently close-knit group which would usually be in a position to tip the scales as it wished; the balance of power in the West is also at stake. For in practice the vast territories occupied by Islam, with their strategic areas and potential resources, are of such importance that indirectly they may determine the future of the Atlantic community.

II. THE NEW NATIONS OF THE EAST

The national concept is totally alien to Moslem civilization, and in each of the modern states recently created it still seems an "heretical innovation" to orthodox Moslem jurists. The modern nation which we take as our model in talking to the East is a segment of humanity, enclosed in precise frontiers, where men live free and equal under the law without distinction of race or creed, legislate for themselves and develop a consciousness of their own historic destiny. Its core is the state, organized according to orderly administrative techniques, which by reason of its structure is adapted to the economic and social developments necessitated by increases in population and the competition of other nations. Its vitality provides the moral and material forces needed for its internal and external security.

All these principles are new to Islamic civilization. Moslem

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law, the *shari'ah,* makes no provision for separation between church and state. For centuries it has held sway over innumerable phases of family, economic and political life of the faithful. Its authority rests upon the precepts of a revealed Holy Book through which the will of God is clearly expressed. As a result, the only points on which man can legislate freely are those few regarding which Moslem law itself is silent. Even though Moslems often protest against our calling their civilization theocratic, because, they say, there are no priests in Islam, it must be admitted that the divine origin of the *shari'ah* has the practical result of subordinating social and political life to the dictates of Allah. The worldly destinies of peoples bow to the decrees of eternity.

From this it becomes clear why—as history indicates—the Moslem peoples have never asserted their individuality through freely enacted laws. The only method for so doing found by certain groups was conversion to some heretical sect, as in Iran, the Yemen, and, before the great conquests of eastern Islam in the Maghreb, among the Berber peoples of North Africa.

Nevertheless, all Islamic history is filled with the violent struggle between monarchs, aided by the guardians of the law, and rebellious tribes which aspired to self-government. The justification for the princely attitude was that the traditions governing tribal law antedated the revelations of the Prophet and were consequently considered a legacy from the "time of ignorance." This rivalry has too often been ignored by the West. Down even into the twentieth century it often has paralyzed the internal unification of Moslem countries, which long kept intact, and in less developed areas still do keep intact, habits of political and social life similar to those known in Western Europe in the eighth century, before the feudal era, when the barbarian invasions had broken up the Roman Empire.

In Islam, every believer, wherever he may be, can serve any and all Moslem princes on the same terms and according to the same uniform law. In Islam, in consequence, the idea of frontiers has no juridical meaning, and the most complete and perfect theoretical unity of the community easily accords with an anarchical division into many principalities, temporary or lasting.

But even though the universal Islamic law applies to all the faithful without discrimination, those living in a Moslem state who do not belong to the true faith remain in a subordinate

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position. Monotheistic infidels—Christians and Jews—living according to their own religious laws, have only a protected status politically, and rigidly restricted judicial and economic rights. As for pagan infidels, they have no rights at all. The situation reveals the depth of the belief in the superiority of the believer to the unbeliever.

As is well known, Moslem civilization which was so brilliant in the twelfth century became static just as our civilization began its irresistible rise. In the nineteenth century, the West's expansion suddenly brought home to the Islamic élite the grave dangers inherent in their archaic institutions and their military and economic weakness. The more open-minded of them, convinced of the need for "reforms," aimed primarily at restoring the lost strength of the Moslem nations through imitating European technical methods. The best thinkers among them acknowledged at the same time that a metamorphosis of political methods was imperative also and that Western liberalism offered a solution to their internal ills. These first attempts, though sincere, were almost everywhere ineffectual. Doubtless this was because within the superficially modernized framework religious thought and social institutions remained in strict conformity with mediaeval ideals.

It was then—as early as 1880 but especially after 1918—that a strong reaction set in, motivated by Islamic pride. After all, argued the traditionalists and all who were troubled and dissatisfied, occidental supremacy was purely material. The true reason for the decline of Islam was divine wrath due to the decay of faith and morals. Like the ancient prophets of Israel, the orthodox jurists therefore urged that a complete return to revealed truth would simultaneously restore to Islam its power, prosperity and happiness. Even today, this belief is firmly rooted alike in the minds of theological scholars and the ignorant populace. More than any other factor it nourishes the stubborn dream that the past can be restored.

In 1918, among the ruins of the Turkish Empire, there began what for the Moslem East was a new experience. The West introduced the concept of the nation; and by establishing new frontiers or taking in charge old crumbling countries it stimulated everywhere the formation of modern states which were expected to transform themselves in the course of time into national entities. The most fruitful field of experiment was the Arab penin-

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sula, the very heart of Islam, where were drawn the outlines of seven nations, one of them to become the state of Israel. This partition was much criticized by a section of the Arab élite. Ignoring the strength of particularism, the rivalries of cities and dynasties and the persistence of tribal traditions, these men had dreamed for several years the romantic dream of a great unified nation, a kind of resurrection of the Omayyad and Abbasid Empires.

Disillusionment followed the jettisoning of this great project; but the experiment in nation-building nevertheless achieved partial success in the next 30 years. At least three countries—Iraq, Syria and Lebanon—have, after many vicissitudes, actually made themselves into modern states. Two of them have adopted republican governments on the French model, while the third has a constitution inspired by English traditions. Egypt, which became independent in 1936 following a long and profitable tutelage under British and French political and cultural influences, seemed on the eve of the Second World War to be the most powerful and best organized of the new Arab nations. She derived immense prestige in the Middle East and in Africa from this situation—a sufficient justification in her eyes for the leadership which she claimed by right. Saudi Arabia and the Yemen alone preserved their mediaeval attitudes; they were countries of tribes and feudal fiefs held together by the authority of Islamic law exercised by absolute monarchs who made no concessions to modern thought.

Within these somewhat narrow limits, the work of the Western Powers proved fruitful, especially until 1947. The frontiers drawn by the West have been respected; goods crossing them have been subjected to protective tariffs; and each nation has strictly and proudly enforced the laws governing foreign activities and the sanitary and quarantine regulations. Each country has built up its own ports and railroads, Syria going so far as to use Latakia rather than depend on the Lebanese port of Beirut. Modern administrations run by correctly trained officials have provided the advantages of modern administrative techniques.

In addition, the assimilation of ethnic and religious minorities has been undertaken, not without occasional clashes, especially in Iraq and Syria, but on the whole more easily and with more continuity than had been expected. In the last few months, when it was proposed that the Syrian constitution make Islam the

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state religion, the heads of the various other churches addressed a joint protest to the authorities, something which Moslem public opinion would never have permitted 40 years ago. Little by little the tribes themselves are weakening, except in the region of the steppes where the Bedouin shepherds still engage in bloody struggles, without, however, menacing the central authority of the state.

But it is in the realm of jurisprudence that the greatest progress is being made. Western attitudes are gradually permeating legislation, though not without opposition, judging by the present conflict in Lebanon where the lawyers find themselves in opposition both to the Christian canonists and the orthodox Moslem jurists. Of major importance has been the influence exerted by the best Egyptian legal minds—among them the dean of the bar, Sanhoury—who for years have been accustomed to the Mixed Courts where Western codes are applied, and who have been influential in introducing modern ideas into the codes of Iraq, Syria and Jordan. This slow evolution has not yet accomplished as much in the Arab countries as Kemal Atatürk achieved in Turkey by introducing the Swiss code of law. But the current of ideas, even though less powerful, has nevertheless been gradually drawing these new countries in the same direction—that is, toward the West.

Finally, great efforts have been made in intellectual fields. Education in primary, secondary and higher schools has been pushed resolutely ahead in each of the modern countries, though at the expense of religious and traditional education. In the absence of a native literature, a modern Arabic press has arisen and is gaining increasing numbers of readers in each country. The national economies have also progressed. Each endeavors to satisfy its own ends, keep its trade in balance and maintain the stability of its currency.

The psychological results of these sustained efforts are evident. Signs of vigorous patriotism have appeared inside frontiers which at the start were considered artificial. Although there is a longing for union, each government pursues its own domestic policies and defends them against any sign of intrigue by its neighbors. These successes—however limited—do credit to both East and West and prove that the national idea has taken firm root.

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III. DOMESTIC CRISES

To this optimistic picture some shadows must be added. And unfortunately it must be said that in recent years they not only have darkened but sometimes have obscured the new national characteristics.

From 1910 to 1935, the evolution of the Middle East states benefited from the methodical activities of a modern governing class trained in schools and universities under French, American and British influence. They supplied a framework of men with liberal ideas for government. Inspired by Western humanism, even though not daring specifically to deny the ancient traditions, they made the states ready for modernization. But about 1935, as the Italian and German dictatorial régimes developed, a great change took place. The student youth rapidly abandoned liberal principles and began modelling itself on the Fascist organizations which were rallying the new European generations to belief in naked force. Suddenly—in Iraq, in Syria, in Lebanon, in Palestine, in Egypt—there sprang up paramilitary youth organizations, with different-colored shirts and gaudy emblems, which placed their battalions, some disciplined, some anarchical, at the service of the politicians. At the same time the universities (especially in Egypt) became hotbeds of agitation. Learning was at a discount, replaced by patriotic zeal. Degrees were still awarded, however, to this enthusiastic but badly educated youth in the same lavish manner as before. The public service—indeed the national life itself—was soon affected by this decadence, with consequences which cannot be overestimated in these troublous times.

The truth is, of course, that the machinery of modern economic progress by its very nature benefits first of all the rich classes, which in any event profit from government favors. In Egypt, Iraq and Syria, where there are great rural estates, social inequalities increased because the rapid growth of the poverty-stricken population deferred improvements in the standard of living. The city proletariat, increasing in numbers and in misery, quickly became an element of economic, social and soon political instability. The resulting menace is aggravated by the fact that under modern constitutions this wretched populace is expected to participate in political life.

Alongside these developments another must also be mentioned: the weakness which has overtaken the Moslem brother-

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hoods as a result of puritan and bourgeois reformism. Formerly these mystical fraternities had held the common people in a tight hierarchical organization, making them resigned and submissive to traditional Islamic values. But when faith is still strong and active in an ignorant and neglected people, religious sentiment can become, in a crisis of misery, uncontrollably explosive. A Moslem Caliban arises, screaming hate for the rich and the foreign; he fires palaces, hotels, night clubs and cinemas, while the radio endlessly repeats the *suras* of the Koran exhorting the faithful to a Holy War.

Such a popular rising is the result of a deep social cleavage. The first generations trained by the West had gradually turned from religious studies and traditional devotional practices, and thereby found themselves isolated from the common people; whereas the new youth, turbulent, less well educated, and anxious to seize power, went, unlike its elders, directly to the suffering plebs. It spoke to them in the only language which can successfully unite and direct them, the language which evokes the idealized glory of the Islam of the past. Simple and austere slogans, religious and anti-foreign, aroused the people to rid themselves of Western influences and restore by force the divine law and the faith which are so dear to the hearts of humble believers. Modern civilization became synonymous with corruption and depravity.

The popular religious and anti-foreign movement of the Ikhwan Muslimin appeared in Egypt in 1930, with the immense success that we all know. On the eve of the war with Palestine this new religious and political sect had under its control more than a million Egyptians, and it continues to increase its power in Palestine and even in Syria, where it claims to exercise a decisive voice in the elections. In Iran the Fedayn el Islam was organized on the same basis, and now it controls the Majlis by its threats. Terrorism has taken the place of political activity; and assassination has become a method of government, so much so that in three years a dozen statesmen of the older generation have paid with their lives for their courage and independent spirit.

Inevitably, under such conditions, the survival of democratic institutions in all these countries became increasingly threatened. Parties formerly animated by a liberal spirit, like the Egyptian Wafd, were forced to come to terms with the new popular trends; they yielded increasingly to demagogical pressures and began to

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use them instead of controlling them. The ignorant and emotional masses exerted strong influence in both foreign and domestic affairs. The result has been a series of military coups d'état, which appeared as early as 1936 in Iraq and have been frequent in Syria. The army steps forward as the umpire, the only agency capable of reëstablishing order in Baghdad, Damascus or Cairo. Salvation seems to lie only in the formation of strong governments, and the legendary figure of Kemal Atatürk of Anatolia shines as a desirable model. Happy the people lucky enough to have as its leader a good tyrant!

The Palestine crisis of 1947 further contributed to the internal disorder of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, while simultaneously stimulating an irresistible movement toward Islamic solidarity across national frontiers. Jews who had been inhabitants of the Arab states, often for dozens of centuries, were summarily expelled toward Israel. The Christians themselves felt their status affected momentarily. Thus at fundamental points the modern concept of the state received a series of setbacks.

IV. PAN-ARABISM

We spoke above of the beginnings of the pan-Arab movement early in the present century. Highly divergent ideas joined to form it—national romanticism, inspired by the examples of German and Italian unity; literary reminiscences of the great Arab empires of the Middle Ages; and confused Islamic longings, favorable to the restoration of an *Oumma* in political form. Synthesis of the doctrine was gradual, and is still best expressed in the strange and almost prophetic manifesto of Abd el-Rahman published in 1932, so sympathetic to the oriental mind that it was memorized in the schools. From there on, the pan-Arabism with which the young were indoctrinated became a political force. In Iraq, King Feisal tried to turn it to his own advantage; later the Syrian leaders spread the doctrine; and finally in 1943 the Egyptian politicians sought to bring it under their control through the complicated transactions which culminated in the formation of the Arab League. Everyone wished to appropriate the new force. Even England thought to direct its development.

The impossibility of coöperation of the Arab states in practical terms, and more especially the disaster in Palestine, are gradually destroying the elaborate political machinery which, it had been dreamt, would extend the operations of the League to Libya and

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all of North Africa, and even down the coasts of the Atlantic to Mauritania. These various ambitions, agitations and resulting intrigues have had a serious effect on the solidarity of the nations concerned. Certain political leaders cautiously sought to realize the greater unity by first extending their own frontiers, with the result that other states, Syria and Lebanon for instance, found their own existence threatened. They reacted violently. The effort at unification became itself a source of discord. Meanwhile the foreign propaganda of the proponents of unity fanned false hopes in the breasts of Arab patriots in the towns and cities of North Africa and made more difficult the thorny problem of racial symbiosis arising from the presence of 2,500,000 Christians and Jews among 20,000,000 Arab-Berber Moslems.

Political assassination and the secret activity of fanatical sects are a specialty of the political life of the Moslem Orient, due, doubtless, both to the existence and diversity of the ethnic and religious groups and to their concealed existence. In contrast, the Maghreb, both simpler and more unified, had been generally spared this plague since the time of the Arab Empire, when the Eastern sects had set out to conquer it. The Second World War reawoke the inclinations toward violence everywhere in the regions. The examples of the Irgun and of the Stern gang, of the European resistance and of Communist group activities, incited the organization of terrorist movements divided into cells and operated by secret and remote control. They professed pan-Arab nationalism or fanatic Moslem aims. But organizations thus constituted rarely remain true to the aims of their founders. The law of secrecy has its weaknesses, among them that it allows skillful infiltration. Various foreign elements insinuated themselves into the very core of these activist groups, either to further certain objectives or to appropriate the sect's formidable destructive power. Such movements know no frontiers. Their instruments are assassination and riot, and they can inflict wounds on the governments of the states where they operate which, as one sees in Iran, risk becoming mortal.

In the last few years, significantly, efforts have been made to establish these oriental methods even in the Maghreb under the guidance of political leaders who are established in Cairo or have taken refuge there. In Tunisia, the "Black Hand of Neo-Destour" renewed in 1952 the efforts which it made in 1940 when it was financed with German and Italian money; in Algiers

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demonstrations have been staged by the Algerian Popular Party; Tangiers, where there have been riots, was favored by a secret visit of the Algerian Foudil el Curtilani, one of the chiefs of the Ikhwan and the assassin of the King of the Yemen. Recent inspired troubles in the Middle Atlas and at Safi reflect the same techniques. In all of this rioting, sabotage and assassination the activities of nationalist extremists, fanatic Moslems and Communists are so mingled that it is impossible to disentangle one from the other. It is a fact, however, that the Communist papers destined for North African Moslems carry a discreet propaganda favorable to the Ikhwan Muslimin, and apparently the tactical alliance of Moslem terrorism and Communism is virtually accomplished.

V. THE NEW PAN-ISLAMISM

The failure of the Arab League crushed many hopes in the minds of the young élite and in the simple hearts of the masses. Any experienced politician in the Orient knows he must soothe the mob by conjuring up consoling visions. Indeed, a recognized habit of the Arab mind is to evade the harsh realities of the present by retreat into dreams of past and future glories. The man of the desert, weary of the sight of stony steppes, looks in the clouds for the golden mirage of the "City of Bronze."

We have seen in the last two years how everything has tended to foster the concept of a union even more comprehensive and close-knit than that of pan-Arabism—a union of the peoples and governments of the whole world of Islam. The popular effervescence aroused by religious slogans and the solidarity shown in face of the Israeli peril had already laid the groundwork for a spiritual union. Pakistan seized on the opportunity thus offered. This young Moslem country, powerful in size but still organically frail, threatened by its Hindu neighbor India, saw that it might strengthen itself by offering to serve as an organizing center for the new pan-Islamism. Three congresses were held in Karachi, in February 1949, 1951 and 1952.

Here once again, as in the case of pan-Arabism, men of divergent attitudes found themselves coöperating. Those who had taken the initiative in the project were perhaps the most up-to-date and open-minded men in the Moslem world today. They were disciples of Sir Mohammed Iqbal, trained in modern methods by British instructors, but still completely devoted to the

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Holy Book and deeply respectful of the *Sunna*, the prophetic tradition of the first century. It was their dream to reject the patient work of the orthodox jurists of earlier eras, now held responsible for the stagnation of Islam. Such a revolution, they thought, would permit the creation of genuine modern states. One cannot help sympathizing with them, even though the basis of their reform seems very narrow. But in the Karachi congresses they were surrounded by their insatiable opponents, the orthodox jurists who even in Pakistan refused to accept a modern constitution and who were supported by their colleagues from Egypt and the Maghreb. With these in spirit were the politicians, the heroes of the holy war—an Abd el-Krim who was to reveal himself in a *jihad* of the accepted type in the Rif, or an Amin el-Husseini, implacable enemy of the Jews and of England. Even more numerous were the unemployed fighters for pan-Arabism, the leaders of the mob, the terrorist organizers. In such circumstances the character of the new government seems settled. In spite of the skill and moderation of its organizers, among them the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, two resolutions were adopted at the most recent congress—one demanding the expulsion of Western cultural missions established in Islamic countries, the other suggesting that a new concept be defined, that of "Moslem nationality," to be granted all the faithful regardless of race or continent.

Two ideological tendencies, in political terms, met in conflict in these congresses. One—Western, moderate, constructive—aimed to unite the states of Outer Asia in a sort of political alliance, free from the weaknesses of pan-Arabism, in much the same spirit as permeated the pact of Saadabad. The other and stronger trend, favored by the orthodox doctors of Moslem law and by the popular leaders, doubtless with the muddled support of the masses, was toward resuming the aims of pan-Arabism and extending them to Asia. It favored "neutralism" and the principle of the "third force" which have furnished such popular themes for politicians and journalists in the East in the last three years. It deliberately made no choice, among the contending world imperialisms, which are characterized in Moslem eyes—with the exception of a small thoroughly Westernized élite—simply by their immense material power. Dimly aware of their permanent inability to compete with our civilization on the modern technical level, the faithful of Islam comfort themselves with

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a belief in their immense spiritual power and religious superiority. Having secured the political liberation of the Moslem nations in the name of modern theories, they hope to be in a position to free themselves one by one from their heavy military, economic and cultural obligations to the West. But that still would be only the first stage in a reorganization along even more ambitious lines. At once a powerful alliance of peoples and governments would be formed, constituting an exclusive and closed sphere which could lead a life of its own in renewed awareness of the eternal mission of Islam on its borders.

VI. EXPECTATIONS

This last prospect is so close to the spirit of the peoples of Africa and Asia now awakening to political life that it cannot fail to exert a profound influence on them; and if circumstances are favorable it may well become a reality. There already has emerged in the Far East the shape of a yellow world closed to the white man—or at least to the white man of the West—along the lines of the "co-prosperity sphere" formerly sponsored by Japan. We may also perceive the outlines of an Indian continent enclosed with its private metaphysical dream. Also a part of this new political map of the world, and also isolated from us, would be the reconstructed Islamic community. Later still, and likewise beyond our influence, would be formed the great racial union of the black world. The conclusion is inevitable that the San Francisco Charter and the new international institutions which it created are threatened by this prospective division of the world along ethnic and religious lines.

Nor is this the only contingency to be considered. Quite possibly after the world of Islam had freed itself from the West it might not find the internal resources needed to mobilize its strength and live safely in a dangerous world. The great adversary of the free nations might succeed in making a hypocritical alliance with a powerless Islam, and might transform Outer Asia and white Africa—while waiting for black Africa—into an area of chronic disorder.

Optimists will perhaps feel that this analysis shows too little faith in Islam's ability to play its rôle in a modern civilization. If so, it is because the regeneration of Islam, so earnestly desired by all who have faith in spiritual values, seems to us still hypothetical. Though Islamic society is gradually adopting Western

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techniques in the fields of economics and state organization, it clings too closely to mediaeval forms of thought and religion to be able to resume its forward journey; and a civilization makes solid progress only as its various forms of life perfect themselves simultaneously. Although a Christian must speak cautiously on this point, he is entitled to believe that a genuine regeneration of Islam presupposes a new evaluation of the Koran. This is impossible so long as the Holy Book remains buried like a precious diamond deep in the ancient and obscure language of the *Sunna,* the prophetic tradition. It will have to be freed. Is this not precisely the evolution known to Christianity since the sixteenth century, and accepted today, which has gradually brought about a distinction between the eternal words of revelation and the casual accretions which, as in all religions, bear the mark of the successive periods during which man received the divine message?

Are we to despair, then, of the future of the states in Islam? The experience of the last 30 years does not authorize so severe a judgment. Nevertheless the persistence of ancient forces, the slow rate of social and religious evolution, the impediments to the creation of modern states still nourished by the old tribal traditions in the more archaic regions of Afghanistan, Arabia, the Sudan and North Africa, the intoxication of racial and religious solidarity which so often ruins modest and limited forward steps made day by day—all this gives clear warning that the work fostered by the West can be achieved only in slow stages. What has happened recently in Egypt is proof that when the work is pushed too rapidly and ambitiously the whole structure can collapse. Cement must be allowed time to set before it will hold the stones firmly. Today more than ever before, the European and American peoples—great builders of modern nations on this earth—must be ready with wise advice and discerning support if free human communities are to be raised up in the world of Islam. Let us not be caught in oriental mirages. Let us remain resolutely devoted to our task of building true nations where Moslems, Christians and Jews can and will live in harmony.

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END OF THE MARSHALL PLAN

By John H. Williams

IN April 1950 I discussed in these pages "The Marshall Plan Halfway." At that time the United States looked forward to completion of the European recovery program by mid-1952, as provided by the Economic Coöperation Act of April 1948. But in June 1950 came Korea. Since then we have been in a process of transition to the Mutual Security Program. Instead of the Marshall Plan, we now have a three-pronged program combining economic aid, now called "defense support," administered since last January by the Mutual Security Agency as successor to E.C.A.; military aid under the Department of Defense; and Point Four (Technical Coöperation Administration) under the State Department. Averell Harriman as Director for Mutual Security has had the rôle of over-all coördinator of these activities.

In these circumstances we cannot attach the same significance as previously to the date mid-1952. Instead of providing the definitive cure for international imbalance, at least so far as Western Europe and its dollar gap are concerned, the Marshall Plan has become one more transitional experience in the increasingly complicated world situation that has been unfolding ever since the war. We can now only speculate whether, but for Korea and the rearmament program, the goal of independence from "extraordinary outside assistance" might have been reached by mid-1952. Actually, as contemplated in our budget for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1952, assistance to Europe will be much greater than in any year of the Marshall Plan, and foreign aid as a whole (except as modified by Congress) will be 7.9 billion dollars, as against total Marshall Plan expenditures since April 1948 of 12 billion dollars. It is, however, important for many reasons to try to appraise at this time this whole experience. How much progress has Europe really made? Has the setback in Western Europe's external balance that has occurred this past year, and which the O. E. E. C. report of last November called "ominous," been wholly due to temporary forces brought on by the Korean war and the rearmament program, or are there other forces suggesting deeper-seated maladjustments? Since the end of the Second World War, there have been sharply divided schools

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of thought as to the nature of Europe's economic difficulties.

The passing of E. C. A. last January 1 was the occasion for much appraising of the Marshall Plan results. One of the most interesting statements was E. C. A.'s final press release. The positive achievements cited form a most impressive record, without parallel in history. After World War I it took seven years to regain the prewar level of production in Western Europe. At the end of 1951 industrial production was 41 percent above prewar, 64 percent above 1947, and well beyond the target originally set for 1952. Agricultural production was 9 percent above prewar and 24 percent above 1947. Gross national product—the total sum of Western Europe's production of goods and services—had risen 25 percent in real terms in less than four years and was 15 percent above prewar. The transportation system has been rehabilitated. Electrical output has doubled over prewar. Steel production has doubled since 1947 (and is one-fifth above prewar), giving a total production last year of 60,000,000 tons as compared with 35,000,000 produced by Russia and her satellites. Refined petroleum products have quadrupled over prewar.

In agricultural products the gains are less striking but substantial. Cereal production and bread grains have about regained their prewar level, and the output of potatoes, sugar, meat, milk and oils is well above the targets set, and in every case except meat (where the prewar level was regained last year) substantially above prewar. The great disappointment has been in coal production, which is still somewhat behind the prewar output and about 20 percent short of the goal set for 1951; of the one billion dollars for economic aid to Europe in our budget for the past fiscal year, about two-thirds represented payments for imports of American coal.

I have always regarded the Marshall Plan as primarily an investment program, whose purpose was not merely to restore war damage but to increase production and productivity to the point where Europe might hope to balance its international accounts without further external aid. A parallel objective was to increase real income, which had fallen below the limits of tolerance, and thus to raise consumption and to provide internal savings which could take over the burden of investment as external aid was tapered off. On these fundamental aims the Marshall Plan must now be regarded as an interrupted experiment, or at least one made vastly more complex by the need of rearming. It is always

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difficult to make comparisons of the level of consumption at different periods in a changing world, and this is especially true in a comparison of prewar and postwar levels, since wars often produce significant changes in the pattern of consumption, and allowances have to be made for such things as continuance of rent controls and food subsidies. The O. E. E. C. conclusion in its last annual report, June 1951, was that in 1950 per capita consumption in Western Europe as a whole was still somewhat below prewar, though this was mainly due to the low consumption levels still existing in Austria, Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey; in most other countries it was somewhat above prewar. How to improve—and above all to prevent a renewed decline of—Western Europe's real income will surely have to be a major consideration in the planning of the defense program if the progress that has been achieved by the Marshall Plan in warding off Communism from within is to be preserved.

When we turn to the investment aspect of the recovery program, the results achieved in the past four years are most impressive. As the O. E. E. C. report just mentioned indicates, as our aid has tapered off from year to year, in accordance with the Plan, the increase in investment financed out of domestic saving has been more rapid than the decline of external aid. "There have been few periods in history when so high a proportion of resources has been freely devoted to investment in such unpromising conditions and with such impressive results. It may be estimated that in 1950 real per capita gross investment (*i.e.* measured at constant prices) was more than 10 percent greater than in 1938. In terms of net investment the increase was much greater and probably amounted to about 40 percent."

II

In the light of this record it comes with something of a shock to find that in 1951 Western Europe's external trade deficit was about 4.5 billion dollars,[1] a deficit that was exceeded within the Marshall Plan period only by that of the first year, 1948, when the deficit was 5.4 billion dollars. This is what the O. E. E. C. report called "ominous." Since the chief aim of the Plan was to remove the external deficit, must we conclude that we have come full circle, and are now back more or less at the point from

[1] This figure is based on January–September 1951 at annual rates of trade. See Economic Commission for Europe, "Economic Survey of Europe in 1951," Geneva, 1952, p. 69.

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which we started? Has nothing much, after all, been accomplished about the hoped-for freedom from "extraordinary outside assistance?" And how could this happen in the face of such an impressive record of economic upbuilding as we have described?

The first, and the main, explanation is that this has been the effect of the Korean war and of the rearmament program that has come in its train. But a fact that may be even more significant in its implications for the longer run is the extraordinary violence of this effect. It appears to reveal once more the precarious nature of Western Europe's international position, and sets us wondering, as often before in my own case, as to whether—even apart from such major disturbances as Korea and rearmament—we are on the way toward a really durable and dependable solution.

To get light on such a question we must look back at the behavior of Western European trade since the war, and especially since the Marshall Plan began. Sir Oliver Franks' exploratory committee,[2] created in 1947 in response to Secretary Marshall's request for a program of self-help, mutual help and external aid, presented a four-point analysis: expansion of output along with general economic rehabilitation, internal financial stability (overcoming inflation), economic coöperation among the participating countries (through O. E. E. C.), and, finally, as the end result, the wiping out of the external deficit. Skipping for the time being from the first point to the last, and looking first at the volume of trade, the results are encouraging. Western Europe's foreign trade has not only recovered strongly from the year of collapse, 1947, but both overseas and within Europe it had by 1950 exceeded in volume that of 1938. Despite the setback in the external deficit in 1951, the growth in volume of trade has apparently continued; overseas exports in 1951 increased by 2.2 billion dollars over 1950, and intra-European exports by 1.5 billion dollars (at constant 1949 prices).[3] The general conclusion seems to be that though export trade for Western Europe as a whole has not fully kept pace with production, and has not yet attained the target set forth in the national four-year plans presented in 1948 (which was a one-third increase by 1952 over 1938), the production program and other measures taken under the Marshall Plan have had an effect on trade that provides strong support

[2] Committee of European Economic Co-operation, "General Report." Washington, D. C.: Department of State, September 1947.

[3] E. C. E. Survey, *op. cit.*, p. 69; based on January–September 1951 at annual rates of trade.

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for the exploratory committee's analysis and expectations. It should be recalled, too, that these results have been accomplished with only about half as much external aid as the committee estimated would be needed.

When we come, however, to the balance of trade and payments, as distinguished from the volume of trade, the facts are much harder to appraise. They show erratic fluctuations even before Korea, and it is to this fact and its implications that I wish later to return. When we come to Korea itself and the defense program we find not only that they were mainly responsible for the "ominous" widening of the gap in 1951 but also for the astonishingly good showing made in 1950. These violent changes are traceable both in Western Europe's balance of payments and in our own. Western Europe's trade deficit fell from 3.5 billion dollars in 1949 to 2 billion dollars in 1950; and when account is taken of invisible earnings, which far exceeded the exploratory committee's expectations, the current account balance of payments of the O. E. E. C. countries fell from 2.4 billion dollars in 1949 to $846,000,000 in 1950. The annual figures really conceal the full measure of the improvement, since there was an actual surplus on current account of $87,000,000 in the second half of 1950. It is not to be wondered at that the O. E. E. C. report of June 1951 contains at times a note almost of exultation—the problem was solved! But one finds here and there also notes of warning and references to signs of impending change. By November 1951 we get a very different document, whose main theme is the "ominous" widening of the deficit.[4]

We find the counterpart of these changes in our own balance of payments. In 1947, the critical year before the Marshall Plan began, we had the huge excess of exports of 9.9 billion dollars, and, including invisibles, a total export surplus of goods and services of 11.5 billion dollars. In that year Western Europe's gold and dollar deficit was 8.5 billion dollars. In the first two years of the Marshall Plan our surplus was reduced by roughly half. Then came the abrupt decline in 1950 to a surplus of 1.4 billion dollars on trade account, and 2.2 billion dollars including services. Again, the yearly figures conceal the magnitude of the change, for in the third quarter of 1950 our current account surplus virtually vanished, and on trade alone we had a deficit for the first time in 13 years. Here again, we can appreciate why the Europeans hoped

[4] O.E.E.C., "European Economic Co-operation." Paris: November 1951.

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the problem had been solved. But by the fourth quarter of 1950 the gap was widening. For the year 1951 as a whole we had an export surplus of goods and services of 5 billion dollars and in the fourth quarter the surplus advanced to an annual rate of 7.5 billion dollars, the highest rate since the British devaluation in September 1949.

III

We have thus a mixed result. Western Europe is much stronger than five years ago. Production and trade have expanded strikingly. But the external deficit, though almost overcome in 1950, has again opened up alarmingly. Though we may discount the deterioration as due to Korea and rearmament, we must discount the great improvement that preceded it as also due to these developments.

As I said earlier, it is the violence of these changes in the past two years that should give us chief concern. They represent a repetition, in an exaggerated form, of earlier experience. Since the war there have been recurrent drains on Western Europe's gold and dollar reserves. They have fallen into a biennial pattern, with a reserve crisis in every second year—1947, 1949, 1951. They have forced drastic remedial measures—in 1947, abrupt termination of Britain's attempt at convertibility and nondiscrimination; in 1948, interim aid for France, the Marshall Plan, Cripps' austerity budget; in 1949, currency devaluations and severe direct import cuts. The renewed drain of British reserves since June 1951, reducing reserves by more than half and bringing them again almost to the pre-devaluation minimum, and the equally acute drain of French reserves, have again been followed by drastic import cuts and other measures.

These disturbances are sometimes called short run. They are short run only in the sense that they recur frequently. Their persistent recurrence suggests that they are symptomatic of deeper-seated difficulties. Since the end of World War I, the world has been troubled by maldistribution of gold reserves and a persistent bias toward gold absorption by this country. In the inter-war period gold drains forced recurrent waves of currency devaluations and in the end led to direct exchange and trade controls and a marked deterioration of multilateral trade. This was all in the background before World War II greatly intensified the problem. With reserves now much smaller than before the war in relation

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to price levels and the volume of trade, there is a fundamental lack of confidence in the ability of countries to maintain stable currencies. Even minor swings in the trade position are magnified by fear and speculation—flights of capital, black markets, delays and accelerations of payments and of receipts by exporters and importers. When knowledge of thinness of reserves is coupled with knowledge that currency devaluations can be and have frequently been forced, the stage is set for recurrent crises such as we have seen; and the evidence seems to be that not even direct controls can stifle them, though necessity forces further resort to such controls on each new occasion. The problem of Western Europe is not merely to solve the dollar gap, difficult and uncertain as that question is, but in addition to build up reserves to an adequate level, and to do this in the face of the strong bias toward gold absorption by this country which has persisted ever since 1914. It was hardly to be expected that the Marshall Plan by itself could achieve such a result, even apart from Korea and rearmament.

The Western European countries are heavily dependent upon foreign trade. Basically, their trade is an exchange of their manufactured goods for raw materials and food. Thus exports are closely tied to imports, and, though foreign trade may expand with home production, there is little leeway in which to bring about favorable changes in the balance of trade. This was a major problem with the German reparation payments in the twenties, and it is the kind of problem that is often overlooked when people talk about the expansibility of production as a cure for trade imbalance. Throughout the Marshall Plan period the availability of supplies, particularly of raw materials, was a constant worry. In each of the biennial swings in the trade balance that I have mentioned, one can readily trace the fluctuations in the stocks of raw materials on hand. The good showing made by Britain in 1946 under the Anglo-American loan was largely an expression of the running down of stocks which resulted from curbing imports and stimulating exports, and this process has been repeated ever since, accentuating the swings in the trade balance.

A related factor has been the pronounced swings in the terms of trade. How important these can be was indicated by the official British statement that the adverse change in the terms of trade in 1951 cost Britain more than the increase in her defense

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expenditures. The kinds of goods that Europe buys are subject to much wider price swings than the kinds of goods she sells. The first effect of the Korean war was a sharp rise in raw material prices, in many cases by severalfold. This rise affected first our own trade position and later that of Western Europe. It largely accounts for the big upswing in Europe's position in 1950 and the marked downturn in 1951. We had a pronounced expansion of imports in 1950. Through government stockpiling and business inventory accumulation in this country at high prices Europe enjoyed for a time a double benefit. Our purchases of raw materials, particularly from the sterling-area countries, whose dollar earnings, through the sterling-area dollar pool, go to swell Britain's reserves, had much to do with the rise in Britain's reserves from 1.4 billion dollars, just prior to sterling devaluation in September 1949, to 3.8 billion dollars by June 1951. At the same time Europe's own exports to both the dollar and the non-dollar world flourished, imports were held down, stocks of goods were drawn down, and before the string had run out the results were highly impressive.

But in 1951 came the inevitable reversal. Western Europe found itself forced to replenish stocks at import prices much above those before Korea. The rise of import prices not only caused a sharply adverse change in the terms of trade but brought on a new outburst of inflationary pressure, after inflation had been held well in check for a considerable period, despite even the currency devaluations of September 1949. From June 1950 to the end of 1951 the wholesale price level rose 28 percent in Britain and 47 percent in France. In the case of Britain, at least, which is farther along with rearmament than the Continental countries, the competition of the defense program with the export industries for home and foreign resources began to make itself sharply felt, to the point where the Churchill Government conceded that the defense program would have to be spread over a longer period of time.

The reference earlier to the sterling area indicates the importance for Western Europe of triangular trade. One of the things that became apparent, even in our own official thinking (E. C. A.), as the Marshall Plan progressed, was that Europe's exports to us were too small to provide the main cure for the dollar deficit. Granted that the drive for exports to the United States should be strongly pushed, the main problem was to shift the

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source of Europe's supply away from us to third countries, and to expand Europe's exports primarily to such countries. Such a pattern of trade, to be self-sustaining, would mean a surplus of exports to the non-dollar world, a surplus of exports by the latter to this country, and a European surplus of imports from us, to be financed in this manner. In such a pattern of trade the effect of swings in the terms of trade is complex. If our imports from the raw-material-producing countries rise in volume and in price, Western European exports to such countries are likely to rise in volume and in price, and this change, coupled with some increase in Western European direct exports to us, can have highly favorable effects.

But against this is the fact that Western Europe in its own buying of raw materials is adversely affected. What will come out of such changes depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. As I have said, Western Europe benefited in 1950, and suffered heavily in 1951, from the changes in the terms of trade. A further factor is that when the terms of trade move against the raw-material-producing countries, as they did after the price rise passed its peak, Europe is apt to lose in volume of exports to such countries, but to find her terms of trade improving through the fall of raw material import prices. Since the third quarter of 1951, Britain's terms of trade have been gradually improving, and this change has been reflected this year in the reduction of the drain on Britain's reserves. But this may not be the end of the road either, for as the position of the raw material countries worsens they come under pressure to cut their imports not only from us but from Europe. Thus since the meeting of the Commonwealth Finance Ministers in London last January we have seen the emergence of a new sterling area policy, in which the sterling-area countries reserve the right to cut imports even against Britain herself. Considering that the essence of the sterling area has been the freedom of trade and capital movements within the area, and the maintenance in consequence of the largest area of fully multilateral trade which still remains, such a policy may have significant implications for the future.

The rise and the fall of raw material prices and the consequent violent swings in the terms of trade and in the volume of trade are strikingly illustrated by the behavior of wool, rubber and tin since Korea. Chiefly because of the phenomenal rise in the prices of these three commodities, export receipts from the United

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States and Western European countries by the countries producing them (primarily the sterling area) totaled 1.5 billion dollars more during the 12 months from mid-1950 to mid-1951 than during the six months preceding Korea, at an annual rate; and then, in the third quarter of 1951, fell by an amount equivalent to 1.1 billion dollars a year.[5] Such erratic swings (and one could amplify by taking more commodities) act as a two-edged sword for some European countries, particularly the United Kingdom; Britain has continuously been whipsawed by fluctuations in the terms of trade, which when favorable for her are unfavorable for the outer sterling area, and vice versa. The complexity of her task as banker for the sterling area under such conditions will, I think, raise serious questions for the future unless, through the development of more effective policies for the area as a whole, some correction of these violent fluctuations can be achieved. In recent years confidence in the future of the sterling area has waxed and waned with each recurrent swing, and the time seems to have passed when the area can be expected to survive on such an informal and almost organizationless basis as in the past.

IV

The point to emphasize, as I said earlier, is that these disturbances in trade and payments, while intensified since Korea, are in no sense new. This is only the last in a series of such crises. It is a striking fact, for example, that when British reserves were drained so heavily in 1949 and sterling devaluation was forced on an unwilling Cabinet, Britain's own trade was not out of balance—she had had for some time an over-all balance except that she could not use her surpluses elsewhere to cover her dollar deficit—and Britain was not seriously experiencing inflation. It was mainly the drain resulting from trade deficits in the outer sterling area that caused the crisis. And it was mainly an abrupt decline in American imports from the raw-material sterling-area countries that produced these trade deficits.

This fact illustrates a further cause of world trade maladjustment. What was for us a very minor business recession was greatly magnified in its external effects. Our imports constitute a small fraction of our gross national product—in most years under 5 percent—but they are sensitive to changes in our level of output and employment. It is estimated in the last United Na-

[5] E. C. E. "Economic Survey of Europe in 1951," p. 12.

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tions' special report that an American recession of the magnitude of 1937–38, when our employment fell by 4 percent and our merchandise imports by 36 percent, would, if it occurred today, reduce the dollar income of the outside world by 10 billion dollars.[6] And yet, historically, a fall in employment of 4 percent would hardly be called a major depression. It is easy to understand by comparison what disastrous effects our Great Depression of the early thirties had on world trade, and why in the discussions of the I. T. O. Charter (which in the end this country turned down) other countries insisted on some kind of guarantee of stability in the United States and on escape clauses if American instability threatened to drain off their reserves.

How seriously this problem of the effects of these short-run fluctuations in our imports is regarded is shown by the United Nations' special report prepared by a group of international experts, including two American economists, in 1949.[7] The report proposed that a country whose imports fell off because of a domestic recession should supply an equivalent amount of its currency, through the International Monetary Fund, to the countries whose exports had declined in consequence. I have elsewhere criticized this proposal as being an arithmetic rather than an economic solution of the problem, and one which no country could be expected to accept in such a generalized, mechanical form without examining the circumstances of the particular case.[8]

The formula was obviously aimed at the United States, and at the meeting of the Economic and Social Council in Geneva in July–August 1950, our representative stated that the United States Government "was not prepared" to enter into any commitment "automatically to provide indefinite amounts of public funds over long periods." The subject, however, was not entirely dropped, and last year a second group of experts was appointed to consider the problem further. There is not space to discuss their suggestions, but the main one is that the International Monetary Fund should address itself to this problem. There has been growing criticism, even within the Fund itself, of its inactivity—until the recent Australian credit the Fund has been virtually inactive for two years—and we should welcome the recent

[6] United Nations, "Measures for International Economic Stability," New York, 1951.

[7] United Nations, "National and International Measures for Full Employment," Lake Success, 1949.

[8] John H. Williams, "International Trade Theory and Policy—Some Current Issues," *American Economic Review, Supplement,* May 1951, p. 429.

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signs of a new orientation of its policies. In my discussions of the Fund in these pages in 1943–44, I was skeptical of its usefulness under the conditions likely to obtain after the war.[9] But the fact is that it does have unutilized gold and dollar resources of over 2 billion dollars which could, I think, help substantially to bolster the reserve position of countries in periods of strain. The United Nations' report also discusses the swings in the terms of trade resulting from price fluctuations of primary products and recommends a new examination of the possibilities of international commodity agreements as a means of reducing such fluctuations.[10]

V

The impact of the United States on the outside world is the basic international economic problem. The short-run disturbances I have discussed are symptomatic of deeper-seated maladjustments arising out of long-run cumulative changes in the relative positions of the trading countries. The great size of the United States, its large home market, its diversified resources, its comparative self-sufficiency, its high productivity and rapid technological progress have introduced a tendency away from, rather than toward, equilibrium in world trade. Until this tendency can be removed, dealing with the short-run disturbances, important though that is, can at best have only palliative effects. The basic question about the Marshall Plan is how much it has contributed toward a solution of this imbalance. The great virtue of the Marshall Plan conception was that it did look toward a fundamental solution through intra-European integration. The urge for integration has been present under some form or name ever since the Plan began in 1948. I have already discussed the strong emphasis on investment to improve European productivity. It was recognized, however, that national investment plans, supported by external aid, were only a beginning and that the objective should be intra-European coördination of investment.[11] But though the O. E. E. C. did much exploratory work, it had no power of action, and the discussion bogged down on the

[9] "Currency Stabilization: The Keynes and White Plans," *Foreign Affairs,* July 1943; "Currency Stabilization: American and British Attitudes," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1944; and "International Monetary Plans: After Bretton Woods," *Foreign Affairs,* October 1944.

[10] See United Nations, *op. cit.,* 1951.

[11] For a discussion of the difficulties involved in coördination of investment, see John H. Williams, "The Marshall Plan Halfway," *Foreign Affairs,* April 1950.

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question of whether political union must precede integration of investment, production and trade, or whether economic integration for special purposes would promote the merging of sovereignty.

The Marshall Plan, though it did not of itself achieve coördination of investment in Western Europe, did much to promote what is now being called the functional approach to the problem, and the new turn of events since Korea has furthered this approach. The program for liberalization of trade, the European Payments Union, the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community, and the proposals for integrating agriculture and coördinating transport are all promising steps in this direction. In the unsettled conditions of October 1949, when there were strong grounds for doubt about how the Marshall Plan would turn out, Paul Hoffman made his plea for a program of integration as the only way of raising European productivity toward our level and thus of solving the basic imbalance. The only immediate step that proved feasible was the liberalization of trade and payments. In the second half of the Marshall Plan, this program played the leading rôle. Liberalization of trade was carried up to 75 percent of goods privately traded and a "common list" of freely traded goods was developed. International payment was multilateralized among the O. E. E. C. countries through the establishment of the European Payments Union on July 1, 1950.

The Payments Union has been hailed as the major achievement of the Marshall Plan toward intra-European coöperation. Certainly it has succeeded better than its critics anticipated, and the O. E. E. C. countries have this year decided to continue it beyond the tentative date of mid-1952 originally set. The Payments Union, however, cannot by itself be regarded as anything more than an initial step toward integration, and even the continued existence of the Union cannot yet be taken for granted. Though it has weathered many difficulties, notably the German deficit position in 1950–51, and has, in that case particularly, demonstrated effective powers of management, the Union is winding up its experimental two-year period with some fundamental questions on which further light will be needed.

One is whether the success of the Union will require feeding more dollars into it. The Union now has almost intact its dollar reserve of $350,000,000 granted by E. C. A. at the time of its creation (as of May 1, the reserve was only $25,000,000 below that

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original amount). But this statement conceals the fact that nearly a half billion dollars of Marshall aid has in indirect ways been utilized, and in addition economic aid was still being given to the individual countries. There is thus left open the question of how the Union will fare now that the Marshall Plan has ended. Our Government has turned a deaf ear to the repeated demands by many Europeans that it furnish from $200,000,000 to $250,000,000 to strengthen the Union's dollar reserves for the rearmament period, and from current reports this decision has been accepted and further dollar aid has not been made a condition of the continuance of the Union.

Another vexing question is what to do about intractable creditor positions, notably that of Belgium, whose credits in the Union now far exceed the original quota and have been threatening to exhaust the Union's reserves. This year Belgium's receipt of gold and dollars from the Union has been cut below the sum to which she was entitled, and the solution now being worked on as I write (if Belgium will accept it, her alternative being presumably withdrawal from the Union) is refunding of the excess credit. But such a solution would be only temporary and does not solve the problem of the intractable creditor position. Belgium has had a persistent export surplus to the other Western European countries ever since the war, which appears to rest in part at least upon the fact that, with the liberal trade policies she has been pursuing, she tends to buy on balance from the United States and to recoup her dollar deficit by means of her European surpluses. In considerable part, the goods imported from us become the basis of Belgium's exports to O. E. E. C. countries. This is a striking illustration of how dependent the success of the Payments Union is upon discrimination against the dollar area. A gap in the wall, as in Belgium's case, represents a drain of dollars not from Belgium alone but from the O. E. E. C. countries as a whole. Thus we are brought back to the question whether Western Europe (or any other part of the world subject to persistent dollar drain) has any other alternative than either to try to protect itself by direct discriminatory controls aimed at cutting imports from the dollar area, or to build up its productivity (and thus its exports) to the point where the dollar shortage problem ceases to exist. This is the fundamental problem not only for the O. E. E. C. countries and the Payments Union but also for the sterling area and the sterling dollar pool.

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The most discouraging feature of postwar experience is that we have not yet been able to find a solution to the problem of trade deficits which does not involve cuts in imports through direct controls. Even the German case I referred to earlier, which has been much cited as an illustration of what can be accomplished by monetary and fiscal measures, did involve direct import cuts, and, as I have indicated, Britain and the sterling area countries have felt themselves forced to resort to these cuts not only against us but against each other. Moreover, in its recent reserve crisis Britain's import cuts were directed against the O. E. E. C. countries to overcome her trade deficits with them and her loss of gold and dollars to the Payments Union. France pursued a similar course, and both France and Britain cut back their trade liberalization program to 60 percent.

VI

Clearly what is needed in Europe is integration in some more fundamental sense than merely a monetary clearing union or a program of trade liberalization. That is why many are now looking forward to the Schuman Plan and to the European Defense Community, in the hope of achieving an integration in terms of production, distribution and coördinated investment. The Schuman Plan Treaty was signed a year ago by France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Italy, and the process of ratification is virtually completed. Unless something goes radically wrong in Western Europe, it should not be long before the Plan comes fully into force. When that happens, there will be created one single market for European coal and steel, a market which in terms of population will be about as large as ours. All tariff barriers and quantitative controls between the six countries of the community, as well as all discriminatory and restrictive practices, will be eliminated with respect to coal and steel, and coal and steel cartels will be outlawed.

This is a bright vision. Jean Monnet, its principal author, has hailed it, and also the Pleven Plan for a European Army (European Defense Community) which, organizationally, is drawn up on similar lines, "as the first institutions . . . of a United States of Europe." The Schuman Plan has encountered many difficulties and doubtless there will be more. Despite the elaborate organizational machinery, there will be room for play of national interests. Already there has been comment on the jockeying for posi-

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tion among the member nations and of pressure on the Steel Committee of O. E. E. C. to sanction increases of output in advance of the institution of the Plan, so that the countries will be in more favorable position for consideration of quotas after the Plan has gone into effect. Of basic importance in the Plan is the coördination of investment, the goal which, as I have indicated, has all along been sought under the Marshall Plan but without concrete results. If the Plan cannot eliminate high cost production and develop a really competitive market, it will fail of its purpose, and Europe will probably be facing again the problems of inefficient distribution of steel and coal capacity and the cartel practices that follow in their train. Though a transition period is provided for, in which countries will be compensated for elimination of high cost production (as in the case of Belgian coal), it will undoubtedly be easier to coördinate investment without undue national pressures through expansion of output. This raises in some minds the possibility of excess capacity. Germany had such a problem between the two wars and found an outlet in armament. In view, however, of the fact that the standard of living in Europe is still very low and that the O. E. E. C. has announced a new program calling for a 25 percent increase in gross national product by 1956, it seems premature to worry unduly about excess steel capacity, and there is surely no such problem for coal, which has been so badly lagging. If a Western European economy at all comparable with ours in productive capacity and productivity is to be created, Western Europe will have to think in much larger terms than heretofore.

VII

This year economic conditions in Europe seem somewhat better. The anti-inflationary measures taken by the Pinay Government have been well received by the French people. Perhaps the main effects have been psychological and political, but the budgetary situation has improved, price increases have been checked, and, as I write, a large internal loan designed to draw out gold from hoarding is in prospect; the external drain has been checked and France's position in the Payments Union has improved. In Britain the Conservative Government has introduced important budgetary changes, has partly removed the food subsidies, and has taken steps to promote labor efficiency and reduce the pressure for wage advances by putting income tax on an incentive

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basis. The drain of dollar reserves has been substantially reduced, but, as of the end of April, the much hoped for counterswing had not yet occurred. Both France and England have increased the bank rate. The Bank of England discount rate has twice been increased, to a level of 4 percent, after having remained unchanged (except for a two months period in 1939 at the outbreak of the war) at 2 percent from 1932 to last November. In Europe, particularly during the second half of the Marshall Plan, there has been a general renaissance of central bank control. The Bank of England's actions were among the last in a succession that has spread pretty much throughout Western Europe.[12] A growing number of economists feel that this reversion to monetary orthodoxy, if backed up by adequate fiscal policies, may point the way toward a more effective control of inflation.

But one must suspend judgment on whether progress is being made toward overcoming the biennial pattern of recurring crises and recoveries. Since the end of the war, each upswing after the crisis has followed a fairly definite pattern. The measures taken to stem the crisis begin to have some effect. The forces of fear and speculation pressing on the currency overreach themselves. Confidence begins to grow that the worst has been seen for the time being, flights from the currency subside and are followed by some backflow. But none of this means necessarily that there is confidence that a durable solution has been found. Western Europe's foreign trade problem is only part of that existing in the world as a whole. As I have indicated, throughout the Marshall Plan period the availability of supplies was a constant worry. The great increase of industrial production here and in Western Europe, in Canada and in some other countries, is making imperative an accelerated development of primary products. Industrial production in the world as a whole since 1938 has increased by some 50 percent, while the output of raw materials has at most increased by 10 percent. Some experts have estimated that, apart from the United States, the world's food production is now lower than before the war, and even the gain in raw materials is questionable if we take out a few large items, such as petroleum and aluminum.

This brings us back to the discussion of the terms of trade. For perhaps three-quarters of a century the problem had been whether the industrial countries could absorb the food and raw

[12] In this country also there are promising signs of a revival of general monetary control, particularly the Treasury-Federal Reserve accord of March 1951.

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materials which they had been instrumental in developing in other countries, on terms of trade tolerable to the latter. Now there appear to be signs that the imbalance is swinging the other way, not merely in the short-run sense of Korea and rearmament but for the longer run. The absorption of metals is an outstanding example, and it is due not only to the great growth of investment in capital goods industries but to the growth of the consumer durable goods industries. American consumption of such products as automobiles, refrigerators, washing machines and vacuum cleaners has doubled and trebled since before the war. Meanwhile, there are sharply divergent views as to the purposes of international investment or grants of aid. The less developed countries, with their recently-won sovereignty and their growing social welfare consciousness, often do not welcome the nineteenth-century kind of foreign investment, which they regard as "exploitation," a process of extraction at low cost of what the industrial countries wanted, while doing little or nothing toward creating a better rounded economy and a better scale of living.

Thus, the urge for industrialization in the underdeveloped countries collides with the world need for primary production. How to reconcile this conflict and achieve a better balance of production and trade in the world as a whole is the great problem for the future. One of its most important aspects is the question what part the European countries should play in it. If they do not participate, they run the danger of being forced into a backwater through the growth of direct trade between this country and the less developed countries. Probably what has held the sterling area together more than anything else has been the free flow of capital throughout the area. Even under the Marshall Plan, American aid was in effect merely siphoned through the British economy to the sterling area countries in the form of "unrequited exports." Now this strain on the British economy will be accentuated by the rearmament program, and there will be similar problems for France and Belgium with respect to their overseas territories. I can only conclude that the problem of how to reach a stable world economic balance will long be with us and will require thinking and planning in new areas of economic policy where we are as yet merely in the pioneering stage. The Point Four program and the Colombo Plan, though proceeding slowly, are at least indications that we are beginning to perceive the nature of the problem.

Immediately upon us are the problems of rearmament. The

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latest O. E. E. C. report contains a warning that there may be a new inflationary outburst in Europe next fall or winter, and one of the most debated questions here at home has been whether the sidewise movement which we have had since the spring of 1951 will be followed by renewed inflationary pressure as our defense program gets into full stride. Many, both in Europe and here, have warned that a program too big or too rapid would not only lead to renewed inflation but would open up a serious danger of deflation when the build-up is completed and the replacement phase of the program is reached. In Britain, as I have said, the need of stretching out the military program has already been officially conceded, and for some time past the time-schedule of our own program has also been undergoing a process of stretching out. On the Continent, except for the heavy burden on France in Indo-China, the defense program is still in its early stages. Meanwhile, there is complaint in Europe that our aid, both military and economic, has been seriously lagging. There have also been complaints this year, including formal protests to our State Department by Italy and Britain and actual tariff retaliation by Belgium, that our tariff practices belie our preachments about freer trade. There is nothing new in this. One of our chief problems is, and long has been, with ourselves. We cannot hope to achieve freer trade in a better balanced world if we do not live up to it ourselves.

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FORMOSA TODAY

By Albert Ravenholt

THE immediate problem that confronts Formosa is military. Last winter the Chinese Communists completed construction of a string of airbases along the Fukien coast on the mainland opposite the island. These bases are backed up by a network of airfields—including many built by Americans during the war—stretching across the interior of China to the foothills of Tibet. The new Communist airbases have been stocked with petrol and lubricants, and equipped with radar and antiaircraft guns. The Communists also have kept near at hand the thousands of junks and other craft they assembled for an invasion of Formosa before the U.S. Seventh Fleet moved in to protect the island in June 1950.

If the Korean war ends without a settlement that includes provisions for Formosa, the Chinese Communists may shift a substantial portion of their strength south. Their high command can then choose between launching a full-fledged invasion of Formosa or putting the Chinese Red Air Force, reported to number about 1,600 combat planes, to work on the island. The Red Air Force can now stage out of relatively secure bases deep in the interior and strike against American planes and ships that have only limited air warning facilities.

In anticipation of possible Communist attack against Formosa, the United States is working with the Chinese Nationalists to organize a defense of their island refuge. A U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group has been functioning on the island officially since May 1, 1951. During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, it supervised the use of about $78,000,000 worth of military aid. The Mutual Security Program for 1951–1952 included an additional appropriation of roughly $217,000,000 to provide military aid to Formosa.

In addition to enlarging several Formosan airfields and modernizing other installations, the American effort has aimed chiefly at reorganizing, training, arming and otherwise rehabilitating the Nationalist military establishment. These Nationalist forces number nearly 650,000 men. They include roughly 90,000 in the Air Force, some 50,000 in the Navy and about 20,000 in the Combined Service Forces. Political officers and garrison troops ac-

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count for about 120,000. The remaining 370,000 can be classed as ground forces.

But these figures suggest a much stronger force than actually can be mobilized for action. There are several regiments of infantry in the Air Force, used to guard airfields, and the Navy includes a force of Marines. There is a superabundance of officers, including more than 125 admirals and 1,600 generals. Many of the troops suffer from disease, particularly tuberculosis. When the Red Armies completed conquest of the mainland in 1949, the Nationalist soldiers best able to evacuate to Formosa were often the older men assigned to rear area service units near the ports. There is no working retirement system; the Nationalists lack the funds to pay for pensions and instead transfer old soldiers to less active service such as cooking. Each year the entire military establishment grows that much older.

From among these forces the American military advisors are encouraging the Chinese to select the 300,000 who are judged to be potential combat effectives and organize them into a modern fighting force. To accomplish this a drastic reorganization of the Nationalist military is required. Infantry, artillery and armored forces have operated as semi-autonomous units, without training in the combined operations that are so essential for the defense of Formosa's coastal plain. Each branch of the service is jealous of its identity. Old personal rivalries that cost so many battles on the mainland are still much in evidence; but now the generals are all crowded together on one island.

Morale within the Nationalist forces has been hurt by the expanding activities of a corps of political officers under the command of President Chiang Kai-shek's elder son, General Chiang Ching-kuo. Two of these political officers are assigned to each company where they manage political indoctrination and report on the activities of all officers and men. Many Chinese officers complain that a number of their comrades have been imprisoned without trial on charges made by these political officers and that the system generates suspicion and intrigue. Official explanations state that these political officers are needed to counter Communist attempts at subversion, but responsible American and Chinese officers believe that more effective and less destructive methods to insure loyalty can be devised.

The activity of political officers is closely related to the practice of political interference with the military. Officers still are pro-

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moted or demoted on occasion without the previous knowledge of their superiors. In practice there is no single clearly defined chain of command—a basic requirement for morale and loyalty. The Generalissimo apparently lacks confidence in a single subordinate command structure and tends to balance one group in the military against another. The resulting duplication of responsibility is another reminder of the military practices that proved so destructive on the mainland.

American efforts to improve upon this military structure are handicapped by the fact that the members of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group are only advisors. They screen Chinese requests for military aid and demonstrate use and maintenance of the new equipment in training. They are helping improve the inadequate diet of Chinese troops and supporting the development of combat rations and improved uniforms. But their suggestions usually are ignored when they affect the crucial personal relationships within the Nationalist military structure. Chinese generals sometimes admit the soundness of American recommendations and then confess their own inability to alter existing arrangements; each of the senior Chinese military leaders is so much a prisoner of his old loyalties and accumulated obligations that none is able to cut across the channels of influence and make drastic changes. These considerations have led some responsible Chinese and Americans to conclude that the military humbug that has plagued the Nationalists for so long can be eliminated, and the combat potential of the Chinese soldier realized, only when an American is placed in command. In the absence of such an arrangement, they feel progress could be made by sending Chinese Nationalist forces to Korea, where it would be possible to reorganize and train them in combat situations under United Nations command.

Even such measures, however, would provide no adequate answer to the strategic problems posed by the threat of Communist attack on Formosa. These strategic considerations can, I think, be summarized as follows:

1. The Nationalists alone never can organize and support a permanent defense of Formosa against the kind of total attack the Chinese Communists can launch if the Korean war ends. This will be the situation even after the United States has outfitted the Chinese forces as now planned.

2. Since the United States has determined that the Chinese

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Communists must be kept out of Formosa, at the very least for the period that America is responsible for the defense of Japan, it is a minimum requirement that the U.S. Fleet and Air Force continue to participate in the protection of the island and the 100-mile-wide strait that separates it from the mainland.

3. The Nationalists can make only "token" invasions of the mainland, unless they receive American protection, supply and military support, including troops. Such action automatically would involve America in full-scale war with the Chinese Communists and perhaps with the Russians.

4. Although the Nationalists continue to use the myth of an early return to the mainland to bolster their own morale and enlist support abroad, the most sincere proponents of this line of action at present are the native Formosans, who see it as a means of ridding themselves of an unwelcome tax burden.

II

In many respects the island of Formosa is one of our planet's more attractive garden spots. Almost three-fourths of the land surface is covered by extremely rugged mountain ranges that rise abruptly out of the Pacific and, near the east coast, reach a height of 14,000 feet. Most of the approximately 9,000,000 civilians, including about 8,000,000 native Formosans, live on the lush subtropical plain that skirts the west coast of the 270-mile-long island.

This naturally rich island was systematically developed by the Japanese after they were ceded Formosa by the terms of the Treaty of Shimonoseki in 1895. As part of their pioneer colonial effort, the Japanese introduced a system of public health, and built railways, roads and a hydroelectric power system. They started a sugar industry that achieved a prewar peak production of more than 1,000,000 tons per year. Farmers were taught to use improved seed and fertilizer. Before the last war there was a popular saying on Formosa that the island produced enough rice in one year to feed itself for three; the surplus was shipped to Japan. The Japanese also developed Formosan production of superior varieties of oranges, pineapples and bananas. They organized production of tea, camphor and fish and built cement and paper making plants.

When their police measures failed to keep the rebellious Formosans in line, the Japanese introduced universal primary edu-

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cation as a method of inculcating allegiance. All they sought was to help supply Japan's needs for labor, food and raw materials, but, incidentally, their program also developed for the Formosans the highest material standard of living that is available to ordinary citizens anywhere in the Far East, with the possible exception of Japan itself. Whereas the ordinary Chinese farmer on the mainland usually goes to bed shortly after sundown because he cannot afford to burn an oil lamp, the Formosan farmer stands a good chance of having an electric light bulb in his house. Instead of the straw sandals so commonly used on the mainland, the Formosan wears rubber shoes. Unlike his cousin across the Formosan Strait, an ordinary Formosan expects to own a bicycle. Island farmers haul their heavy goods on ox-drawn wagons with pneumatic tires that carry a ton and a half—a great advance compared to mainland peasants who usually depend either upon wooden wheelbarrows or their own backs.

This prosperous economy suffered substantial war damage. Before V-J Day brought an end to hostilities, American submarines had sunk the Japanese ships that carried fertilizer to Formosa. Our bombers destroyed large areas in several cities, burned railway yards, and, by attacking dams and power facilities, reduced electricity production to one-third of the prewar level.

At the end of the war the United States assisted in the repatriation of all the Japanese administrators, engineers, technicians and businessmen who had managed the island. They with their families numbered about 300,000. The Nationalists, who had difficulty finding enough men to govern the newly liberated coastal cities of China and Manchuria, sent to Formosa only a small number of first-rate technicians. These few, however, did a superior job of patching up essential facilities. The Nationalist Government also dispatched to Formosa a group of loot-hungry officials. The activities of these men, combined with the policy of milking Formosa to feed the mainland, further depressed the standard of living, and in February 1947 goaded the Formosans into open revolt. The uprising was put down by troops brought in from the mainland. Observers on the island at the time estimate that between 5,000 and 10,000 Formosan leaders were hunted out and killed in an action that has left a deep scar, despite the later execution, by the Nationalist Government, of the governor responsible for the slaughter.

When the spectacular Communist victories in 1949 drove the

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Nationalist Government off the mainland, Formosa was poorly prepared to absorb the influx of refugees and troops crowding the LST's that arrived from Shanghai and Canton. However, the Nationalists came equipped with the desperate determination to survive. And they brought to Formosa many of their ablest administrators, whose energies formerly were dispersed from Manchuria to southwest China.

Within the last two and one-half years these underpaid officials have made significant progress in reassembling the tattered ends of their government. They have introduced new vigor and effectiveness into the Formosan provincial administration and carried through some important reforms. One of the most effective of these is the land-reform program which has denied the Communists an opportunity to organize rural discontent. All rents have been reduced to a maximum of 37.5 percent of the main crop, and tenants have received written land contracts and achieved security of tenure. The program is now in its second stage, with the sale to tenants of public land confiscated from the Japanese. The third and final phase of the program calls for government purchase of large private land holdings and the sale of these properties to tenants. The returns on this effort are already apparent in falling land prices, as capital moves to invest in business and industry. More working capital is now in the hands of actual farmers, and there are greater incentives for production now that peasant families retain a larger share of the proceeds of their labors.

The Chinese have been greatly aided in their efforts at reconstruction and development by a rather unique American aid program. The United States effort, organized originally under E.C.A., and now under the Mutual Security Administration, has developed along three distinct lines. Through its commodity program the American M.S.A. mission finances and supervises importation of critical items such as fertilizer, textiles, bean cakes and replacement parts for industry. As a rule these items are sold on the market and most of the proceeds are used to finance the Chinese Government's deficit. As a second phase of the American aid effort, the United States Government, through M.S.A., finances the employment by the Chinese of the services of the J.G. White Engineering Company to assist industrial rehabilitation and development. The results of this effort have become very evident during the last year. The railway system has been

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repaired, and daily tonnage hauled is more than twice what it was at the end of 1949. Two and one-half years ago there were about 5,000 spindles operating on Formosa; late last year this number had been increased to more than 95,000. In 1951 the island's plants produced 104,000 tons of chemical fertilizers—an amount far short of consumption needs, which are more than 500,000 tons, but a great improvement over the previous year.

The most distinctive feature of the American aid program has been its support of the Chinese and American Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. This Commission, composed of Chinese and American agricultural specialists, was first established under the provisions of the China Aid Act, passed by Congress in 1948. The members of the Commission initiated their efforts on the mainland during the last hectic months of the civil war. However, it is only on Formosa that they have had the time and opportunity to implement a comprehensive program of helping Chinese farmers use more modern methods. The program has affected almost every phase of Formosan farm life. The specialists have worked with local officials to organize self-supporting public health stations in the villages. Improved seed, pesticides and purebred breeding stock have been made available to farmers. Island-wide programs have been carried out to vaccinate cattle against the dread rinderpest, and hogs against cholera. Formosan farmers are being taught new methods and attitudes toward their work and community through illustrated pamphlets, posters and a rural newspaper. Many of these efforts are channeled through the Farmers Associations that were established by the Japanese as a control and distribution mechanism, but now are gradually being converted into member-managed coöperatives. There is mounting evidence of the effectiveness of this kind of aid. Last year Formosa produced the largest rice crop in its history—more than 1,500,000 tons. This crop, which was partly achieved at the expense of a reduced sugar acreage, left a small surplus for export. The island now carries more than 1,800,000 hogs compared to 1,300,000 two years ago—important news to Chinese who value pork as much as Americans do beef. The Commission has found that social change to insure more equitable distribution of benefits is a necessary counterpart of any comprehensive attempt to increase farm production. In keeping with this discovery they are now working to improve rural credit facilities to prevent money lenders from syphoning off returns from increased production.

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III

Despite these substantial achievements, the pressure of the military and governmental burden periodically threatens to wreck the Formosan economy and start runaway inflation. The heavy taxes levied, particularly on Formosan farmers, meet slightly more than one-half of the total internal expenditures on the island. To date the Nationalists have covered part of the deficit by selling gold bullion, and public property such as houses confiscated from the Japanese. The remainder has been financed largely through the sales proceeds made possible by American economic aid. In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, E.C.A. allocated more than $97,000,000 for economic aid to Formosa. The Mutual Security Act for 1951–1952 provided almost as much again. However, the new barracks, roads, bridges and runways demanded by the present military program on Formosa all must be paid for in local currency. And the Chinese have very little gold bullion left to meet a financial emergency. The indications are that unless military expenditures are reduced, for example by training more effectively for productive work the several hundred thousand military personnel who are unfit for combat, only increased American aid can save the Nationalists from resorting to printing more money.

Without the present military load most economists agree that Formosa could be both prosperous and self-supporting. This would be especially true if capital were available to develop Formosa's great hydroelectric power and industrial possibilities. However, long-term prospects must take account of the rate of population growth. The records indicate that there were about 2,000,000 persons on Formosa when the Japanese took the island in 1895. Since then the native population has increased about fourfold. The present birth rate is more than 42 per 1,000 and the death rate is less than 11 per 1,000. And yet the island has only 2,000,000 acres of arable land and all of it is cultivated. Rice production per acre per year is higher in Formosa than anywhere else in the Far East; the average yield is about five times as high as it is in the Philippines. There are limited opportunities for further expanding productivity. But, as one American agricultural scientist expressed it, "We can begin to see the ceiling that is feasible with presently known methods." A few of the Chinese leaders are concluding that if they are to avoid a falling standard of living and with it growing discontent, they must somehow limit

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the rate of population growth. In approaching this problem the Chinese have received no assistance from the United States Government or its representatives on Formosa.

Within the last two and one-half years the Chinese Nationalists have made only rather halting progress in evolving more democratic methods of government. But the obstacles to the growth of democracy include more than lack of faith in a popularly elected government among many senior Nationalist leaders; Formosa is desperately short of democratic experience and education. When the Nationalists retreated to Formosa in 1949 the ranks of their government and army were infiltrated by a large number of Communist agents. Chinese on the island, whose families remained on the mainland, also were easy marks for Communist blackmail. As a consequence, the Nationalists acted hurriedly and sometimes ruthlessly to stamp out Communist activities, arresting and interrogating some thousands of suspects. They captured and executed some real Communist agents and frightened others off the island, but they also intimidated and imprisoned many individuals who appeared to be innocent. At present several thousand persons are in jail, where many of them have been held for more than a year and a half without benefit of public trial.

For the great majority of Chinese on Formosa the fearful feature of this situation is the lack of legal protection for the ordinary citizen. He can be arrested at night by a squad of military police, tried by a military court-martial and sentenced, with little opportunity for appeal. Once taken into custody, the ordinary Chinese is in effect at the mercy of the garrison headquarters. A person may be arrested because he actually is subversive. He can also be picked up because someone who wants his job or property has denounced him as a Communist to the authorities. Responsible Chinese officials state that within the last two years much progress has been made in correcting such conditions, and that no civilian now can be legally arrested without a civil police warrant. To the extent that this regulation is enforced, it should provide the civil authorities with a record of individuals who have been arrested by the various secret police organizations and make it possible to trace persons who disappear. The Cabinet has ruled that defense counsel must be allowed in military courts and that the accused must be permitted the presence of his family and material witnesses during the trial. And the cabinet also has de-

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cided that all cases of alleged violations of economic regulations must be dealt with by civil courts rather than by military tribunals.

However, there is still no civilian board empowered to review and rule on the cases of all persons arrested. In the absence of such a board, with supreme authority, and the means to make independent investigations, the garrison headquarters, the special police and several secret police organizations exercise enormous power. Many Chinese feel that with the added security from Communist attack made possible by American participation in the defense of Formosa there is no adequate justification for this lack of due process of law, which tends to discourage even constructive criticism of the Government. They are particularly disturbed by the lack of respect for civilian authority demonstrated by police and garrison officers.

The absence of effective rule by law and resulting limitations on freedom of expression were reflected in the elections held on the county and municipal levels throughout Formosa last year. The elections started in the southern sections of the island where there was considerable freedom to campaign and vote. Indications are that about one-half of the offices in that area were filled by relatively fair elections. But when it became apparent that a great majority of Formosans were winning office, the Kuomintang Party machine stepped in and so managed the elections that their candidates were chosen for most of the offices in northern Formosa. In some districts where its man was not elected, the Kuomintang continues to exercise indirect control either through the police or by placing a party man in the same office with the local official. Some Nationalists have justified this practice on the grounds that there are few local Formosan leaders experienced in managing public affairs.

This approach to the elections, however, reflects a much deeper political conflict within the Nationalist régime; the senior leaders are not agreed upon what kind of government they should develop. A number of Chinese leaders would like to see the creation on Formosa of a genuinely democratic society with protection and opportunity for the individual. These men include several members of the Cabinet, and the Governor of the island. But they lack a commonly agreed-upon, clear-cut program for applying the political principles they have learned from the West. Most real authority on the island, however, belongs to another

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group that can best be identified as the Kuomintang Reform Committee. The 16 members of this policy-making body of the Kuomintang were appointed by Chiang Kai-shek in his capacity as Director-General of the Party. Most of these men subscribe to the principle of democratic government, but tend to think of it as an objective to be attempted after they have liberated the mainland. Meanwhile, they are working to make the Kuomintang a more efficient and disciplined party. Some of their actions suggest they believe the mainland was lost because their control was not sufficiently thorough. It is significant that the Kuomintang Party reforms, announced in July 1950, adopt as one of the principles of organization the system of "democratic centralism." This permits open discussion in party meetings, but requires that once a decision is reached all members must obey. Therein it is similar to Chinese Communist Party practice.

These conflicting ideologies are developing among a people who have only a vague conception of democracy. Japanese education made the Formosans literate and taught them technical skills, orderliness and respect for authority. It did not encourage appreciation for nonmaterial political and cultural values. And today a large proportion of the young people on Formosa adopt the principle that might makes right. Chinese educators working on the island since 1945 have been too poor and powerless to modify these attitudes substantially. They also have been handicapped by the activities of secret police informers who report on students and teachers in the schools. The present educational facilities are not equipped, financed and staffed in a manner that enables them to turn out young men with the technical qualifications needed to manage the Formosan economy at its present rate of productivity. There is even less evidence that young Chinese are being trained to carry forward the fine traditions of synthesizing Chinese and Western thought and science that have been built up during the past century of our contact with the Orient. So far the great economic, military and political leverage possessed by the United States on Formosa has not been used to encourage constructive political, intellectual and scientific development of a long-term character.

IV

The essential question for all Chinese, whose illusions of the "New Democracy" have been shattered by the harsh realities of

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Communist rule, is whether Formosa holds any promise for the future of their race. It is already apparent that the determining factor will be, not the international legal status of Formosa and its Chinese Nationalist Government, but the opportunity available on the island for ordinary Chinese to express and realize their hopes. The first need of the Chinese today is for an acceptable ideal that offers a demonstrable alternative to their presently inadequate experience. Formosa today does not provide this. Within the last 18 months Communist land-reform tactics on the mainland have alienated large elements among the more than 10,000,000 overseas Chinese who live in Southeast Asia. But many overseas Chinese leaders are afraid to make trips to Formosa to organize anti-Communist resistance for fear they will be imprisoned because of old personal and political differences with senior Nationalists on the island. Some of China's ablest thinkers and leaders, who have escaped from the Communists to Hong Kong, are not permitted by the Nationalists to enter Formosa. Most of the Chinese students, professors and businessmen in America are reluctant to return to the island. The businessmen see no adequate legal protection for their enterprise. Students and professors whose skills are needed on the island see little prospect of being able to do worthwhile work. The Nationalist Government, which fled from the mainland, scorned and sometimes hated by the people it had ruled, has not yet won a substantially different reputation with a significant number of Chinese, particularly on the mainland. As the Communists proceed with the liquidation of the unconverted officials, intellectuals and gentry who once were the link between the Nationalist Government and the Chinese people, this becomes even more difficult. Communist efforts also are aided by systematic reëducation of the young, rewriting of the history books and capitalizing upon the national prestige they have won as a result of the Korean war.

And yet, when viewed in a longer perspective, Formosa has many of the physical prerequisites for building one of the most attractive societies in the Far East. For example, it is estimated that at least 15 years of intensive effort, including heavy capital investment, would be required to bring the Philippines to the same level of development. The high productivity and extensive use of modern scientific farm methods as applied to Asian conditions suggest Formosa could make an almost ideal demonstration

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area for showing other nationals in the Far East how to improve their agriculture.

It is to some of the Chinese leaders and thinkers whose values most closely harmonize with those of the West, however, that Formosa suggests the most significant possibilities. Like most Chinese they have a keen sense of history. They are convinced that if all the significant elements of the Chinese people are fitted to the Communist mold, their race will lose many of its finest values. In order to avoid such a loss to world culture and to offer their people an alternative standard for judging life, they feel it is essential that there be maintained outside of Communist domination an area where Chinese civilization can carry forward its great traditions. If Formosa is to be used for this purpose, they are convinced that the United States must more skillfully and firmly use the power that is ours to insure healthy development. It is now apparent that if our concern for the defense of Formosa stops merely with the prevention of invasion it prejudices the democratic case throughout the Far East, and at the same time jeopardizes the military effort itself. We are forced to make certain that the total economy is sound. Active American governmental and private interest in the administration of justice under the rule of law on Formosa is necessary if we really want the Chinese people to be on our side. In order to provide non-Communist Chinese leadership for the future, efforts must be launched now to train up young men and women with the necessary qualifications. If blunders are to be avoided, it will be necessary to provide American diplomatic representation with enough support to permit courageous and sustained action in dealing with the Chinese situation. Charges of interference in the internal affairs of another country beg the essential issue; in the minds of the ordinary citizens of Formosa the United States is primarily responsible for the presence on their island of the Nationalist Government. In their minds, the decisive question is whether our interference has been in their interest.

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THE FRENCH ACCOMPLISHMENT IN MOROCCO

By General Augustin Guillaume

A WORD which the French think cannot fairly be used about their overseas activities is "colonialism," because the term implies racial domination and commercial exploitation, ideas which are alien to the French spirit and are denied, they believe, by the work they have accomplished. This is an age, however, when facts are twisted to suit propaganda needs. In the same moment, for instance, that the Soviet Union represents itself as heading the "truly democratic" nations in a struggle against American "imperialism" and British and French "colonialism," it is busy oppressing and exploiting half of Europe.

Frenchmen see quite clearly that this American "imperialism" is actually only the development by the United States of methods of defense for the Western community against Communist expansion. But do Americans see equally clearly that the alleged French "colonialism" is merely the performance, often under adverse conditions, of a twofold duty of civilization: to better the physical condition of the local populations and to educate them? The task can be performed only in a spirit of understanding and regard for the traditions of the people. Those aims and that spirit pervaded the work of the greatest French administrators, Savorgnan de Brazza in darkest Africa and Lyautey in Morocco. "Men like Lyautey are our most dangerous enemies," said the pan-Arab agitator, Chekib Arslan, "because they know how to make themselves liked." Lyautey's high concept of the French mission in Morocco is revealed in what he wrote to one of his colleagues: "What I dream of, and what many of you dream of with me, is that, among all the disturbances which rock the world so that one wonders when and how it will ever regain its equilibrium, there should be created in Morocco a sound, orderly, harmonious organization; we wish this country to be a sturdy bastion of order against the mounting tide of anarchy."

To what extent has this vision been realized after 40 years of the Protectorate? The answer is written in the soil of Morocco and the faces of its people. No statesman visits this country without expressing astonishment at the tremendous results obtained in such a short time. But those who have not had an opportunity

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of observing on the spot how Frenchmen and Moroccans work harmoniously together are sometimes deceived by a systematic distortion of the facts, prompted—whether outside or inside the country—by emotion, self-interest or political calculation.

There can be no doubt that the Franco-Moroccan achievement benefited at the start from France's earlier experience in Algeria and in Tunisia, even though the political conditions were different. The country which France christened Algeria was a political void when she landed there in 1830, for Turkish sovereignty had become theoretical, and even this had not survived the fall of Algiers. After some hesitation, France in 1848 incorporated Algeria into the home territory and divided it into three departments (Algiers–Oran–Constantine) which were added to the 89 metropolitan departments. Thus its inhabitants became French before they became Algerian, as one of its present political leaders has pointed out. Today the proportion of Frenchmen of European origin living in Algeria is high—close to 1,000,000 in a population of something over 8,000,000. This fact, and the integration of the indigenous population into the French political system, give this part of white Africa the character of a French province, stretching southward into the heart of the Sahara.

No natural boundary separated Algeria from Tunisia. The "hereditary possession" of this little kingdom had belonged since the beginning of the eighteenth century to a family with the rank of Bey; and its inhabitants had inherited their civic and cultural traditions from the most ancient times. As France felt unable to leave Algeria's eastern frontier open onto a country which was in perpetual anarchy, she took over the nominal Turkish sovereignty and, in 1881, established in Tunis, through an agreement with the Bey, a régime which received the name of Protectorate. Under this régime the character of the protected state was respected; and the replacement of the former international controls by the French guarantee gave France the necessary powers for developing the country economically and modernizing its administration. With this impetus Tunisia has regained the prosperity it knew in the days of the Roman Empire, and today its population has passed 3,000,000, of which about 250,000 are Europeans.

The Moroccan Protectorate was negotiated in the same spirit with the Sultan of Fez in 1912, following the international conference in Algeciras and diplomatic agreements which permitted France to remove certain international restrictions which had

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weighed on Morocco since 1880. The unity of control indispensable to the renaissance of North Africa was now complete. However, France granted Spain a zone of influence in the northern part of the Protectorate, where that country had had a foothold as a result of the occupation of the ports of Ceuta and Melilla in the *Reconquista* of the fifteenth century. In addition, the territory of Tangiers in 1923 acquired international status, insuring its permanent neutralization.

Above and beyond its privileged geographical position, the Sherifian Empire was peculiar in that it was bounded on the east and to the south by a range of mountains which made it as it were turn its back on the rest of Africa. Sometimes it is said that Spain is an unattached fragment of the African continent; it could equally well be said that Morocco is an unattached fragment of the European continent. Its important Atlantic coastline, which improves its climate and widens its horizons, combines with its wide coastal plains and high mountainous interior to give it a European rather than an African character. What is more, the Berber origin of the majority of its rural population, which explains its strong peasant nature, and several centuries of intercommunication with Spain, further accentuate its Western orientation. Only its Moslem religion, the tribal organization of its rural population and the theocratic form of its government link it to the East.

Lyautey understood immediately the special nature of this country, its capacity for utilizing the fertilizing influences of France, and the temporal and spiritual strength which could result from the union. Under his guidance and that of his successors the French went to work.

II. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ACHIEVEMENTS

First the tribes had to be pacified, especially those of the Berber mountain ranges who had never permanently admitted the authority of the Sultan. Persuasion was used more than force, following Lyautey's maxim, "A bargain is worth a battalion." The task was finished in 1934.

While this was going on, the old Sherifian organization was equipped with a modern administration, called "neo-Sherifian." French Directors, assisted by Moroccan Delegates, supervise the public services along the lines usually followed in modern nations, except for those which are subject to Koranic law and

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therefore come under the authority of Moroccan ministers (*vizirs*). The Resident General acts as the Sultan's Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Sultan, with the assistance of a Grand Vizir, remains the sole legislator. In the tribes the Sultan is represented by *caids,* but these act subject to regulations designed to limit various feudal abuses and to facilitate the operation of a more highly developed administration. The Sherifian Empire was divided into seven large administrative regions—Casablanca, Rabat, Meknes, Fez, Oujda, Marrakech and Agadir.

Once these over-all reforms had been made, France was able to devote attention to the economic and social betterment of the country, in order to guarantee the population work, food and health. A few statistics will bear witness to the rapidity with which, in spite of two world wars, Moroccan modernization has progressed in the last 40 years.

First of all, internal and external communication systems had to be created. A rail system of 1,000 miles now links Marrakech and Fez and continues toward Algeria on the east and to Tangiers on the north. In our automobile age, however, it naturally is road travel which has been especially developed in Morocco: 7,500 miles of surfaced roads and 18,750 miles of maintained roads now permit the year-round movement of more than 65,000 vehicles. Egypt, by contrast, with twice as large an area and population, has a much less extensive highway system.

Five great ports provide for foreign trade. The chief of these, Casablanca, placed by Lyautey's decision on the site of a fishing village, now handles more than 7,000,000 tons a year, which puts it fourth among French ports, ahead of both Dunkirk and Bordeaux. Though its piers are 3,710 meters long, they are inadequate and are to be doubled in length.

This rise in harbor traffic is due largely to the growth of mining. In a short time, Morocco has succeeded in establishing a place in the world market for two of her commodities, phosphate and cobalt (the phosphate mines were nationalized in 1920 for the benefit of the Sherifian state); and her exports amount approximately to one-quarter and one-tenth of the world production respectively. The mining of tin, zinc and manganese is increasing yearly.

The Algeciras Treaty inaugurated a liberal customs régime for Morocco, but in spite of this, processing industries have been developing since 1940 under the pressure of necessity; the chief is

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a fish cannery, supplied from large sardine banks just off the Moroccan coast. In the last few years, thanks to an inflow of capital, there has been an astonishing development in the manufacture of cork, cement, oils, paper, fabrics and other goods.

As the country is short of coal (the only mine, that of Djerada, produces about 400,000 tons of anthracite), three-fifths of the power necessary for this new Moroccan industry is provided by water. Six dams have been constructed, producing 380,000,000 kwh, while two new dams now being built—one of which ranks among the greatest in the world, with a storage capacity of 1.5 billion cubic meters of water—will raise this figure to 800,000,000 kwh; to this should be added 400,000,000 kwh produced in the thermal plants. Since the total power production in Morocco was only 140,000,000 kwh in 1938, this is a more rapid development than has taken place in any other country.

In the field of social welfare, the authorities of the Protectorate gave first place to medical assistance and improvements in hygiene. As the country had been devastated periodically by epidemics of plague, typhus and smallpox, to say nothing of endemic malaria, everything needed doing. Today there are 260 rural clinics, 73 infirmaries, and 6 specialized hospitals (ophthalmological, anti-venereal, anti-tubercular, etc.). When the new hospital at Rabat is finished in 1953, there will be 11,500 beds, 9,300 of them in the Moslem institutions and 2,200 in the mixed hospitals, open to both Europeans and Moroccans. All medical consultations and hospitalization is free for Moroccans, whether Moslem or Jew. In addition, especially trained field teams use the most modern methods to fight malaria. As a result of this immense public health effort both the infant mortality rate and the death rate have dropped dramatically—the latter from 30 per 1,000 in 1930 to 21 per 1,000 in 1950. The population is increasing about 100,000 a year.

These projects, instituted by French scientists and with French money, have provided work for the increasing urban population, which has risen since 1920 from 250,000 to 1,700,000. In Casablanca alone it grew from 268,000 in 1936 to 551,000 in 1947, an increase of 30,000 a year, creating, incidentally, a number of serious problems in town planning.

The old *medinas*, or Moroccan towns, which Lyautey had sought to preserve by building the new European cities alongside, were soon too small. Careful sociological studies showed

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that it would be wise to create a special type of satellite city which would come up to international standards of town planning and yet be financially practicable. As a result, in the main industrial centers there now are areas limited to 30,000 or 40,000 inhabitants and consisting of four or five community units, separated from each other by park zones. In the hygienically arranged building areas cell-like dwellings are slowly rising. Each covers 64 square meters and looks like a honeycomb, divided into two main rooms facing south and east and opening, according to Moslem custom, onto an enclosed interior court. In other words, Morocco is developing, but in accordance with its traditions.

The cost of this economic and social program has amounted since the beginning of the Protectorate to about 50 billion francs a year. At first it was met entirely by French funds, and French capital still accounts for two-thirds of it. In 1951, the Fund for Modernization and Equipment, which had received 9 billion francs from loans and French taxes and 6 billions from the Marshall Plan, obtained 15 billions in Morocco; and to this was added the sum of about 20 billions of private investments, 90 to 95 per cent of it from the French market and only about 15 billion francs from the Moroccan budget.

It would be less than truthful not to add that all this work was undertaken by France before the Point Four doctrine was so generously set forth by President Truman, and, moreover, that the doctrine cannot be efficacious without the assistance of competent technicians and a trained staff.

III. THE CREATION OF A RURAL MIDDLE CLASS

In spite of the important rôles assumed recently in Morocco by mining, industry and urban development, it is not to be forgotten that 85 percent of the population still depends entirely on the cultivation of the soil. For both social and economic reasons, then, Protectorate officials have been working energetically to modernize agricultural methods; this will improve the living conditions of the fellah as well as develop a socially stable rural élite.

Traditionally, Morocco was a country of sheep and goats, and grain monoculture. When pacification permitted the tribes to settle on the land, there resulted a major agricultural development in the truest sense of the term: from 1927 to 1951 the sown and cultivated area rose from 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 hectares.

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In the first period (1920–1945) the French administration sought to protect the fellahs from the plague of usury by forming a Farm Association and creating marketing facilities for grain. "Sociétés Indigènes de Prévoyance" unite the farmers of two or three tribes, place agricultural implements at their disposal, and when each agricultural year begins provide them with selected seed; the distributions amounted to 280,000 quintals in 1951. Short and middle-term improvement loans are also available.

In spite of this assistance, the fellahs did not follow the technical example of the French farmers in their midst as rapidly as had been hoped. There are now some 4,000 of these European farms, each easily recognizable in the open Moroccan countryside by the grove of trees around the farmhouse, the evenness of the ploughed furrows and the orderly vineyards and olive and orange plantations. What is more, though they occupy only 7 percent of the arable land, they produce 15 percent of the grain harvest and 80 percent of the vital citrus crop. But the neighboring fellahs, even those who are large landed proprietors, remained for long stubbornly attached to their traditional farming methods.

The major enemy of North African farming is the variability of the rainfall. Usually there is one good year in every five. The harvest depends on the prompt arrival of the autumn rains and even more of the spring rains; it can also be virtually destroyed in a few days by the hot, dry wind from the interior known as the *Chergui.* The two remedies are power cultivation and irrigation.

Only a tractor makes possible the summer plowing of earth hardened by drought—the method of dry-farming—and quick ploughing and sowing in the fall when the rains come late. In addition, the lack of fodder makes it impossible to support teams strong enough to pull heavy carts. Faced with the inability of the Moroccan farmers to alter their ancestral habits, the administration of the Protectorate decided in 1945 to take in hand the modernization of their means and methods of cultivation step by step. For this purpose it scattered throughout the country organizations known as "Secteurs de Modernisation du Paysanat" (S.M.P.), which were in the nature of model farms supplied with mechanized equipment at the disposal of the neighboring fellahs. At first the fellahs were wary, but gradually they became accustomed to making use of this equipment for their own work and began to accept the advice of the supervisors.

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In six years, methods of cultivation on over 100,000 hectares of land were modernized in this way. The rate of progress is necessarily slow in the period of adaptation to the human and physical environment, where its work is as a drop in the bucket; but it is increasing steadily. While providing this technical assistance to the fellahs on their own land, the administration is also undertaking the irrigation of vast outlying areas, the improvement of which will soon alter the whole physiognomy of the Moroccan countryside.

Already the construction of three little dams between 1925 and 1935 had made possible the irrigation of some 45,000 hectares devoted to the cultivation of citrus fruits, and more recently of cotton. New improvements and the completion of big projects now under way on the Oum-er-Rbia at Bin el Ouidane and at Imfout will increase the area of irrigated land in a few years to 400,000 hectares. In the first of the new areas a state bureau created in 1941 for the sole benefit of the Moroccans is dealing with the problems of resettlement and technical organization presented by this complete transformation in the use of the soil. The Moroccan fellahs will be the chief if not the only beneficiaries, for since 1938 the proprietary tribes are protected by law from undue dispossession. Valuable crops (rice, cotton, vegetables, citrus fruits, fodder, etc.) will thus reinforce the financial stability of the small proprietors in many parts of the country.

Here is the crux of the Moroccan problem: the creation of a rural middle class. Its absence was the main reason why certain East European countries and, more recently, China, were so vulnerable to Communism. Its lack enfeebles the countries of the Near and Middle East today and accounts for the fact that in spite of their apparently democratic constitutions they still contain an anachronistic feudal régime. In Egypt, half of the land under cultivation belongs to 12,000 big landowners; the other half is divided among 14,000,000 fellahs.

Farsighted and honest Arab politicians agree that this is the crucial problem for their countries. They might do well to come and study the steps which have been taken in this field in Morocco, a country for whose well-being they often profess great concern; and the results of such a study would be more profitable to the great masses of their compatriots than the agitation they stir up in order to keep themselves in power. They would find, for example, that in 1945, a year of great drought and a bad har-

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vest, a law was passed in Morocco entailing family property to prevent small landholders from selling out to the large. In Morocco as elsewhere rural modernization is more often a matter of social education than a technical problem.

IV. FRANCO-MOROCCAN SOLIDARITY

The gradual education of the Moroccans, then, is the Protectorate's basic work. The budget of the Department of Public Instruction accounted for 19 percent of the general budget for 1952 (as opposed to 12.5 percent in Egypt). This has permitted 300 new schools to be opened per year. Statements of that sort give only a partial indication of the scope of the program, however. The Youth Service is very active, constantly organizing playing-fields, summer camps and group trips for young Moroccans. The goal is the balanced nation of which Lyautey dreamed.

The diverse elements of the population make this difficult. There are in Morocco 3,000,000 Berbers, divided into 385 tribes—the basic element of the indigenous population, living in the mountains and in the south; 3,000,000 Arabs and Arabized Berbers, divided into 247 tribes, inhabiting the coastal area and plateau; 600,000 city-dwellers, artisans and bourgeois; 800,000 workers, recently migrated to the industrial areas; 200,000 Jews; and 400,000 Europeans, the majority of them French.

Each group forms a community, separated from the others by its own traditions and customs. The Berbers, now subject to a central government after centuries of anarchy, are still attached to their traditional laws, and many would willingly resume their former separatism. The city-dwellers have no rural affiliations, and the women among them still lead cloistered lives as in the Middle Ages. The workers in the towns, uprooted from their tribal environment, no longer observe their religion's ritual obligations and retain only the strong sense of racial solidarity, in which circumstance they are easy prey to anti-foreign or Communist propaganda. The Jews, still for the most part living in the *mellahs,* are developing with surprising rapidity, and never again would accept their previous inferior status. Though the Europeans are only 5 percent of the population, they provide the majority of the administrators and the technicians, and the taxes on their economic activities provide half of the state income; the size of their economic stake in the country makes it im-

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possible for them to accept the position of a political minority.

The complexity of this social system is entirely ignored by the small group of agitators who exploit the idea of independence in order to secure political power. The first result of independence would be the destruction of the balance upon which European and Moroccan coöperation depends. This would occur, too, at a time when the spirit of solidarity, sealed with the blood of two wars, is so genuine and so strong that France no longer feels any need to keep more than half as many troops in Morocco as Spain stations in Spanish Morocco. (The population in the Spanish Zone, incidentally, is only a tenth as numerous and its area is only one-twentieth as large.) The goal set by France is to develop the internal administration of the Protectorate just as fast as a rural and urban middle class can provide a suitable Moroccan staff—that is, men who are well-trained, honest and devoted. Such officials have participated in the mixed social and economic committees of the administration since the beginning of the Protectorate, and the number of Moroccans taking an active part in the direction of affairs is growing. To hasten the pace a Moroccan School of Administration has been established in Rabat. As a further means of developing competent officials the Frenchmen responsible for the future of Morocco have arranged a large number of scholarships for young Moroccans to do technical or legal graduate work both in France and Morocco. Though this youth is much attracted by French culture, it sometimes allows itself to be diverted from constructive work to sterile political agitation. When the winds of demagoguery blow from various Near Eastern countries, where mere opposition to the West is enough to figure as an ideology, there is no great danger, for enlightened Moroccans believe that their Western orientation is sound and have no real sympathy for states with antiquated social systems. It is a more serious matter, however, when the criticism is accepted in foreign countries, not because it has been investigated and found to have some substance but simply because the public opinion there is moved (as is French public opinion) by the idea that one people must not be oppressed by another people, and because, not being fully and fairly informed, their warm hearts and good faith are imposed upon.

V. THE NEW EAST AND THE NEW WEST

In the middle of the twentieth century, after two world wars,

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both nationalism and colonialism have become outmoded. Modern life is built on the concept of solidarity of peoples. In Western Europe the recognition of this fact results in an attempt at a unified organization which, beginning on economic and military levels, and helped by the United States, will one day be given expression in the political realm as well. Parallel with this development, under the conditions of the atomic era, and face to face with the vast stretches of Eurasia which already have been Sovietized, the promontory which is Europe must find support on the African continent by forming a Eurafrican bloc. The place where the two continents can be welded together is North Africa. By geography, by the ethnic origins of the major part of its population, and, until the Arab invasions of the Middle Ages, by history, North Africa was an integral part of Europe when the latter was developing in its Mediterranean cradle. This integration is the more natural economically in that semi-arid and temperate climates complement each other in food production. Today, 75 percent of Algeria's external commerce is with France, and the figure for Morocco is 50 percent even under its present liberal customs system.

Strategically, North Africa protects the southern flank of Western Europe just as Great Britain protects its northern flank. As an air and logistics base at the Atlantic and Mediterranean crossroads, whether considered as a supply base or as a point of departure in the event of war, the possession of it is a trump card in the hands of the Western Powers. The loss of it, or simply its collapse into anarchy, would open up a threat from the flank to the whole strategy for the defense of Europe and break a vital link in the system of Atlantic communications. Of this whole area, Morocco, covered by Spain on the north and protected to the south and east by the Atlas Mountains, is the most unassailable bastion. Geography designates it as a base for the strategic air forces of the coalition of Powers which are working to save the peace.

The development of Morocco and provision for its security thus are then essential elements in Western defense. They can be achieved only by a combination of industrial progress, agricultural modernization, social organization and political stability. The *sine qua non* for each of these is Franco-Moroccan unity. It has become a symbol of the reconciliation and fusion of what might now be called the old West and the old East. In 1952 the

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West and the East are no longer what the history books told us; the traditional terms have acquired a new meaning. The present division of the world is no longer a religious schism, such as used to exist between Christianity and Islam, both of which are united today in spiritual aspirations which often seem startlingly similar. The division in the world today is between two concepts of man's fate: the individualistic and liberal concept versus the collectivist and totalitarian concept. That, today, is the new West and the new East.

The ancient East, from the Arab states of the Mediterranean basin to Pakistan, India and the new Indonesian Republic, is not yet fully aware of this world revolution. But whatever dreams it may have of forming a third force—traditionalist, feudal and artisan in nature—cannot survive the inexorable lessons of reality. Should the West succumb, each of these countries would have to surrender to Communism; their very nationalism would have prepared them for that fate, as has been seen in China and even more vividly in Korea. In North Africa, France is not simply responsible for the safety of 1,600,000 Frenchmen. She has the responsibility for the new world which is taking shape there. In Morocco it must correspond to the dream of Lyautey; whether it does or not is one of the tests on which may hang the future of the West.

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THE FOREIGN STUDENT IN AMERICA

By John W. Gardner

DURING the academic year 1951–1952 more than 30,000 foreign students came to the United States for training of one sort or another. This is a fact which wins the warm approval of most citizens. Both the Government and private foundations have expressed their enthusiasm for international exchange of students by contributing substantial sums of money to carry it on.

The presence in this country of large numbers of impressionable youngsters from abroad accords beautifully with American notions of how international amity is to be furthered. We are entirely sure that all concerned will benefit if foreign peoples get to know us. We have the warmest faith that, knowing us, they will like and respect us. We believe (without ever having examined the belief very critically) that, if people can be placed face-to-face, they will find a common human basis for understanding. It is a Christian, humane belief and it does us credit.

So great is our belief, however, that we have tended to assume that the process will inevitably be successful, no matter how haphazardly planned and carried out. This is almost certainly untrue. There are better and worse ways of doing it; and, as in all human endeavor, there are hazards inherent in the enterprise. Those who have had extensive dealings with foreign students know that many of the individuals who have come here have not been wisely selected; that many have received training which has left them ill-fitted to deal with problems in their own countries; that many have left our shores despising us rather than loving us.

The problems vary according to the country from which the student comes, of course. The Canadian student, for example, has an infinitely easier task of adjustment to American life than the Indonesian student. The problems which require more thought than they usually receive are chiefly those of students from cultures unlike our own.

The United States has certain clear objectives with respect to the nations of the free world. We wish them to gain in economic strength and political maturity. We wish them to be free and remain free. We wish them to be friends of the United States. The

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achievement of these objectives will depend upon the quality, the vigor and the maturity of indigenous leadership in these countries, and upon the capacity of this leadership to understand and sympathize with our aims. The success of all our efforts to provide military and economic assistance will ultimately depend on this.

Seen in this context, the presence in the United States each year of tens of thousands of the ablest young people from these countries must be regarded as a uniquely promising opportunity. Most of the countries of the free world are in a period of social ferment, and in such times younger leaders play an unusually significant rôle. Many of these countries do not have enough able men who are trained to deal with complex political and economic problems. Effectively carried out, the process of student exchange could provide them with a steady flow of individuals whose experiences in the United States have not only led them to like and respect us but have fitted them to play a constructive rôle in the development of their own nations. And even in those countries which now have an adequate supply of able and well-trained leaders, it would be to our interest if the leadership ranks were steadily replenished by young men with a firsthand understanding of the United States.

II

The 30,462 foreign students who were enrolled in our institutions of higher education during the academic year 1951–1952 came from 126 countries.[1] Geographical proximity accounted for heavy representation (11,304) from our neighbors in the Western Hemisphere—Canada (4,232), Mexico (1,185), Colombia (953), and so on down to Dutch Guiana, which sent ten students. The reëducation programs of the Department of State and the Department of the Army were the chief factors in producing substantial contingents from the occupied areas—Germany (1,236), Japan (1,150), and Austria (237). Total representation from Asia and the Near East was 10,952, and from Europe 7,220.

This flood of students spread to every corner of the United States, enrolling in 1,354 different institutions of higher education. They found their way to liberal arts colleges and vocational schools, to theological seminaries and art institutes, to medical

[1] See "Education for One World, 1951–1952." New York: Institute of International Education, 1952.

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schools and military academies. They went in large numbers to the great universities (1,379 at Columbia University alone) but they also sought out innumerable small institutions throughout the land such as Millsaps College, Mississippi, Briar Cliff College, Iowa, Deep Springs College, California.

About one-half of the students were enrolled in undergraduate studies. Most of the remainder were enrolled in graduate study of one sort or another. They sampled almost every variety of higher educational offering. More than 3,700 students were enrolled in general liberal arts courses in the first two years of college. Of the more advanced and specialized courses, engineering was far the most popular, with almost 6,000 students. The other major fields (in order of preference) were the social sciences, medical sciences, physical sciences, business administration, religion, education, agriculture and the fine arts.

The Institute of International Education estimates that the presence of these large numbers of foreign students in this country represents an investment of approximately $75,000,000. Data are not available on the sources of financial support for all foreign students, but some facts are known. It is known, for example, that at least one-third of the students receive no funds other than those obtained from their own private sources. About one out of eight receives United States Government aid toward travel or maintenance or both, and about the same proportion receives some sort of scholarship award from the institution in which he is studying. Four and one-half percent receive scholarship awards from such nongovernmental organizations in this country as Rotary Clubs, women's clubs, foundations and professional groups. About 4 percent are known to receive aid from governmental sources in their own countries, and another 2 percent receive aid from private organizations at home.

The nearest thing to a central organization in the field of student exchange is the privately-sponsored Institute of International Education, which administers most of the governmental programs on a contract basis, handles scholarship funds for private groups, provides counseling and guidance facilities for foreign students, and in general acts as a central servicing organization for student exchange. Many other nongovernmental organizations play an active—though much more limited—rôle in exchange of students. To name only a few, the Rockefeller Foundation, the Guggenheim Foundation and the Commonwealth

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Fund have conducted over the years very carefully designed fellowship programs for individuals of outstanding talent. So-called "bi-national" organizations such as the American-Scandinavian Foundation and the Belgian American Educational Foundation have played a significant rôle in exchange between the United States and their own countries. The International Houses in Berkeley, Chicago and New York City have provided comfortable and congenial living quarters for thousands of foreign students since the first one was founded a quarter of a century ago.

On the governmental side, the Department of State is responsible for the United States Educational Exchange (Smith-Mundt) and Fulbright programs. The Department of State and the Department of the Army have both conducted large programs of exchange involving the occupied countries. The Office of Education is responsible for exchanges with Latin American countries. The Economic Coöperation Administration has conducted certain special exchange programs.

It is perhaps characteristic of us as a nation that we have thrown ourselves wholeheartedly into such an enormous venture without ever having subjected it to critical scrutiny. There is no reason for assuming that student exchange is unworthy of the energies lavished upon it, but these are times which call for reexamination of all phases of our intercourse with other nations and peoples.

An appraisal of the process of student exchange might properly begin with the problem of selection. The choice of most students is not in American hands, but we do select a good many and could influence the mode of selection of many more. It is an open question whether we have used what influence we do have to favor a wise choice. Our basic objective, of course, should be to assure ourselves that the students who come are individuals of talent, character and capacity for leadership, individuals who may be expected upon their return home to serve their own countries constructively, vigorously and wisely.

The machinery which the United States Government has set up for selection of foreign students is fairly uniform. The most common device is a Committee on Study and Training in the United States. The Department of State has encouraged the establishment of such committees in most countries which send large numbers of students. The committee is composed of a few educational leaders in the foreign country involved, a few Ameri-

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cans resident in that country who are acquainted with our own educational system, and the cultural affairs officer of the U. S. Embassy or Legation as an observer or *ex officio* member. The United States Educational Foundations set up in various countries to deal with exchanges under the program of Fulbright grants are roughly similar bodies. In some countries the process of selection has been delegated to the bi-national foundations.

These various groups set up by the Department of State are used almost solely for selection of those students who are to receive aid from the United States Government, and thus they deal with only a fraction of the students who come here each year. But these groups could set a pattern of intelligent selection which might have far-reaching influence.

In spite of the conscientious effort which has gone into the establishment of such machinery, wise and impartial selection cannot be taken for granted. It is a matter of common observation that favoritism and nepotism are prominent in the choice of students in some countries. Another problem goes deeper still. In many countries domestic circumstances are such that only a favored few get through the tight bottleneck of the lower educational system to the college level, at which most international exchange takes place. In the light of our American tradition of keeping the road to achievement open at all times to talent drawn from every social level, it would be ironic if we fell into the error of seeking talent in other countries only from among the favored few, leaving it to the Communists to recruit—as they eagerly do —the vigorous and striving potential leaders outside this charmed circle.

III

Effective selection, however, is only the first step—though an important one—toward a sound development of the possibilities of student exchange. Everyone who has worked with foreign students knows that even with the ablest and most promising human material the visit sometimes goes sour. Often this is traceable to problems of personal adjustment and social relations. For most of the foreign students who come here the visit is a major experience of a lifetime. It is exciting, disturbing and invariably difficult in some of its aspects. The student's whole feeling about the United States, his effectiveness as a scholar, and the usefulness of his work in years to come may hinge on his capacity to

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solve the personal and social problems inherent in the exchange process. This is not the place to review them all, but it may be worth while to suggest their nature.

The foreign student almost always experiences a diminished sense of personal worth. An individual's self-esteem is rarely a wholly portable asset; it is rooted in his social context and in his sense of belonging there. The foreign student leaves behind his whole personal and social environment—his family, community and nation, the way of life and the sense of membership—the terms in which he is accustomed to identify himself and appraise his worth. He is introduced into a strange context in which his own status is ambiguous and difficult to establish. The position which he had at home means nothing here. In a sociological sense, he comes naked to our shores. Small wonder if he shivers a bit!

The American high-school graduate who goes to a distant university experiences in his first days on campus the same sense of strangeness, of anonymity, of loss of personal context. But he soon finds common ground with the other anonymous newcomers, and he finds that he can quickly communicate to others the context in which he is accustomed to see himself. He can say to his new roommate: "I'm from Emporia; I played football; my father's a druggist." The problem of the foreign student may be recognized if one were to imagine the roommate replying: "Where's Emporia? What is football? Is a druggist someone who peddles narcotics?"

In short, the foreign student is almost certain to find that his confidence is shaken by the sheer fact of being transplanted into a strange environment. And in this vulnerable state, he soon encounters experiences which multiply the effect. His confidence in himself is to some degree based upon a sense of his capacity to make sound judgments in the routine matters of social living. But now he finds that he can no longer trust his judgment. A remark which he intends as a witticism may evoke anger; reserve may be taken for coldness; intended friendliness may be taken as presumption; intended courtesies may be regarded as quaint. He must master a new set of rules.

No one can spare him the learning process which he faces. All travelers in all centuries have experienced it. But he can be prepared for it; he can be forewarned of its difficulties; and he can be given some helpful advice concerning it. Consider, for example, the problem he faces in expressing any criticism of the United

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States. He can be reminded of the fundamental fact that members of a group, no matter how freely they may criticize themselves, resent similar criticism from outsiders. A Marine can criticize the Corps, but he does not welcome similar comments from the Army. Residents of Denver may complain about their city, but they will not applaud the same criticisms from a Bostonian. The foreign student will readily recall occasions in his own country when he and his countrymen bitterly resented outside complaints. He can be warned that the people of the United States are like all other humans in this respect. Friendly Americans who assure him that we love criticism are doing him no favor.

It would be a serious mistake to underestimate the importance of these matters in the experience of the student. They can totally destroy the constructive character of the visitor's reaction to the United States. The student who feels insecure and shaken in confidence, who feels alone and unworthy and buffeted, is in a perfect frame of mind to formulate a negative view of the United States. He can explain his troubles and salve his wounded self-esteem by convincing himself that the United States is an intolerable environment. In this frame of mind every flaw in American life is a sop to his ego, every weakness he discovers in us feeds his own need for a sense of superiority. What American traveling abroad has not found himself nourishing just such a state of mind? These are reactions which cannot be wholly avoided in any case; but they can be diminished.

It is obviously impossible to "nurse" the foreign student through his stay in this country—impossible for practical reasons, quite aside from the unfortunate effect which such ministrations might have upon the student. It is possible to hope, however, that the visiting student can be placed in a social context to which he will have a reasonable opportunity of achieving a satisfactory adjustment, and within which he can enjoy normal participation in American life. If this could be done, then we might safely assume that the student would work out on his own the difficult but unavoidable process of adjusting to his new environment.

The foreign student does not need to be singled out for elaborate attention; indeed, there are real hazards in the sporadic efforts to lionize him which are so often the consequence of well-intended community action. The familiar community pattern of lionizing the student for a time and then forgetting all about him is probably harmful in both phases.

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The student will as a rule be far better off if left to himself to a reasonable degree—but left to himself in a situation which provides him with a fair opportunity to achieve a satisfactory experience in American life. One would want to ask, for example, whether he has ample opportunities for comradeship with Americans, and whether he has the opportunity to experience a sense of belonging to some American group. The advantages of comradeship with Americans are obvious: his clearest insights into American ways and American beliefs will be achieved through firsthand sharing of work and play with Americans. And the gains of comradeship will be substantially heightened if he *belongs* to some American group, not necessarily in the sense of holding formal membership, as in a club, but in the sense of being a fully accepted participant in a group or community of manageable size. He may experience this as a member of the student body on a small campus, as a resident at one of the International Houses, as a graduate student in a laboratory which has more than usual *esprit de corps,* or as a member of a campus living group. The student who is receiving graduate training in a professional school is fortunate in that most professions provide a strong sense of membership, and this is a vivid experience even at the graduate student level. The important thing is that he not be left to float as a lonely, anonymous individual lost in the busy swirl of university life.

In thinking about the living circumstances of the foreign student it is necessary, of course, to face candidly and realistically the problem of racial discrimination. Throughout Asia, the Near East and Africa, resentment of Western attitudes of racial superiority is a potent and dangerous ingredient in the political thinking of native populations. Local leaders have long since discovered that this reservoir of resentment can be tapped for a wide variety of political purposes. Systematic exploitation of this resentment is a central feature of Communist propaganda throughout these areas. The Communists could wish for nothing better than a steady stream of youngsters returning from the United States embittered by humiliating experiences of discrimination.

Organizations concerned with the exchange of foreign students recognize these facts, and have attempted to deal with them in two ways: first, by sending non-white students to those parts of the country where they are least likely to encounter difficulties; and second, in so far as possible, by arranging to have them

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placed in a social setting in which they can count on being accepted as normal participants in community life. The foreign student who comes with open eyes and an open mind will find reasons for praise as well as censure. If he is willing to examine the progress made in recent decades he will surely recognize that great advances have been made. The problem is a serious one, but certainly not wholly discouraging. Discriminatory practices based upon racial, religious or social differences are familiar facts of human experience—certainly familiar to all of the students who come here. While the foreign student will find that we do indeed have this problem, as do most human societies in one form or another, he will also find a degree of public discussion of it, and a vigor in trying to correct it, which are almost unique in the long and tragic history of inter-group conflict.

IV

The kinds of training which foreign students seek in this country are so varied that the question of the appropriateness of the programs we offer cannot here be discussed comprehensively. But the question is too important to be ignored. The hope is, of course, that the training received in the United States will enable the students to make a constructive contribution in their own countries. This is not as certain a consequence as one might suppose. Many agricultural students from tropical countries, for example, have found to their dismay that the training they were given in certain of our agricultural colleges had little or nothing to do with agriculture of the sort which they had to practise on their return. Many engineering students have found that the training which fits the American student to work for a huge industrial concern has little relevance to the rudimentary problems they face in their own countries.

Nothing could be more disheartening and frustrating to the returning student than to find that his training in the United States had little to do with the day-to-day problems with which he must deal. The student must be equipped to play a constructive rôle within the framework of his own society. In so far as this involves appropriately designed technical training, the problem is more and more widely recognized, and one may expect great improvements. But more than technology is involved. The foreign student who comes for technical training will be an agent of technological change; and technological change brings socio-

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logical and political changes of the most complex sort. If the student does not understand this complex background against which he will have to work, he will be in for some surprises and some sharp disappointments. Anyone who has ever been concerned with technological change can testify that the technical problems involved in accomplishing an innovation may be minor compared with the sociological problems involved in getting the innovation accepted. Technological innovations disrupt old ways of doing things; they often run counter to deeply-rooted beliefs and customs; they frequently have political and social repercussions which result in every variety of resistance and sabotage. Thus the technically trained student, on returning to his native land, may find himself all dressed up with no place to go. He may find that his technological ideas are unwanted, or that he meets inexplicable resistance and becomes entangled in unexpected political conflicts.

If the student is to use his training effectively and wisely, then he must understand the sociological context in which technological change takes place. Only the most modest beginnings have been made in this sort of education for foreign technical students, and indeed no more than beginnings can be made until our technical schools become wiser about the process of technological change in backward countries. At the present writing those technical schools which are giving any attention at all to the problem are wholly bemused with techniques and almost totally ignorant of the sociological problems involved in introducing techniques.

It is hoped, of course, that the foreign student will learn things in this country which are not a part of any prescribed course of study; and most of all, let us confess, it is hoped that he will learn something of the fundamentals of democracy as we know it; we want him to understand the mainsprings of life in the United States. We have been consistently hesitant about "indoctrination" or "propaganda" aimed at the foreign student. We do not want to "sell him" anything; and this stems partly from our proud confidence that, if he has eyes in his head, he will soon learn more favorable things about the United States than we could possibly tell him. Unfortunately, this assumption does little justice to the complexity of our national life and the confusing aspects of the foreign student's experience in this country.

A visit to the United States gives the student a firsthand sense of how we behave, and of the sights and sounds of a democratic

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society in action. It provides him with an emotional understanding of certain aspects of our national life which he could never achieve in any other fashion. It enables him to get beyond and behind the clichés by which the United States is described abroad. It may enable him to get a few of the lessons of democracy into his nervous system, so to speak. But we make a great mistake if we assume that such an experience will necessarily provide him with a real understanding of democracy or of the American people.

An initial difficulty is that when foreign students arrive in this country they have their heads full of the most astonishing preconceptions of American life; and some of these preconceptions are so strong that the student is in danger of seeing only those things in the United States which accord with his settled notions. Anyone who has had extensive contact with foreign students will recall cases of students who have been here for considerable periods without relinquishing the most curious misconceptions concerning American life. But the problem of giving the student an elementary understanding of the meaning of democracy as it is practised in the United States is more than a matter of clearing away quaint misapprehensions. Even American citizens are apt to have only a vague idea as to what the essentials of democracy really are. For a foreign student to separate the essentials from the nonessentials is difficult indeed. His final idea of democracy may be a bewildering hodgepodge of impressions regarding the high standard of living, the freedom we accord women, racial discrimination, social informality, free speech, municipal corruption, the arrogance of workers in the service trades, preoccupation with sanitation, sky-high prices, and endless, seemingly aimless, activity.

It is only sensible to insist that all foreign students arriving in the United States be given an opportunity to learn some of the broader realities of American life before they plunge into a specific program of work and study. It is a mistake to suppose that the foreign student will be offended or bored by a well-conceived attempt to orient him with respect to life in the United States. He comes ready and willing to learn, and on his arrival no topic is more exciting and interesting than the nature of the country to which he has come.

Many of the students who are brought here under grants from the United States Government, and some who come under other

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sponsorship, are now exposed to orientation sessions of varying degrees of adequacy. But the sheer problems of traffic control make such arrangements difficult. It is both awkward and expensive to route and schedule very large numbers of students in such a way that they gather at predetermined spots for a period of orientation. It might be possible to set up a number of regional sessions to which all colleges and universities within a given area could send their foreign students for preliminary orientation. Far more flexible would be the provision of orientation sessions on each campus which has foreign students.

v

At the heart of the whole question of the potentialities and limitations of student exchange is the fate of the student after he has returned home. Does he enter upon a more constructive and creative rôle in his own society as a result of the experience? Or is he merely more discontented? What effect does the experience have upon his career during the next 20 years, upon his capacity for leadership, upon his political orientation? Is he a stauncher friend of the United States than he might otherwise have been?

These are not easy questions but they cannot be shrugged off, for the part that these young intellectuals will play may be a fateful one, particularly in those countries which are economically underdeveloped and politically turbulent. In the past half-century the course of events in underdeveloped countries has underscored the strategic rôle of the intellectual—in revolutionary movements, in the normal political life, in all efforts for economic and social development. Though the process of selecting the young men and women who come to America may be far from perfect, there is no doubt that we receive from these countries youngsters who are well above average in capacity. But are we equipping them for good or ill?

We are inclined to hope, of course, that students from those countries which are economically underdeveloped or politically immature will learn here things which will be useful not only in their own careers but in the development of their countries. This need not be a vain hope. But we must be quite realistic about the degree to which the student can transfer what he learns here. We cannot assume that democratic practices as we know them can be transplanted everywhere. The Western democracies are the product of a long tradition. We can export food and machinery and

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even—to some degree—techniques, but we cannot export our past. Economic factors, the level of literacy, local customs and traditions—all determine the particular forms which democracy will assume in any country at a given time. It is ridiculous to assume that democracy as it exists in the United States can be transplanted without modification to countries of very different political, economic and social circumstances. One of the important things which the exchange student must learn is that he will have to work within the context of his own culture upon his return. His own society has its own path of development and must follow it. He must be at home in his own culture and creative in its terms.

There are two major hazards facing the student on his return. The first is the one just mentioned—that all that the student has learned and experienced may serve only to make him feel out of place in his own society. All too often the student who receives his training in a country more advanced than his own returns to find that he no longer "belongs" in his own culture; and yet he does not really belong in his adopted culture. He is lost between two ways of life, at home nowhere. The repercussions of such a state of mind are far-reaching. It is not surprising that some individuals who find themselves in this painfully ambiguous situation—unable to adjust to their own culture and unable to transform it into the image of the advanced country they have come to admire—seek a way out of the conflict by escaping into a rabid nationalism and a fierce insistence on the supremacy of the culture which they feel has been taken away from them—in being "more native than the natives," so to speak.

The other hazard is that the student's own country may simply be incapable of providing useful employment for an increased supply of highly-trained young men. With all his arduous preparation for a useful life, he may come home only to join the ranks of the unemployed intellectuals. Of the two hazards, the latter is far more serious. But from the standpoint of our national interest, both are serious for the same reason. Able, vigorous, intelligent young men who can find no outlet for their talents, no possibility of a useful rôle in society, and no hope of realizing their aspirations, constitute an explosive element in any country. And the Communists have had long experience in working with such explosive materials. Communism offers them a dogmatic ideology which will relieve them of all uncertainty and give them a sense

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of acting with inexorable forces of history. It provides an organization which will relieve them of the sense of being alone and helpless in the face of the social forces which frustrate them. It promises that the social order which produced their frustration can be changed. And it provides them with definite methods for bringing about this result. This constitutes powerful medicine for the able and aspiring youngster who knows that his training is not used because his society is too archaic to use it. In the case of the less highly developed countries, then, much of the ultimate success of our program of student exchange depends upon finding a solution of the larger problem which faces us in dealing with these nations today. The question is whether we can help the vigorous elements in these societies to discover how they can bring about needed social changes without resorting to Communism.

We need not be so pessimistic as to say that the whole success of student exchange hangs on this contingency. It is very likely that for large numbers of foreign students the experience of living in a free society is never wholly erased, whatever their subsequent experience. The attitudes and impulses engendered by such an experience may find no adequate expression for years and yet may profoundly influence later action. It is a mistake, for example, to assume that the large sums of money spent in bringing exchange students from China were wasted. Only the future will tell what rôle these Chinese students may yet play in bringing their nation back to sanity.

The process of training foreign students in this country, though filled with pitfalls, may prove to be one of the most significant activities of these years of feverish experimentation with every sort of program designed to advance international understanding. The likelihood of success, however, will be considerably enhanced if we are aware not only of the possibilities of the program but of its limitations.

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SOVIET PRESSURE ON SCANDINAVIA

By Arthur Spencer

IN fundamentals, the foreign policies of the four northernmost European nations have not changed since they made their respective choices in 1949. Norway and Denmark (together with Iceland) are members of NATO and the Atlantic Community. Sweden, warily neutral and comparatively well-armed, and Finland, geographically exposed and until recently completely self-effacing, maintain an allegedly interdependent isolation. In the last year or so it has been apparent, however, that Soviet Russia is putting pressure on all four countries, in ways appropriate to each, with the aim of reviving the project of a neutral Scandinavian defense bloc, in which Finland would be included. The restatement of Finland's foreign policy by her Premier, Urho Kaleva Kekkonen, on January 23, 1952, therefore aroused immediate interest. The Finnish Premier's main thesis—that Finland desired good relations with the Soviet Union and wished to stand apart from Great Power conflicts—was nothing new. But his plea that the Swedish policy of neutrality be adopted by Sweden's neighbors reopened the broader question of a regional defense bloc.

"A thorough and secure neutrality for the Scandinavian countries, such as Sweden has observed for nearly a century and a half, is thus in accord with Finland's interests, since it should remove even the theoretical risk of an attack on the Soviet Union through the territory of Finland," Mr. Kekkonen declared. "The goal of Finland's policy is to secure the country's peace in all circumstances, and peace in the northern countries is an essential prerequisite for the achievement of this aim." For several reasons this statement has been thought to have been inspired, or at least connived at, by Russia. It envisaged a more active rôle for Finland in foreign affairs than she has played since the war, and one which she could not support against Soviet wishes. Since Mr. Kekkonen insisted on issuing his comments for publication in his party's paper, just before undergoing an operation which necessitated the postponement of the scheduled speech, they seemed to have an unwonted sense of urgency. That there was any prompting by the Soviets was denied by the Finnish authorities; and, indeed, there may have been none. The

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Russian desire for a neutral north accords with Finland's deepest interests; and an astute politician like Mr. Kekkonen can take a cue without prompting. His action, nevertheless, shows the way the wind of Soviet diplomacy is blowing.

II

Broadly speaking, the policies of Norway and Denmark, both firmly within the Atlantic community, represent only local variants of what might be called the larger Atlantic policy. There are, however, two particular aspects which are worth noting. The first is that both countries still have a strong feeling of northern solidarity; for example, when the question of restricting the freedom of movement of Russian diplomats was taken up at the Copenhagen meeting of Scandinavian Foreign Ministers in March of this year, all stood together in rejecting the idea. The second is that Norway is subjected to special pressure from Russia. The Soviets are much annoyed by the way Norway maintains the "Atlantic" against the "Scandinavian" view in major matters and gives staunch allegiance to NATO. And the Russians are sensitive about their common frontier with Norway; until Turkey joined the organization, Norway was the only NATO Power with which the Russians shared a frontier. References to this frontier, and to Norway's Spitsbergen and Bear Islands, have padded out a whole series of Russian notes.

The main theme of these notes, from the first one of January 29, 1949, which protested against Norway's apparent intention of joining the Atlantic Pact, has been that Russia considers the cession of bases to NATO a threat to her security, for which she will hold Norway responsible. The Norwegians have consistently said that they will not permit their allies to occupy Norwegian bases unless Norway is attacked or threatened by attack. The Russians think they know better. Their notes employ the familiar "as is well known" technique, backed up by suitably distorted "evidence" from Moscow Radio, *Pravda* or similar propaganda organs. But the style and content of these notes cannot compare with what the London *Times* once called "a vintage Molotov of the best period;" and in their eagerness to make their points they have sometimes committed such absurdities as implying that the Russian Northern Fleet is coal-burning.[1]

[1] In the Russian note of October 15, 1951, the following occurs: "The Soviet Union owns parts of the coalfields on Spitsbergen . . . thereby supplying the northern regions of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Northern Fleet."

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The Russian offer of a nonaggression pact to Norway in February 1949 may to some extent be used to gauge the validity of the Swedish claim that Swedish neutrality is largely responsible for the continued independence of Finland. Sometimes it is claimed that Sweden remains neutral in order to protect Finland. There is no doubt that the Swedes genuinely believe that their present policy helps Finland, and it probably does. But this is a justification of Swedish neutrality, not the reason for it; and the absence of any Russian reprisals against Finland for Norway's defiance suggests that when formulated this way, Sweden's claim is excessive. It may also mean that the boot is on the other leg—that the Russians treat Finland remarkably well in order to avoid frightening Sweden into joining the West. For it is a cardinal weakness of the Swedish position that, as her Foreign Minister, Mr. Östen Undén, has put it, "neutrality is a juridical not a moral concept." The struggle of ideologies that now torments the world is moral and not juridical. From the standpoint of Communist ideology Sweden is a Western state and must therefore be presumed to be a potential ally of the West. This in itself vitiates the Swedish position and emphasizes the fact that neutrality depends on outside factors for its success. No state can be neutral today unless all the Powers whose antagonisms have made a choice of sides necessary have sufficient reasons of their own for permitting it to enjoy that status.

Whether or not Sweden would be allowed to remain neutral in any future war is an open question. But there is no doubt that, if attacked, Sweden would fight, with or without last-minute allies. I say "last-minute" because in the present state of Swedish opinion there is absolutely no possibility of any commitment prior to attack. The extreme sensitivity of Sweden to anything that may conceivably develop into a military commitment inconsistent with neutrality is shown whenever occasion arises. Mr. Eden's proposals in March that the Council of Europe should assume responsibility for European schemes such as the Schuman Plan or the Pleven Plan, or Mr. Acheson's proposals for effective armed forces for the U.N., immediately prompted the Swedes to question whether Sweden would be able to coöperate fully with organizations which became tainted with military or "unneutral" functions. The episodes once again disclose the two strands in the line of Swedish foreign policy—the genuine idealism, which finds its expression in certain forms of international

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collaboration, of which Hjalmar Branting was the chief exponent; and the caution and pursuit of economic advantages which characterize the stronger and more normal mood.

Because the opponents of neutrality in Sweden are extremely articulate, it is probably not generally realized how unimportant is their influence on Swedish policy. Of 380 members of the Swedish Parliament, only two or three, apart from the 12 Communists, could possibly be conceived of as voting in favor of an unneutral policy, unless the country were attacked. At every debate on foreign affairs the Opposition, after a great display of windmill-tilting, reaffirms its support of "alliance-free, armed neutrality" as the only possible course.

The fact that such discussion of Sweden's position is continuous and well-informed often gives foreigners an impression that the bases of a new policy are being investigated. This feeling is sometimes fostered by the replies of important Swedes to foreigners who ask whether any change in the present policy is contemplated. When the answer is "Not at present," as it often is, Americans or Englishmen go away confirmed in their belief that such an obviously Western and successfully bourgeois people as the Swedes are merely waiting for the right time to join the West. But such an impression is wrong, if by "right time" is meant any time before attack. The Swedes feel for neutrality as the English feel for the sea; and their attitude will be as difficult to change, even if they themselves want to change it. Increased danger merely makes them look to neutrality as the English "look to their moat"—or used to.

The maintenance of neutrality requires very quick reactions to the moods of the Great Powers; positions held too long can become compromising, as the Great Powers develop new aspects of their policies. If neutrality is to succeed, it must exhibit qualities of inconsistency similar to those for which, in rather different circumstances, "Perfidious Albion" has been criticized since the time of Cardinal Wolsey. However, for the observer of the international scene in northern Europe it is precisely this sensitivity to changing situations which makes Sweden such a valuable political barometer.

III

It is a reasonable assumption that the Russians consider Sweden's neutrality of benefit to them, and they have given

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various indications of the importance they attach to it. Most significant, perhaps, were the comments made by Mr. Molotov, then Soviet Foreign Minister, on the conclusion of the Russo-Finnish Treaty of Mutual Assistance in Moscow in April 1948. The gist of his remarks was that he hoped Finland's neighbors would note that Soviet Russia had the interests of the small northern states at heart. More recent, and in different vein, was the somewhat hysterical reaction in April 1950 to alleged Swedish indifference to the "violations" of her aerial sovereignty by United States aircraft searching for the crew of the Privateer which the Russians had shot down off the Latvian coast. But apart from such manifestations there is the overriding consideration that, as long as Sweden is neutral, the limits of NATO are kept many miles further away from Russia than they would otherwise be.

To foster, or at least not to discourage, a neutral bloc that would serve as a buffer for Russia's frontiers has been a major aim of Soviet policy in northern Europe since shortly after the war. The development of NATO has now precluded Norwegian and Danish participation. But there is strong backing for the idea in Germany, whose acceptance of such a scheme would more than offset the absence of Denmark and Norway from the group. Finland would, of course, belong to it; and it might reach far enough into central Europe to include the Russian satellites Poland and Czechoslovakia. A glance at the map shows how strategically important such a combination would be. A few moment's reflection shows how little prospect it has of materializing; but, equally, it shows that in all the northern countries except Norway there is sufficient support for such an attractive illusion to make the idea of a "Third Force" grouping in Scandinavia and certain neighboring countries of continuing value to Russian propaganda.

Thus in the last year or so the meretricious attractions of a neutral bloc have been displayed around the northern capitals. For a while, an apparent increase in the friendliness of Soviet diplomats and a definite increase in the number of parties they gave led to the belief that something new was afoot. These manifestations roughly coincided with the Ottawa meeting of the Atlantic Foreign Ministers, and the beginning of the financial difficulties in NATO which were eventually dealt with by the special three-man committee consisting of Mr. Harriman, M. Monnet and Sir Edwin Plowden. They were obviously intended to under-

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mine the resolution of some of the smaller NATO Powers by suggesting that their considerable efforts at rearmament were not really necessary.

As the economic prospect deteriorated, as the truce negotiations in Korea dragged on, and as the struggle for Germany continued, various other moves were made. Last autumn Norway received several Soviet notes in the space of a few weeks protesting strongly against various actions she was alleged to be taking as part of an aggressive plan against Russia. Against the background of the increased camaraderie noted above, and of contemporaneous rumors in Copenhagen that the Russians were now ready to reach a settlement on Germany, these protests were probably intended as a warning to other small countries. All this time, of course, the "peace campaign" proceeded apace, and preparations were in train for the Moscow Economic Conference.

A surprising intervention by Sweden in the U.N. discussions on all-German elections, at Paris last December, revived speculations about this neutral bloc. Seeing a rare opportunity of combining both the idealistic and the egotistic strands of foreign policy, the Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Undén, put forward proposals which were described by Herr Ackermann, the East German Foreign Minister, as "near to the East German ideal." Mr. Undén proposed that the four occupying Powers should be responsible for arranging all-German elections as a preparatory step to the reunification of Germany, and should report within a month on the feasibility of such elections. The plan would have provided just those opportunities for introducing irrelevant matters which would have enabled the Communists to damage the Western case, while postponing any decision on elections.

The Swedes did not intend to help the Communists, of that we may be sure. We may equally believe that they did intend to benefit Sweden even at the incidental expense of vital Western interests. The United States delegation lobbied so strongly against the Swedish proposal that it was dropped, and the State Department indicated its disapproval of the move to the Swedish Government. The reason given officially for the Swedish initiative was that, since the investigation of the possibility of elections in Germany had little chance of success, it was better to let the four Control Powers negotiate unsuccessfully among themselves than waste the time and damage the prestige of the United Nations by yet another disagreement there between East and

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West. The Germans were to be brought in because they were the people whose future was being decided.

This narrow view disregarded the realities of the situation in Germany so completely that the West Germans themselves expressed annoyance at such a gratuitous weakening of their position. Taxed with the broader implications of their action, government circles in Stockholm took refuge in wounded idealism. Behind Mr. Undén's move lies one of Sweden's greatest preoccupations—the revival of a strong Germany, preferably reunified at the price of "neutrality" and enjoying a good trade with the East. Such a development, it is thought, would greatly strengthen Swedish neutrality by reviving the triangular pattern of power which favors it. Furthermore, it is highly probable that a Germany united after really free elections would have a Social Democratic government—a prospect which the Swedish Socialists welcome and have an interest in bringing about. Of course there is also a considerable body of opinion in Sweden which is highly suspicious of Germany, whether Christian Democrat or Socialist, and disapproves of such objectives.

The attractions of the picture of a neutral group of nations enjoying greater trade with the East are enhanced by the increasing difficulties which Sweden's exports are beginning to meet in the West. Those difficulties should not be exaggerated, however. Public interest in Sweden has been focused on the "pulp war;" but in the long run the effect of recent wage increases on the competitive position of the engineering industry's exports may be more serious. It is in any case the nature of these neutralist tendencies rather than their present strength that makes them so interesting. They spring from deep inside the Swedish national consciousness, and for that reason may blossom with surprising vigor in the conditions that would be provided by a real threat to Sweden's prosperity. The Russians probably had an eye to these proclivities when they proved so accommodating in the negotiations for the Russo-Swedish trade agreement last December. As it happened, the famous Russian Trade and Credit Agreement of 1946 ran out, with only about half its provisions fulfilled, just at the time when world economic tendencies were more in line with the general temper which had produced it then at any moment since it was concluded. Of course there is at present no likelihood of the great American slump which the agreement with an "insulated" Russia was to guard against; but

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the level of trade in the West is diminishing and Sweden will suffer in consequence. This naturally predisposes the Swedes to look for compensatory trade in the East, or in previously neglected markets such as Indonesia. There is little evidence that the necessary volume of trade is there—except in goods which can be sold to the West as well, iron ore, for example—but the mood exists. The unusual Russian purchase of such consumer goods as razor blades and butter under the new agreement was probably designed to encourage this state of mind as well as to keep making propaganda for the Moscow Economic Conference.

IV

If increased and more varied trade with the Soviet empire is useful for Sweden—all questions of control through strategic blacklists and the allocation of raw materials apart—it is coming to be a matter of vital importance for Finland. By September 18 next—and probably before—the last reparations deliveries will have been made. Finland will then have to decide what to do with the industries she has built up to produce reparations goods. The prices of the products of these industries—primarily engineering and metal-working—are far too high to compete on the world market. There is thus the prospect that they will either have to sell their goods to the East, or reduce their capacity, with all the consequent economic and political repercussions. For a time the home demand for some things will mask the severity of the problem. But the long-term prospect is one of increasing economic dependence on Russia and her satellites. There is no intrinsic harm in this. After all, this is what was already happening in the early years of reparation deliveries: in 1945, for example, reparations accounted for 62 percent of all exports, and in 1946, 34 percent. It all depends on how Russia chooses to use her strength. The Finns prepare for the worst, but in the light of Russian behavior in recent years remain fairly optimistic.

Their own Communists probably cause them more anxiety. Politically weaker than their 16 percent voting strength in the general election of July 1951 would imply, they have nonetheless tended in recent years to get a firm grip on certain sectors of economic activity. This they have done in two ways. Firstly, they manage the former German companies which were handed over to Russia as reparations. These include important sectors of the forest industry—the largest is the group of firms run by the

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Waldhof Concern—and a variety of businesses ranging from engineering, fuel distribution, and shipping to cinemas and dress shops. Secondly, several trading companies founded with Communist funds obtain preferential treatment from the state-trading agencies of the satellite countries, and are building up monopolies in various commodities—Polish coal, for example. The most important of these is the Suomen Export-Import Agency ("Sexim"). Thus the Finnish Communists are strengthened by their capitalist interests; it would be a bold man who prophesied that they would never be tempted to use this strength for their own purposes.

The difficulty then would be that, although the Soviet Government has behaved well toward Finland, as the Finns would be the first to admit, it is inconceivable that it would refuse to support more effectively the revived claims of a Communist Party strong enough to afford prospects of a successful seizure of power. It is possible that some such reasoning contributed to Mr. Kekkonen's announcement on foreign policy. Among other things, he might have been trying to suggest to the Russians that in his Administration they had a broad-based non-Communist Finnish Government which nevertheless considered that in matters of major policy Finland's interests were identical with Russia's Scandinavian interests—that therefore it was not necessary to replace this Government by a Communist régime. To adapt the private expression of one of Finland's leading politicians, the Finns realize they are in a cage but are trying to avoid being chained up as well.

Various other explanations of the significant portion of Mr. Kekkonen's speech have been advanced, and it is unlikely that any single motive accounted for it. The apparent sense of urgency which impelled him to publish his draft speech on the eve of a surgical operation has been taken as evidence of Russian pressure to get the renewed appeal for a neutral bloc in the north on the record, before the Lisbon meeting of NATO, so that, by "disregarding" it, the NATO countries would provide a spurious justification for any future Russian action. It is also said that the timing of the statement can be explained by the circumstances of internal politics which made Mr. Kekkonen anxious to make known his views before the Diet met the following week. However that may be, his effort to give a lead to the Scandinavian states in the direction of neutrality focuses attention on significant Russian moves in the area.

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CAN EUROPE USE AMERICAN METHODS ?

By André Siegfried

FRANCE, which is a country, cannot be compared with the United States, which is both a country and a continent. The only fair comparison is between Europe and North America—two continents, with two conceptions of production, two different structures corresponding to two different atmospheres and civilizations. Perhaps it should be added that we are also considering two different ages: on the one side youth, on the other maturity, eventually old age. By thus underlining the most striking contrasts between them we are enabled, perhaps, to understand them better. This is the spirit in which any useful discourse on the relations between France and the United States—between the Old World and the New—must be conducted. It is the best way, moreover, to serve Western unity. I always feel that I understand the United States while I am there. But back in Europe I know that I understand it no longer, and I therefore try to be prudent in my judgment. I sometimes wish that Americans who talk about the Old World and its problems would feel the same scruples.

II

First let us look at American industrial production. I must confess that in this field my admiration for the United States is almost unbounded.

We can distinguish two principal periods in the industrial revolution. The nineteenth century, the European period, was based on the machine. It was adapted to European conditions and to the specific and diversified structure of Europe. The twentieth century, the American period, was based on standardization, mass production, scientific organization of labor. It profited from the conditions existing on a new continent which permitted the development of a specifically American structure. Though the initial inspiration in both cases was identical—the machine—the scale of the American application made it the equivalent of a new creation. Where one would have expected a simple difference in degree there turned out to be a difference in nature. When we set ourselves to learn from the United States, therefore, let us

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keep in mind that the conditions are not the same on the two sides of the Atlantic and that one cannot imitate without making adaptations.

To a Frenchman who is used to Cartesian methods of reasoning the American system of production seems to derive from four distinct and coördinated operations: systematic use of the machine; intensive standardization and mass production; scientific organization of labor; and concentration of production, if not by creating giant factories, at least by unified management of efficient working staffs. This has nothing to do with state planning of the Soviet type, as suggested by the word "rationalization" which was first introduced by the Germans but is unknown to Americans. It is rather the spontaneous achievement of an industrial élite, the true expression of the genius of the people.

Now, in this system there are certain things which can be taken over or copied just as they are and others which are as impossible to transfer as the climate itself. American industry, operating under characteristic conditions and with a characteristic structure, enjoys a number of advantages which we lack in Europe. In the first place, it has raw materials and fuels in abundance, in some cases even in excess. The manufacturer is assured of a steady supply of raw materials of uniform quality, suitable for machine use and standardized techniques. In comparing American and European conditions we do not take into sufficient account how much this quality factor affects the value of the finished American product. The American also has the tremendous advantage of working in an organized and stable economic setting. If he needs new equipment, he has no trouble in obtaining financial credit. His stock on hand can be small; a telephone call, a truck—and the necessary items appear! The whole mechanism is precisely adjusted. It does not suffer from dislocations due to the shocks of war, bombardments or shortages. This is an oversimplification, of course; but it indicates how and why production has developed as it has in the United States, and with what results.

In an economic system where individuals are standardized as easily as the mass product there is no place for classes. The whole North American continent is one enormous market, and after the customers have been steam-rollered into the accepted pattern they are ready to absorb without question the mass-produced models which are fed out to them indefatigably. Publicity and advertising direct the customer's taste into precisely the chan-

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nels chosen by the big industries. Lincoln most certainly deserves his countrymen's gratitude for saving American unity. If a Southern Confederacy had been established alongside a Northern Union the entire fate of the continent would have been different.

In such a simplified structure it is easy for employer and employee to see their common interest and develop a feeling of solidarity. The worker realizes that he benefits from the prosperity of the enterprise where he is employed, and the fact is that he does benefit. His union understands that it is in its interest to cooperate toward the same end. In both cases experience has taught that in the United States progress does pay. Under such conditions the owner does not hesitate to mechanize his production, even if this means discharging part of his personnel. Those who are thrown out of work can find other employment because the New World is in fact new and is still being borne forward on a rising tide. There still are great opportunities for development both in new industries and in the exploitation of hitherto unknown natural resources. Think just of Texas, where today oil is causing a wave of feverish activity in a style which we supposed had died with the nineteenth century! And on top of its enormous natural gifts the United States has only one-tenth as many inhabitants per square mile as there are in Central and Western Europe. The advantages of being lifted on such a flood tide are literally beyond comparison.

Europe does not have that sort of atmosphere or that sort of structure. Doubtless we are in a position to equip ourselves and to practise industrial techniques not inferior to those used in America. We can also practise Taylorism, organizing our production scientifically along authentic American lines. But beyond that point we must struggle in a jungle full of underbrush, creepers and parasites, whereas the American benefits from a simplified structure as regular as a California plantation. Where North America forms practically one single market, Europe has 20 different countries, each with its own sovereignty expressed in an intransigent tariff system. And whereas the English language serves almost all the North American continent, Western Europe has ten different languages.

The established and rigid European system does not produce men who are nomadic or standardized. If they lose a job it is so difficult for them to find a new one that employers often hesitate to undertake necessary mechanization for fear of turning entire

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families out into the street. It can be said truthfully that in Europe technical progress does not necessarily "pay." There are too many people and too few raw materials; the social system is too complicated. After two wars, the second of which came when we had not even recovered from the first, the Old World certainly does not give the impression of moving forward on a rising tide.

III

American methods as they are practised in America attain maximum efficiency, and productivity is a reality. This is because the various factors contributing to production have full play there—as they do not in Europe.

In the first place, there is research. In a competitive economic system, where any concern which does not modernize continuously is soon outstripped by its rivals, the research laboratory has become an indispensable instrument of production. Progress as such is a luxury no longer; it is a necessity. The discovery of some new process, some new way to use a given material, may give an enterprise a sensational boom just as its failure to find new methods may lead it rapidly to ruin. Research in the twentieth century, moreover, bears little resemblance to what we associate with famous names like Claude Bernard, Berthelot, Pasteur or Perrin. It does not rely on the genius of individuals but on the collective work of teams of experts. This requires practically unlimited capital which only giant enterprises can command. Before 1914, when imperial Germany was engaged in research work on that scale, she became a pacemaker in many fields of big industry. But the United States is in a position to go much further. Even allowing for America's colossal resources, the results of the American method are so remarkable that the question arises whether it is not perhaps the only efficient method at the present time. However, make no mistake: as things now are in the world it is only in the United States that it can be practised at all. By an additional piece of luck, America has secured a large number of brilliant and creative European minds that the Old World either failed to keep or actually persecuted and expelled. This valuable help, noticeable particularly in the field of atomic research, should, no doubt, be credited to Europe; but it is the United States that has profited.

Standardization and mass production form a second factor which the New World can exploit fully but the Old World can-

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not. At first glance the United States would not seem to have any advantage here, for it has only 150,000,000 inhabitants whereas Europe, even in its present reduced dimensions, has considerably more. But it must not be forgotten that the 150,000,000 Americans form a homogeneous body within a single tariff system. With them should also be counted 15,000,000 Canadians, who have the same customs, the same way of living, producing and consuming. Europe, divided into many sovereignties and with ten different languages, could never approximate the same conditions except after almost impossible negotiations. The modern man's standard of living is involved also. If it is to be raised, custom-made goods must be replaced by mass production. However, mass production should necessarily go hand in hand with mass consumption, and this consumption must itself be rationalized, nursed along and educated by advertising to accept the limited number of models which are kept in stock. From the cultural point of view, this standardization of the customer may not be exactly progress; but from the social point of view it is. We often forget that since mass production necessarily depends upon the mass consumer it can prosper only in the climate of democracy. France, democratic politically but aristocratic in taste, has taken a long while to understand this truth. In the United States it has been accepted without reservation or regrets, and the same can be said of advertising, which is taken as a matter of course. The United States is also the birthplace of "public relations"—the art of justifying business enterprises to the public on the score of service. Sectionalism and diversity have prevented these activities from developing in Europe, but they have flourished quite naturally in the homogeneous society across the Atlantic.

I am much impressed by the fact that America has succeeded in giving the worker a rôle that suits him and encourages him to contribute to production. No doubt this is easier to achieve in an expanding economy. But what is interesting is the fact that modified capitalism—and it should be stressed how much it is modified—allows the free enterprise system which is based on risk and profit to have a salaried class which is not a proletariat. Before the First World War, employers were paternalistic and arrogant, but since then the extraordinary development of the labor unions enables employees to negotiate on an equal footing. The Communists are in the habit of contrasting the Western democracies with the so-called People's Democracies. I would like to think

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that there is as much social equality in Russia as in the United States. And if the latter is called reactionary, I no longer know the meaning of the term.

Be that as it may, from the point of view of production the results are remarkable. Today the policy initiated by Henry Ford is practised by most American industrialists: high wages, but to the accompaniment of increasing efficiency, so that a reduction in the net cost is reflected in the selling price—the only effective way to increase the buying power of the public. It was through this policy that Ford, in his heroic period, laid the foundations of his immense success. The trusts—forerunners of rationalization—had not understood that from the moment an industry threatened with overproduction is unable to dispose of its surplus, it cannot help itself by maintaining high prices. Franklin D. Roosevelt did not understand it any better when he favored increasing prices and wages simultaneously without paying any attention to the rate of production. It seems that today the lesson has been understood. We in Europe have no idea to what extent rationalization, productivity, research—in other words, the elements of technical progress—have become the rule in the United States. And it is mainly this technical progress which is the key to social progress and finally also economic prosperity. In the long run there is no use in "doping" the consumer by artificial excitements of publicity or credit if you cannot offer him, at an attractive price, the merchandise which you want him to buy. The depression of 1929 was to a large extent the result of such practices.

If the present prosperity of the United States seems sound, it is because American buying power increases quite logically from an increase in productivity. It is a common European idea that industrialization necessarily brings overproduction and unemployment. But this is an error, at least as regards the New World. I am convinced that, on the contrary, the elasticity of the domestic American market is almost unlimited. It will not be limited unless initiative slackens or there is a weakening in the present passionate pursuit of technical progress.

It is from this point of view that the present crucial period in America should be judged. Two opposing tendencies are at work. The struggle is between the forces of inflation and deflation—a struggle which at bottom is a struggle between politics and economics. The development of an increasingly progressive economy tends toward deflation; but the social democracy of the welfare

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state and the rearmament policy tend toward inflation. As inflation is the easier and less painful of the two, governments invariably end up by yielding to its temptations. Possibly, then, the tide may go that way. But the instinct of an industry which has always made a success of progress works in exactly the opposite direction. If its action cannot counteract the rising tide of social and military expenditure, it can at least for a time reduce its effects.

IV

All we have said is true—but true in America and not necessarily true elsewhere. Here is where misunderstandings and errors begin, and often they are as much the fault of the Americans as of the Europeans.

The real characteristic of American prosperity is that it is American and that it exists specifically for American reasons. In saying this I do not mean to minimize the American merit, but to draw attention to the fact that a Europe which looks back across an impressive cavalcade of centuries and which has been subjected to war on its own territory twice in 30 years can simply not be expected to achieve similar results. I am afraid that the American industrialist in judging his European colleague underestimates the handicaps on European production. He is so used to riding a rising tide that he forgets how much effort it takes to hold one's own when the tide is slack or low. He gives his advice, then, in a condescending manner and often in caustic terms—and fails to produce the desired effect, for he is being as annoying as Frenchmen are when they assume a superior manner and present themselves as the defenders and sole guarantors of the intellectual civilization of the world.

Another thing the American should remember is that since he has not had the war on his own territory he should talk about it with utmost reserve. He cannot understand what war and the fear of war mean to a European. Those who have been in the two world wars and those who had close relatives in them have suffered personally. But for most of those who stayed in the New World the idea of war is associated with such things as full employment and the absence of depression. At the present time, again, Americans do not suppose that the policy of rearmament need affect the standard of living in any way, and one even hears the view expressed that it offers an opportunity for setting a new

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level for the national standard of living. But to Europe, and to France in particular, war means invasion, destruction and ruin; and so as far as any idea of a third world war is concerned, it means simply death. The mere possibility of it cannot be mentioned without horror, without physically shivering. If one has to prepare against the possibility of such a war, one should talk about it only with great care to the people in countries whose casualties are numbered not in the hundreds of thousands but in the millions.

I understand that, ever since the First World War, the United States has lost some of its feeling that the rest of the world is essential to it economically. That is all too natural, and if I were an American I would feel tempted to tell myself that North America could probably prosper all by itself without the other continents, and particularly without Europe, which is a burden anyway. Since 1914 the balance between the two continents has never been restored. America needs nothing—Europe needs everything. America exports without importing. As a result, since the only way the importing countries can repay is in merchandise, they can hardly pay at all. Instead of our holding out our hand and America giving, it would make for much sounder national economies if there were an exchange of products or services.

But even if there is no commercial solidarity, there is political solidarity—the solidarity of civilization, due to the fact that both sides are united to defend the West. Sometimes, however, this solidarity seems hardly to be recognized by American public opinion, and this is one of the reasons, I believe, why American arguments do not carry the full weight they might in the Old World. Instinctively we hope to find allies, partners; instead we find arbiters, often judges. It will be recalled that the French people were shocked when President Wilson, in 1918, refused to visit the devastated areas of northeastern France. We sense a similar aloofness from reality in the attitude taken by the American representatives in Iran, Egypt and Indo-China. I know all our errors very well; but we tell ourselves that we fight on the front of the same civilization. If that thought were voiced oftener in the United States it would have a considerable effect in France and would give American opinion greater influence over French public opinion.

Americans are inclined to feel that because the American states found it so advantageous to unite in a federation the European

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states should do likewise. The suggestion is of course highly sensible, and it is precisely what Europe is trying to do at this very moment. The fact that American opinion is growing impatient because after three years of striving the goal still seems distant reveals a serious lack of understanding. The citizens of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia who united in 1787 spoke the same language, were of the same ethnic origin and had only a very short period of American history behind them. A thousand years of history stand between France and Germany and (in spite of a certain feeling of Continental solidarity) an opposition on the very essence of institutions and ideas. A frontier between two European countries has nothing in common with a line between two states of the American Union or even with the border between the United States and Canada. In these circumstances might not a little more admiration, perhaps, be lavished on the progress which in three years has brought Europe in 1952 to speak of the Schuman Plan and a European Army?

The lessons of these random observations is that for arguments to be effective they must be adapted to the surroundings where they are used. Things that apply in the United States apply in a different way in Europe. I am always surprised to find in my own experience, and within myself, how much American and European ways of seeing things differ even though basic ideas and essential tendencies are the same. Is it possible to be at the same time American and European? Certainly not. There should be, therefore, a continuous effort of adaptation and transposition, and when it is made by those who are friends and partners in the defense of the same civilization that effort should be crowned with success.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

AWAKENING: THE WORLD AT MID-CENTURY. By Erwin D. Canham. New York: Longmans, 1951, 209 p. $2.75.

The editor of *The Christian Science Monitor* and members of his staff survey the present world situation reasonably, though with an ultimate appeal to transcendental values.

NEW HOPES FOR A CHANGING WORLD. By Bertrand Russell. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951, 213 p. $3.00.

In these new essays Bertrand Russell demonstrates once again the vigor and challenge of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment, of which he seems to be one of the few surviving spiritual heirs.

THE PRICE OF REVOLUTION. By D. W. Brogan. New York: Harper, 1952, 280 p. $3.50.

Sprightly political essays, often bearing some relation to the title, and most interesting—as is frequently the case with Mr. Brogan—when dealing with the United States.

POLITICAL REALISM AND POLITICAL IDEALISM: A STUDY IN THEORIES AND REALITIES. By John H. Herz. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 275 p. $3.75.

An intelligent effort "to describe and analyze some basic types of political thinking which to the author seem to recur again and again throughout history." A reworking, but a constructive one, of the realist-idealist antithesis.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNISM. By Giorgio La Pira and Others. New York: McMullen (for Fordham University Press), 1952, 308 p. $5.00.

A series of papers, prepared largely by Italian scholars, for meetings held in Rome in 1949 at the Pontifical Academy of St. Thomas.

EUROPA SE APAGA. By Pedro Caba. Madrid: Colenda, 1951, 511 p. Ptas. 50.

Somber Spanish-Catholic meditations on the present phase of world history.

PRELUDE TO WAR. By P. A. M. Van der Esch. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1951, 190 p. Guilders 15.

A University of London dissertation on the international aspects of the Spanish Civil War, making use of the documentary material published in the last decade.

EUROPA: GROSSMACHT ODER KLEINSTAATEREI. Edited by Edgar Stern-Rubarth. Bielefeld (British Zone): Eilers, 1951, 295 p.

A symposium of essays on European union by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, Salvador de Madariaga, Clarence K. Streit, Edward Crankshaw and others.

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A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. By F. P. Walters. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1952, 2 v. $11.50.

A comprehensive and authoritative history by a British member of the League Secretariat from 1919 to 1940. The author sees the League as "the first effective move towards the organization of a world-wide political and social order, in which the common interests of humanity could be seen and served across the barriers of national tradition, racial difference, or geographical separation." His treatment corresponds to this high theme.

THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS. By Stephen M. Schwebel. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 299 p. $4.75.

An intelligent, though not wholly convincing, exposition of the thesis that the political prerogatives of the Secretary-General are a significant factor in international relations. The narrative provides a useful review of developments.

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. By H. Field Haviland, Jr. New York: Carnegie Endowment, 1951, 190 p. $2.75.

An examination of the forces that have led to the General Assembly's assuming political functions originally assigned to the Security Council.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

FOUR THOUSAND MILLION MOUTHS. Edited by F. Le Gros Clark and N. W. Pirie. New York: Oxford University Press, 1952, 222 p. $3.00.

A group of British scientists—botanists, agronomists, biochemists and nutritional experts—have contributed to this valuable collection of essays dealing with the world's food problem and the means of mastering it.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF HUNGER. By Josué de Castro. Boston: Little, Brown, 1952, 337 p. $4.50.

A Brazilian nutritional expert assails the pessimism of the neo-Malthusians concerning the feeding of the world's masses, but inclines to carry his counter-arguments to an extreme.

POPULATION ON THE LOOSE. By Elmer Pendell. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1951, 398 p. $3.75.

The neo-Malthusian case presented with an excess of italics and punch lines.

TRAITÉ DE SOCIOLOGIE: LES GUERRES. By Gaston Bouthoul. Paris: Payot, 1951, 550 p. Fr. 1200.

This ambitious sociological inquiry into the nature of war reviews the theories on the subject, discusses its economic, demographic and psychological aspects, and classifies the causes of conflict. It may be challenged at points but is useful for its effort to sort out the elements comprising this most complex phenomenon.

CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM ON TRIAL. By Fritz Sternberg. New York: Day, 1952, 603 p. $6.50.

Arguing in the framework of the under-consumptionist tradition, Mr. Sternberg elaborates his thesis that capitalism was kept afloat by imperialism, that imperialism is no longer a feasible support and hence that the new international order, which he definitely does not identify with the Soviet system, must be Socialist.

MOBILIZING RESOURCES FOR WAR. By Tibor Scitovsky and Others. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 284 p. $4.50.

A critical examination of programs of economic control under conditions of full mobilization of resources. The authors favor a system of rationing expenditure.

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MOBILIZATION AND INFLATION. By Frederic L. Simmons. Claremont (Cal.): Claremont College, 1951, 98 p. $2.75.

Three lectures by the economist of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York.

DER AUSSENHANDEL ZWISCHEN MARKTWIRTSCHAFTLICH ORGANISIERTEN UND ZENTRALGELEITETEN VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTEN. By Willi Graf. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1951, 190 p. Sw. Fr. 12.

This dissertation reviews the sparse literature of state trading, discusses a number of theoretical points and makes some use of Eastern European experience. It does not, however, reach new fundamental conclusions as to how trade between controlled and market economies can be conducted on any but an *ad hoc* basis.

THE ECONOMICS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION. By John R. Commons. New York: Macmillan, 1950, 414 p. $5.00.

This posthumous work by one of our most original economists aims to set out in fairly simple terms some of the major elements of his point of view. The volume also contains a bibliography of Commons' works, and explanatory and biographical material by some of his associates.

L'ÉCONOMIE MONDIALE AU MILIEU DU XXe SIÈCLE. By Jean Chardonnet. Paris: Hachette, 1951, 405 p. Fr. 750.

A substantial survey growing out of the author's earlier study on the economic consequences of the war. Emphasizes America's expansion in the world economy.

SCHUMPETER: SOCIAL SCIENTIST. Edited by Seymour E. Harris. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 142 p. $4.00.

A valuable collection of memorial articles on the late Austrian economist.

CORPORATIVISMO. VOLUME I: INTRODUÇÃO. By J. Pires Cardoso. Lisbon: The Author, 1950, 134 p. Escudos 50.

An introduction to the fundamentals and antecedents of modern corporativism.

AIR WAR AND EMOTIONAL STRESS. By Irving L. Janis. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951, 280 p. $5.00.

A volume in the Rand series, evaluating the psychological effects of air warfare to assist in planning the defense of the United States against air attack.

THE STORY OF THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION. By Raymond B. Fosdick. New York: Harper, 1952, 336 p. $4.50.

A popular but well-based presentation of the diverse activities of the Foundation, by its president from 1936 to 1948.

The Second World War

THE STRUGGLE FOR EUROPE. By Chester Wilmot. New York: Harper, 1952, 766 p. $5.00.

Mr. Wilmot has combined his firsthand experiences as a war correspondent with much subsequent research to create the most vivid account yet published of the war in Europe. The book is in some respects definitely partisan, as in its advocacy of the Montgomery strategy as against that of Bradley and Patton. But though it will wound some susceptibilities it will bring a new perspective on many matters to American readers. In the political field Mr. Wilmot argues some points which will not pass unchallenged, as, for instance, that the alarming expansion of Soviet power following the war was a consequence of defective American strategy, against which Mr. Churchill struggled in vain. Mr. Churchill's prescience, if it existed as far back as Mr. Wilmot alleges, was not shared with American leaders, so far as their public records reveal.

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THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. VOLUME I. By W. N. Medlicott. London: H.M.S.O. and Longmans, 1952, 732 p. 35/. (New York: British Information Services, $8.00.)

An official history of the organization and activities of the British Ministry of Economic Warfare, up to the German attack on Russia. An important work of reference but overly sparing on generalizations.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE WAR DEPARTMENT. WASHINGTON COMMAND POST: THE OPERATIONS DIVISION. By Ray S. Cline. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951, 413 p. $3.25.

This eighth volume of the history of the army in World War II deals competently and extensively with the vitally important activities of the Operations Division of the Army General Staff. An important source book.

THE ARMY AIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II. VOLUME III: EUROPE: ARGUMENT TO V-E DAY (JANUARY 1944 TO MAY 1945). Edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 947 p. $8.50.

This third of a projected seven-volume series under the supervision of the U.S.A.F. Historical Division proceeds from the assault on the German aircraft industry up to the end of hostilities in Europe.

FORCE MULBERRY. By Commander Alfred Stanford. New York: Morrow, 1951, 240 p. $3.50.

The absorbing story of the planning and installation of the two artificial harbors supplying the Normandy invasion.

THE DAM BUSTERS. By Paul Brickhill. London: Evans, 1951, 269 p. 15/.

The history of the R.A.F.'s 617 Squadron, which smashed the Moehne and Eder Dams and then went on to other notable special bombing missions.

THE BIG SHOW. By Pierre Clostermann. New York: Random House, 1951, 242 p. $3.00.

The log-book of a French pilot in the R. A. F.

LA BATAILLE POUR NICE ET LA PROVENCE. By General A. Montagne. Montpellier: Arceaux, 1952, 161 p. Fr. 1000.

The commander of the XV Corps tells the story of the battle for Nice and Provence after the Italian attack in June 1940.

LA PASSION DE LA FLOTTE FRANÇAISE. By Albert Kammerer. Paris: Fayard, 1951, 572 p. Fr. 750.

A solid account of the catastrophes which struck the French Navy at Mers-el-Kebir and Toulon.

ERINNERUNGEN EINES SOLDATEN. By Heinz Guderian. Heidelberg (U. S. Zone): Vowinckel, 1951, 464 p.

One of the most informative of the German military memoirs. While including a good deal of rather technical information about General Guderian's specialty—the armored forces—it has much to say on the strategy and conduct of the war itself.

HITLERS TISCHGESPRÄCHE IM FÜHRERHAUPTQUARTIER 1941–42. By Henry Picker. Bonn (British Zone): Athenaeum, 1951, 463 p.

Hitler's mealtime monologues at headquarters in 1941 and 1942 as recorded by a stenographer. Edited by Gerhard Ritter, they are a verbose but useful source on the Führer's outlook at this stage of the war.

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MANSTEIN: HIS CAMPAIGNS AND HIS TRIAL. By R. T. Paget. London: Collins, 1951, 239 p. 15/.

A forceful defense of Field Marshal Erich von Manstein by his chief British counsel at the trial. Critical of the legal basis of the War Crimes Trials.

A WAR OF SHADOWS. By W. Stanley Moss. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 239 p. $3.95.

The author of "Ill Met by Moonlight" (noted here in January 1951) continues, with somewhat diminished excitement, his career as a behind-the-lines fighter—in Crete, Greece and Thailand.

THEY FOUGHT WITH WHAT THEY HAD. By Walter D. Edmonds. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1951, 532 p. $5.00.

The desperate story of the Army Air Force's unsuccessful attempt to defend the Philippines against the Japanese attack in 1941–42.

BACK TO MANDALAY. By Lowell Thomas. New York: Greystone, 1951, 320 p. $3.50.

Cartoons from "Terry and the Pirates" are appropriate illustrations for this racy account of General Wingate's war in Burma.

The United States

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS. By Samuel Lubell. New York: Harper, 1952, 285 p. $3.50.

This is an extremely stimulating analysis of the American political scene. Lubell's principal theme is that there has been a transformation in the United States from a traditional Republican majority to a normal Democratic majority. His conclusion that the key to the political situation is to be found in the "conflict among the clashing elements in the majority party" has been arrived at after extensive analysis of elections and much field work. He provides interesting insights on the impact of the maturing generation of immigrants and on the structure of isolationism.

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. By Felix Morley. New York: Knopf, 1951, 175 p. $2.50.

Essays in support of the proposition that foreign policy cannot be "nonpartisan," that it should be "a matter of household concern and sharp Congressional debate."

MASTER PLAN: U.S.A. By John Fischer. New York: Harper, 1951, 253 p. $3.00.

An intelligent effort to define and expound the Administration's foreign policy. The author's major concern is to demonstrate that there is a plan which is both consistent and comparatively stable.

MAJOR PROBLEMS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: 1951–1952. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1951, 479 p. $3.00.

This fifth volume of a useful annual series devotes a special section to the problem of collective security action under the General Assembly.

MR. PRESIDENT. By William Hillman. New York: Farrar, Straus, 1952, 253 p. $5.00.

A White House correspondent, given access to Mr. Truman's diaries, papers and correspondence, has drawn a portrait based largely on the latter's own words. Many useful sidelights on the President's personality and outlook and some new information on certain controversial events of his administration. Handsomely published; lavishly illustrated.

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THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT HOOVER. By Herbert Hoover. New York: Macmillan, 1951–52, 2 v. $9.00.

From time to time in his extended career Mr. Hoover has prepared accounts of his multitude of activities. These have been assembled for this substantial autobiography. In general his recollections of his early life were written in 1915–1916, his activities during World War I between 1920 and 1924, his years in the Cabinet and Presidency between 1933 and 1936. Further volumes are to follow.

THE PRIVATE PAPERS OF SENATOR VANDENBERG. Edited by Arthur H. Vandenberg, Jr. and Joe Alex Morris. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 599 p. $5.00.

The major theme of these well-edited papers, of course, is the late Senator's transition from isolationism to an advocacy of international coöperation. A valuable new source for our understanding of American foreign relations in the years since Pearl Harbor, the book is particularly useful in presenting the story from the point of view of a member of the legislative branch of the Government.

CHARLES EVANS HUGHES. By Merlo J. Pusey. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 2 v. $15.00.

An authoritative, carefully documented biography of a dominating figure in American public life, by a Washington editor who had the coöperation and confidence of the late Chief Justice in his years of retirement. The author's evidence of Mr. Hughes' personal warmth clearly belies the legend of the "human icicle," but he provides a critical analysis of actions and court opinions which nourished this legend throughout a long and distinguished career.

THE MARSHALL STORY. By Robert Payne. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951, 344 p. $5.00.

An unexceptional biography, which is neither official nor authoritative, by an astonishingly prolific author.

AMERICA'S RETREAT FROM VICTORY: THE STORY OF GEORGE CATLETT MARSHALL. By Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951, 187 p. $2.00.

The Senator's brief against the General, based largely on his speech in the Senate of June 14, 1951.

THE MACARTHUR I KNOW. By General George C. Kenney. New York: Duell, 1951, 264 p. $2.75.

A personal and friendly appraisal, by one of General MacArthur's associates, the commander of Allied air forces in the Southwest Pacific from 1942 to 1945.

WHAT EISENHOWER THINKS. Edited and Interpreted by Allan Taylor. New York: Crowell, 1952, 186 p. $2.75.

A collection of General Eisenhower's public statements and writings, aimed at giving a picture of his ideas on public issues, foreign and domestic.

THE FEAR OF FREEDOM. By Francis Biddle. Garden City: Doubleday, 1951, 263 p. $3.50.

The former Attorney General records in effective form his anxiety over the uncertainty and fear with which he feels this country is obsessed. The book is most disturbing in indicating how pervasive is the mood of near panic in the state and local communities.

CIVIL LIBERTIES UNDER ATTACK. By Henry Steele Commager and Others. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1951, 155 p. $3.50.

Six timely lectures by Henry Steele Commager, Robert K. Carr, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Walter Gellhorn, Curtis Bok and James P. Baxter, III.

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AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND MILITARY POWER. By Louis Smith. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, 370 p. $5.00.

A serious effort to give a comprehensive picture of the past and present American system of civil control of military power.

THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION. By Owen J. Roberts. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 102 p. $2.00.

Three lectures on Sovereignty and the Power to Tax, Conflicts of Police Power, and the Fourteenth Amendment.

THE LOBBYISTS. By Karl Schriftgiesser. Boston: Atlantic (Little, Brown), 1951, 297 p. $3.50.

While not criticizing lobbying as such—the right of petition is guaranteed in the First Amendment—Mr. Schriftgiesser has substantial and well-argued criticism for the perversion of this right through anonymous or disguised pressure groups.

OÙ VA LE PEUPLE AMÉRICAIN? By Daniel Guérin. Paris: Julliard, 1950–51, 2 v. Fr. 1170.

This two-volume critique of contemporary America has been the object of much controversy in France. Vehemently hostile to the "tyranny of Big Business," it seeks to depict the forces which will lead to a Socialist United States—labor, the poor farmers and the Negroes. To an American reader the author's categories of analysis—not Stalinist, though he has been called a dupe of the Communists—seem singularly inappropriate and lead to inaccurate and unpleasant distortions.

AMERICA AND THE MIND OF EUROPE. By Raymond Aron and Others. New York: Library Publishers, 1952, 125 p. $2.75.

Ten articles, originally appearing in *The Saturday Review*, with an introduction by Lewis Galantière, on what Europeans are thinking about the United States.

HET GROTE AMERIKAANSE DEBAT OVER DE BUITENLANDSE POLITIEK, 1939–1942. By P. G. J. Korteweg. Amsterdam: Noord-Hollandsche Uitgeversmaatschappij, 1951, 176 p.

A Dutch review of the American debate on foreign policy before Pearl Harbor.

THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL. By Eliot Janeway. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951, 382 p. $5.00.

This "chronicle of economic mobilization in World War II" (in the "Chronicles of America Series") is largely concerned with political manœuvring in Washington. The subject would seem to warrant at least one statistical table.

MANPOWER RESOURCES AND UTILIZATION. By A. J. Jaffe and Charles D. Stewart. New York: Wiley, 1951, 532 p. $6.50.

An extensive descriptive and analytic study of the United States working force, with considerable attention to the problems of methodology.

SURVEY OF UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 1950. By Gardner Patterson and Jack N. Behrman. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 310 p. $2.25.

The second volume of an experimental project in reporting the international financial policies and activities of the United States.

AMERICAN IMPERIALISM. By Victor Perlo. New York: International Publishers, 1951, 256 p. $2.75.

A former official in the U. S. Treasury recites the familiar Communist liturgy with up-to-date examples.

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CATHOLICISM AND AMERICAN FREEDOM. By James M. O'Neill. New York: Harper, 1952, 287 p. $3.50.

A defense of Roman Catholics in America, directed primarily against Paul Blanshard's books on Catholicism.

THIS AMERICAN PEOPLE. By Gerald W. Johnson. New York: Harper, 1951, 205 p. $2.75.

A pleasant and sensible essay on the roots of American democracy and its continuing powers of survival.

PUBLIC AND REPUBLIC. By Alfred de Grazia. New York: Knopf, 1951, 262 p. $5.00.

An historical study of the relation of the American representative system to the "public interest" on the one hand and to the "special values of property, locality, and intellect" on the other.

AGRICULTURAL DISCONTENT IN THE MIDDLE WEST, 1900–1939. By Theodore Saloutos and John D. Hicks. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1951, 581 p. $6.75.

A broad historical treatment of agrarian unrest in the United States from the populist movement, through the inflation of the First World War, the depression of the 1920's and 1930's, and into the relative calm of the New Deal.

THE ELLEN KNAUFF STORY. By Ellen Raphael Knauff. New York: Norton, 1952, 242 p. $3.50.

The German-born wife of an American soldier tells the story of her protracted and eventually successful efforts to gain admission to this country.

I LED 3 LIVES. By Herbert A. Philbrick. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952, 323 p. $3.50.

A more than usually balanced and untheatrical account of a man who penetrated the Communist Party in New England as a counterspy for the F.B.I.

OUT OF BONDAGE. By Elizabeth Bentley. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951, 311 p. $3.50.

Miss Bentley's story of her life in and out of the Communist Party since 1934. Little new information beyond what she has provided in previous testimony.

DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. VOLUME XII: JANUARY 1–DECEMBER 31, 1950. Edited by Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner. Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the World Peace Foundation), 1952, 702 p. $6.00.

This latest volume of a useful series has an expanded section on the development of regional security machinery.

Western Europe

THE COUNTERFEIT REVOLUTION. By Sidney Lens. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952, 272 p. $3.50.

An A. F. of L. official pursues the question why Stalinist Communism should continue to enjoy widespread support among the peoples of Western Europe despite the obvious availability of information about life beyond the Iron Curtain. The answer is seen to be in the absence of satisfying alternatives: Communism may gain "victory by default."

CINQUANTE ANS D'HISTOIRE, 1900–1950. By Lucien Genet. Paris: Tallandier, 1950–51, 3 v. Fr. 9600.

This large three-volume review of French and world history in the first half of

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the twentieth century is of interest largely because of its extensive illustrations. The text is somewhat uneven and relies heavily on quotations from contemporary articles and speeches.

LES FORCES POLITIQUES EN FRANCE. By Jacques Fauvet. Paris: *Le Monde*, 1951, 298 p. Fr. 350.

A very useful, though somewhat outdated, guided tour across the spectrum of contemporary French politics. Each section contains the author's personal observations and evaluations followed by a documented analysis of the party's strength, its social and geographic base.

PÉTAIN: PATRIOT OR TRAITOR? By Sisley Huddleston. London: Dakers, 1951, 269 p. 15/.

An English journalist, who spent the war years in France, undertakes, not altogether convincingly, to explain and defend the late Marshal's policy.

LE DRAME DE VICHY: II. FINANCES SOUS LA CONTRAINTE. By Yves Bouthillier. Paris: Plon, 1951, 552 p. Fr. 825.

This continuation of the memoirs of the former Vichy Minister of Finance (first volume reviewed here July 1951) discusses economic and financial problems faced by the régime under wartime conditions and German demands.

COMPULSORY LABOR ARBITRATION IN FRANCE, 1936–1939. By Joel Colton. New York: King's Crown Press (Columbia University), 1951, 220 p. $3.25.

A competent monograph on French efforts at industrial arbitration between the sitdown strikes of June 1936 and the war.

THE FRENCH FRANC BETWEEN THE WARS, 1919–1939. By Martin Wolfe. New York: Columbia University Press, 1951, 229 p. $3.25.

A competent study relating the vicissitudes of the franc to the broader aspects of French political life and economic policy. Emphasis on the decade after 1929.

PSYCHANALYSE DE L'ALSACE. By Frédéric Hoffet. Paris: Flammarion, 1951, 252 p. Fr. 400.

An analysis of the state of mind of Alsace: politically and sentimentally French but culturally German.

THE PURGE OF DUTCH QUISLINGS. By Henry L. Mason. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1952, 199 p.

A scholarly examination of the Dutch experience in dealing with Nazi collaborators after the Liberation. The author was a U. S. Army military intelligence officer in the Netherlands from 1944 to 1946.

DENMARK IS A LOVELY LAND. By Hudson Strode. New York: Harcourt, 1951, 304 p. $4.75.

A pleasant and informative account of Danish life and the Danish landscape by the author of similar books on Finland and Sweden.

BACKGROUND TO SWEDEN. By Terence Heywood. London: Constable, 1951, 332 p. 25/.

A well-written travel notebook; little political information, but interesting observations on Swedish society and history.

DANGER SPOT OF EUROPE. By Alan Houghton Brodrick. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 192 p. $3.75.

Shrewd though disconnected observations on recent and contemporary Germany.

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KNOW YOUR GERMANS. By Count Kurt Blücher von Wahlstatt. London: Chapman, 1951, 188 p. 12/6.

An essay on recent German history, intended as a refutation, in anticipation, of an as yet unwritten "Justice for Hitler." Not particularly substantial.

MOSCOW, TOKYO, LONDON. By Herbert von Dirksen. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1952, 276 p. $4.00.

A translation of the memoirs of the German Ambassador in Moscow 1928–33, Tokyo 1933–38, and London 1938–39 (German edition noted here October 1950).

SCHULD UND VERHAENGNIS. By Hermann Foertsch. Stuttgart (U. S. Zone): Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1951, 239 p.

This is a comprehensive account of the "Fritsch Case" and the position of the Wehrmacht in 1938. The first of a series of studies presented by the *Deutsche Institut für Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit,* of Munich.

DEUTSCHLANDS WEG NACH RAPALLO. By Wipert von Blücher. Wiesbaden (U. S. Zone): Limes, 1951, 180 p.

A modest personal account of Germany's Eastern policy between Brest-Litovsk and Rapallo, by a diplomat who was in the *Ostabteilung* of the Foreign Office.

THE SAAR: BATTLEGROUND AND PAWN. By Frank M. Russell. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 204 p. $5.00.

A study of the Saar problem since the First World War, emphasizing the years before 1935. In the author's view "nearly all of the chief forces and influences that must be taken into account today in any attempt to diagnose the Saar problem were clearly revealed during the period of the Governing Commission's rule."

IMMIGRANT'S RETURN. By Angelo M. Pellegrini. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 269 p. $3.50.

A professor of English in an American university revisits his native Tuscany. A particularly interesting personal account of the contrasts of two cultures.

THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN: AN INTERPRETATION. By Carlton J. H. Hayes. New York: Sheed, 1951, 198 p. $2.75.

In his bibliography Professor Hayes, former United States Ambassador in Madrid, classifies books on post-Civil War Spain as "Anti-Franco criticism and propaganda" and "In behalf of the Franco Régime." His study belongs to the second category.

Eastern Europe

STALIN'S SATELLITES IN EUROPE. By Ygael Gluckstein. Boston: Beacon Press, 1952, 333 p. $4.50.

A diligent and sober gathering of information about political and economic changes in Eastern Europe since the U.S.S.R. gained control. Comparatively little new information, however.

THE COMMUNIST WAR ON RELIGION. By Gary MacEoin. New York: Devin-Adair, 1951, 264 p. $3.50.

An indictment of Soviet policy toward organized religion, especially in the areas of postwar control in East Europe and the Far East.

MARX AGAINST THE PEASANT. By David Mitrany. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952, 301 p. $4.50.

The conflict between Marxist Socialism and populism in the agrarian societies of Eastern Europe. An expansion and elaboration of a theme the author developed in an essay of the same title in the 1920's.

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CINQ SEMAINES CHEZ LES HOMMES LIBRES. By Hélène Parmelin. Paris: Éditions Sociales, 1951, 285 p. Fr. 350.

A Communist propagandist makes a rapturous visit to the People's Democracies of Eastern Europe.

THE BOLSHEVIK REVOLUTION, 1917–1923. VOLUME II. By Edward Hallett Carr. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 400 p. $6.00.

This important study, the second volume of Mr. Carr's trilogy (Volume I was noted here July 1951), deals with Soviet economic policy from the seizure of power up to the inauguration of the NEP. An impressive work of organization and presentation, its subject matter lends itself particularly well—better than in the case of the first volume—to the author's technique of analysis.

MY RINGSIDE SEAT IN MOSCOW. By Nicholas Nyaradi. New York: Crowell, 1952, 307 p. $3.75.

Of books about Soviet Russia and the Iron Curtain by political exiles, these recollections by the former Hungarian Minister of Finance are among the most informative and rewarding. The principal story, told wittily and not shrilly, is of the author's mission to Moscow to negotiate on Soviet claims against his country.

DATELINE MOSCOW. By Don Dallas. London: Heinemann, 1952, 272 p. 21/.

A conscientious report on the Soviet capital between 1947 and 1950; no dramatic revelations, but a reasonable picture within the limits permitted the foreign journalist.

GESCHICHTE SOWJETRUSSLANDS: 1917–1941. By Erdmann Hanisch. Freiburg (French Zone): Herder, 1951, 305 p.

This brief and not exceptional volume concludes the author's "Geschichte Russlands." Dr. Hanisch was formerly professor of Slavic studies at the University of Breslau.

EL CAMPESINO: LIFE AND DEATH IN SOVIET RUSSIA. By Valentín Gonzalez and Julian Gorkin. New York: Putnam, 1952, 218 p. $3.50.

What happened to the Spanish Republican general after his flight to Russia; a translation of the French text noted here in January 1952.

I SPIED FOR STALIN. By Nora Murray. New York: Wilfred Funk, 1951, 256 p. $3.00.

Not much about spying, but an interesting picture of Soviet society as seen by the daughter of a high-ranking N.K.V.D. official.

THE ACCUSED. By Alexander Weissberg. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951, 518 p. $4.00.

A valuable addition to our knowledge of the great purge of 1936–39, by one of its victims, a physicist and one-time C. P. member.

SOVIET LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By V. I. Lenin and Others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 465 p. $7.50.

Representative selections and translations from the writings of Lenin, Stalin, Vyshinsky, Pashukanis and other Soviet legal philosophers.

THE SOVIET ECONOMY DURING THE PLAN ERA. By Naum Jasny. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 116 p. $2.00.

THE SOVIET PRICE SYSTEM. By Naum Jasny. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1951, 179 p. $2.00.

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SOVIET PRICES OF PRODUCERS' GOODS. By Naum Jasny. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952, 180 p. $2.00.

Three closely related essays by the author of a leading study on Soviet agriculture. As in his other work, Mr. Jasny makes an extensive critique of Soviet statistics.

L'AVENIR DE L'ASIE RUSSE. By Félix Leprince-Ringuet. Paris: Flammarion, 1951, 244 p. Fr. 480.

An engineer's survey of the economic resources of Asiatic Russia.

SOVIETS IN CENTRAL ASIA. By W. P. and Zelda K. Coates. New York: Philosophical Library, 1952, 288 p. $4.75.

A postwar journey to the Central Asian Republics of the U.S.S.R. Uncritical and propagandistic.

SUOMEN SOTA 1941–1945. III. KARJALAN KANNAKSEN VALTAUS KESÄLIÄ 1941. Helsinki: Kivi, 1951, 500 p. M. 1950.

The historical section of the Finnish General Staff was commissioned in 1944 to prepare a history of the Finnish-Russian war. The first volume to appear, volume three of a proposed seven, deals with the conquest of the Karelian Isthmus in 1941.

SUOMEN TIE RAUHAAN 1943–44. By Väinö Tanner. Helsinki: Tammi, 1952, 420 p. M. 840.

The German defeat at Stalingrad compelled Finnish diplomacy to seek a way out of the war, not an easy job considering German pressure, Soviet disinterest and the state of Finnish public opinion. Tanner, Minister of Finance and member of the foreign relations committee of the Diet, has turned in another highly significant contribution to the understanding of recent Finnish developments.

C. G. MANNERHEIM. SUOMEN MARSALKKA. By A. F. Airo and Others. Helsinki: Kivi, 1951, 336 p. M. 2250.

Biographical essays on Mannerheim, written by his associates and friends.

A HISTORY OF LATVIA. By Alfred Bilmanis. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951, 441 p. $6.00.

This book, by the late Latvian diplomat, covers the whole range of his people's history. While occasionally marred by inaccuracies and flavored with the almost inevitable irritation of the spokesman for a small state in a world of blundering or sinister Great Powers, it is a valuable contribution, especially the chapters dealing with the twentieth century.

DERNIER RAPPORT: POLITIQUE POLONAISE 1926–1939. By Colonel Joseph Beck. Neuchâtel (Switzerland): La Baconnière, 1951, 361 p. Sw. Fr. 14.50.

During his internment in Rumania, between 1939 and his death in 1944, the former Foreign Minister of Poland drafted three extensive memoranda on Polish foreign policy between the wars. Useful for their illumination of Beck's diplomatic outlook, they are now presented in a well-edited French translation.

THE KATYN WOOD MURDERS. By Joseph Mackiewicz. London: Hollis, 1951, 252 p. (New York: British Book Centre, $3.00.)

A Polish journalist reviews the evidence relating to this wartime atrocity and finds the Soviets guilty (German edition noted here, July 1951).

THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF POLAND, 1919–1950. By J. Taylor. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952, 222 p. $3.75.

A concise but well-documented study covering the inter-war years, the Nazi-Soviet occupation, and the postwar development of the planned economy.

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I LIVE AGAIN. By Ileana, Princess of Romania, Archduchess of Austria. New York: Rinehart, 1952, 374 p. $4.00.

The daughter of King Ferdinand and sister of Carol II writes her personal recollections of the 1930's and 1940's.

TITOISM AND THE COMINFORM. By Adam B. Ulam. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952, 243 p. $4.00.

A description of the great schism, based largely on material recently published in Jugoslavia and some of the satellite states.

GREECE: AMERICAN DILEMMA AND OPPORTUNITY. By L. S. Stavrianos. Chicago: Regnery, 1952, 246 p. $3.25.

A professor of history reviews political developments in Greece since the beginning of World War II. Critical of British and American Greek policy in the past, he is currently concerned with the danger that our Greek ally may prove to be "a government rather than a people."

GREEK RESISTANCE ARMY. By General Stefanos Sarafis. London: Birch Books, 1951, 324 p. 5/.

An abridged translation (the Greek text was written in 1946) of the apologia of the Greek army officer who came to be commander of ELAS. Not particularly revealing as to the author's motives or the extent to which he was a "front" for the Communists.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

IN THE BALANCE. By Winston S. Churchill. Boston: Houghton, 1952, 456 p. $5.00.

Parliamentary and other speeches in 1949 and 1950 by the then leader of His Majesty's Loyal Opposition.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN THE COMMONWEALTH. Edited by Sydney D. Bailey. London: Hansard Society, 1951, 217 p. 9/.

A symposium of articles on constitutional and parliamentary developments in the nations of the British Commonwealth.

MEMORIES OF THREE WARS. By Brigadier the Viscount Dillon. London: Wingate, 1951, 145 p. 15/.

Extracts from diaries, largely relating to the First World War, in which the late author served as liaison officer between Foch and Haig.

VENTURING TO AUSTRALIA. By Ray Dorien. London: Johnson, 1951, 246 p. 10/6.

An Englishwoman's travel record, of interest primarily for those contemplating settling in Australia.

The Middle East

STRANGE LANDS AND FRIENDLY PEOPLE. By William O. Douglas. New York: Harper, 1951, 336 p. $4.00.

Associate Supreme Court Justice Douglas' report on two journeys to the Near and Middle East in 1949 and 1950 is highly readable as a travel narrative, but its principal interest lies in his exposition of the basic problems besetting the area, the shortcomings of American attitudes and policy, and the types of social and economic measures which he sees to be required.

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SEUL À BICYCLETTE DE PARIS À SAÏGON. By Lionel Brans. Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1951, 339 p. Fr. 690.

A travel diary of 12,710 kilometers on a bicycle through Italy, the Balkans, Near and Middle East.

MY TURKISH ADVENTURE. By Pamela Burr. New York: Norton, 1951, 219 p. $3.00.

Pleasantly written observations on present-day Turkey, by a teacher at the American Girls' College in Istanbul.

THE REVOLT. By Menachem Begin. New York: Schuman, 1951, 386 p. $4.00.

The personal story of the former Commander of Irgun Zvai Leumi, obviously tendentious but valuable as a source for the phenomenon of political terrorism.

A SHORT HISTORY OF ZIONISM. By Israel Cohen. London: Muller, 1951, 280 p. 15/.

A useful if somewhat partisan review and summary.

FULFILLMENT: THE EPIC STORY OF ZIONISM. By Rufus Learsi. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1951, 426 p. $5.00.

A well-written popular history of the Zionist movement. Little new information for the specialist.

ETERNAL STRANGER. By Lawrence Resner. Garden City: Doubleday, 1951, 216 p. $3.00.

A competent journalist's account of the unpleasant position of the Jew in Moslem countries.

ARABIAN HIGHLANDS. By H. St. J. B. Philby. Ithaca: Cornell University Press (for the Middle East Institute), 1952, 771 p. $8.50.

An extensive account of two journeys, in 1932 and 1936–37, to the highlands of southwest Sa'udi Arabia.

South and Southeast Asia

ASIA AND THE WEST. By Maurice Zinkin. London: Chatto and Windus, 1951, 300 p. 15/. (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, $3.50.)

A former member of the Indian Civil Service has written a valuably specific and concrete survey of social conditions in Asia. He describes the breakdown of the old peasant economies, and notes the type of assisting measures which he believes the West should take.

THE COMMONWEALTH IN ASIA. By Sir Ivor Jennings. New York: Oxford University Press, 1951, 124 p. $2.50.

Seven lectures on society, politics and constitutional developments in India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

EASTERN EPIC. VOLUME I: SEPTEMBER 1939–MARCH 1943. DEFENCE. By Compton Mackenzie. London: Chatto and Windus, 1951, 623 p. 30/.

The first volume of an extensive history designed to record "the story of India's efforts during the war" covers the period from 1939 to March 1943. The story includes the activities of Indian forces in the various theaters—North Africa, the Near East and Southeast Asia.

INDIA'S EMERGING FOREIGN POLICIES. By Shantilal Kothari. Bombay: Vora, 1951, 219 p. Rs. 6.

While broadly in agreement with Nehru's foreign policy, the author is doubtful about the advisability of India's having remained within the Commonwealth. An all-Asian federation is suggested as the major goal.

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THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF AN UNKNOWN INDIAN. By Nirad C. Chaudhuri. New York: Macmillan, 1951, 506 p. $6.00.

Taking his autobiography as a miniature of recent Indian history, the author has drawn a bitter picture of his country. The book is dedicated "to the memory of the British Empire in India" and denies the possibility of India's restoring herself through her own traditions or efforts.

SEARCH AFTER SUNRISE. By Vera Brittain. New York: Macmillan, 1952, 270 p. $3.00.

A spiritual as well as geographical pilgrimage to the India of Tagore and Gandhi.

LETTRES D'INDOCHINE. By Guy de Chaumont Guitry. Paris: Alsatia, 1951, 222 p. Fr. 480.

Posthumously published personal letters about the war in Indo-China by a young French officer.

A DRAGON APPARENT. By Norman Lewis. New York: Scribner, 1951, 317 p. $4.50.

A well-written account of travels through French Indo-China in 1950.

The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE VOICE OF ASIA. By James A. Michener. New York: Random House, 1951, 338 p. $3.50.

A skillful journalist's report on Asia, largely based on a series of interviews from Japan and Korea to India and Pakistan.

THE SIBERIAN FIASCO. By Clarence A. Manning. New York: Library Publishers, 1952, 210 p. $3.75.

A reconsideration of the United States intervention in Siberia in 1918. In the author's view the chaos in Siberia for the first time opened "to the gaze of the Western World the Asiatic problem in nearly its full scope and range."

THE ENEMY WITHIN. By Raymond J. De Jaegher and Irene Corbally Kuhn. Garden City: Doubleday, 1952, 314 p. $3.75.

A Belgian missionary priest's story of the expansion and victory of Communist power in China after 1937; largely a catalogue of horror stories.

BRAIN-WASHING IN RED CHINA. By Edward Hunter. New York: Vanguard Press, 1951, 311 p. $3.50.

Basing his report largely on interviews with refugees in Hong Kong, the author, a foreign correspondent, presents the formidable story of totalitarian reëducation and thought control as it is being carried on in Red China.

PROFILE OF RED CHINA. By Lynn and Amos Landman. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951, 245 p. $3.00.

A husband and wife describe a two-year stay in Shanghai, from 1948 to 1950. While conscientious reporters, they appear to have fallen into a common error of those who describe newly-established Communist régimes of mistaking what is but a mild preliminary, a period of "moral persuasion," for the end product.

MAO'S CHINA: PARTY REFORM DOCUMENTS, 1942–44. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1952, 278 p. $4.50.

Leading party resolutions and policy-setting speeches by Mao Tse-tung, Ch'en Yün and Liu Shao-ch'i.

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A description, derived in part from the author's personal observations up to

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1947, of the organization of the Red Chinese Army, its strengths and weaknesses, its men and their commanders.

THE REDS TAKE A CITY. By John W. Riley, Jr., and Wilbur Schramm. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1951, 210 p. $2.75.

A summary report of an investigation made by a team of sociologists and opinion researchers during the 90 days in which the North Koreans occupied Seoul.

SHANGHAI CONSPIRACY. By Major General Charles A. Willoughby. New York: Dutton, 1952, 320 p. $3.75.

A write-up of the Soviet-directed "Sorge spy ring" by General MacArthur's Chief of Intelligence.

JAPAN. Edited by Hugh Borton. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1951, 320 p. $4.00.

A useful and competent reference work made up of articles originally written for the 1951 edition of the "Encyclopedia Americana."

THE PECULIAR WAR. By E. J. Kahn, Jr. New York: Random House, 1952, 211 p. $2.75.

Mr. Kahn's perceptive and comparatively leisurely articles on the Korean War bring out many facets and moods of this international undertaking too frequently overlooked in the press dispatches. Especially revealing are his observations on relations between the various nationalities of the U. N. Army.

MY FORTY YEAR FIGHT FOR KOREA. By Louise Yim. New York: Wyn, 1951, 313 p. $3.50.

An ardent patriot and feminist, and presently South Korean delegate to the U.N., Miss Yim writes a highly personal but illuminating account of her work on behalf of Korean independence.

THE PHILIPPINES AND THE UNITED STATES. By Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1951, 315 p. $4.00.

A competent account, by two historians, of relations since the Spanish-American War. More emphasis is placed upon the development of American policy than upon the Philippine side of the story.

Africa

THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA. By Sarah Gertrude Millin. London: Constable, 1951, 324 p. 20/.

This combination of a political history and essays on the racial question is written from a personal but well-informed point of view. To the author, South Africa's problems seem beyond solution.

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THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY. By P. S. Joshi. Bombay: Hind Kitabs, 1951, 304 p. Rs. 8/12. (New York: Heinman, $3.50.)

An Indian's discussion of the color bar in South Africa.

WEST AFRICA. By F. J. Pedler. New York: Praeger, 1951, 208 p. $2.50.

A handy discussion of the politics and economics of French and British West Africa, by a former member of the Colonial Office and the United Africa Company. In defense of empire.

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A useful review of political and economic developments by the archivist of the Ivory Coast government.

THE SULTAN OF MOROCCO. By Rom Landau. London: Hale, 1951, 108 p. 7/6.

A brief and laudatory biographical sketch, critical of French policy.

EX-ITALIAN SOMALILAND. By E. Sylvia Pankhurst. New York: Philosophical Library, 1951, 460 p. $7.50.

To some degree a historical exposition, but primarily a hot denunciation of Italian rule and the Italian trusteeship.

Latin America and the West Indies

PUBLIC FINANCE IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: EL SALVADOR—A CASE STUDY. By Henry C. Wallich, John H. Adler and Others. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951, 346 p. $6.00.

An intensive and valuable analysis, in which El Salvador is taken to illustrate the fiscal and monetary problems of an underdeveloped country moving toward a higher level of economic activity.

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A history of the foreign relations of Panama as they pertain to the development of international coöperation.

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A broad discussion of the background of the four-power Caribbean Commission, more satisfactory in its discussion of recent events than in the survey of the economic and historical roots of the area's problems.

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A former Comintern agent reveals the way the Kremlin in the 1930's undertook to apply tactics developed in China to the Communist movements in South America.

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A concise British survey of South America's "first welfare state."

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A valuable case study. Ecuador is well selected to illuminate the problems of "revolution, *caudillismo,* ineffective written constitutions" which also trouble other Latin American states. The author, formerly with the Coördinator of Latin American Affairs, is assistant professor of political science at Northwestern University.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

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